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This is the sixth volume in Palgrave Studies in Digital Business and 
Enabling Technologies, a series that aims to contribute to multi-disciplinary 
research on digital business and enabling technologies in Europe. Cloud 
computing is the computing paradigm of choice for next generation appli-
cations and is a fundamental building block in social media and the 
Internet of Things, amongst others. Much of the innovation we associate 
with digital transformation and the socio-economic benefits of a ‘Digital 
Society’ are built on cloud computing and the exchange of data between 
various actors and systems in this ecosystem. Despite the massive opportu-
nity in cloud computing, in terms of employment and GDP, Europe lags 
other major markets, both in cloud provision and adoption. This book 
focuses one of the most significant barriers to cloud computing adoption, 
trust and privacy.
Cloud computing is a rapidly evolving borderless technology, a product 
of advances in information and communications technology and globalisa-
tion. Consequently, it poses unique opportunities and challenges. 
Academics, industry, and policymakers alike have proposed a wide array of 
solutions for addressing legally certain secure and privacy-aware cloud 
computing while at the same time allowing firms fair use of data to remain 
competitive. Academic interest in and exploration of trust and privacy in 
the context of cloud computing has expanded rapidly over the last two 
decades. This book aims to provide an overview of progress in the field to 
date paying attention to key areas that are likely to be of interest to the 
cloud computing industry as well as trust and privacy experts and research-
ers. It is designed to be useful to students, researchers and practitioners 
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seeking to gain access to knowledge about cloud computing and the com-
mon issues associated with it, as well as to cloud computing experts inter-
ested in discovering fresh perspectives on one of the most commonly cited 
barriers to adoption.
To achieve this, we invited contributors from a range of disciplines and 
theoretical perspectives to highlight opportunities for insight, integration 
and further research as the field matures. Our book brings together per-
spectives from psychology, law, information systems, ethics and computer 
science to provide a reference point for current knowledge on trust and 
privacy in cloud computing and to open debate on how the field can be 
progressed in a way that is useful to practice. The book is organised into 
seven chapters:
Chapter 1 introduces cloud computing, defines trust, and explores our 
current understanding of the range of antecedents that drive trust deci-
sions with a discussion on how these might apply in the cloud context. 
This chapter also discusses some of the approaches proposed to overcome 
trust barriers to cloud computing, and outlines a framework for exploring 
assurance and accountability in the cloud.
Chapter 2 draws on the literature on trust and control to examine the 
contractual issues associated with cloud computing. The chapter discusses 
the theoretical relationships between trust, contracts and contract law, and 
outlines common terms and conditions in cloud computing contracts 
along with the issues these present. The chapter discusses how both the 
nature of cloud computing and contracts are evolving, and how trust can 
be a useful lens for developing individual vigilance and industry regulation.
Chapter 3 continues with a legal perspective considering how cloud 
computing can be regulated across jurisdictions with a specific focus on 
differences between EU and US approaches to data privacy law. The chap-
ter explores the challenges associated with regulating borderless cloud 
computing and a review of recent cases in the area of data storage and 
location.
Chapter 4 delves further into the issue of information privacy. The 
chapter outlines the range of privacy related issues that can accompany 
cloud computing and considers how theoretical developments and empiri-
cal literature from the field of Information Systems can offer insight in the 
cloud context. The chapter reviews current organisational approaches for 
enhancing privacy perceptions in the cloud, and concludes by highlighting 
some research gaps that may serve as avenues for future research.
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Chapter 5 introduces the concept of corporate social privacy and dis-
cusses responsibility for data privacy in the cloud. The chapter presents a 
conceptualisation of organisational privacy orientations that distinguishes 
between control- and justice-driven privacy behaviours to identity four 
categories of approaches. These approaches are illustrated in a framework 
by reference to the privacy behaviours of key players in the cloud comput-
ing market.
Chapter 6 provides an overview of ethics and ethical theory and its 
practical application in the context of cloud computing. In particular, the 
chapter explores ethical issues related to data ownership and data privacy, 
the provision of cloud computing services including codes of ethics and 
responsible practice, and the use of cloud computing by consumers.
Chapter 7 concludes the book with a computer science perspective on 
the issue of trustworthy cloud computing. The chapter discusses extant 
computer science research on trustworthy cloud computing through the 
lens of security and privacy, reliability, and business integrity, and discusses 
technical approaches to measuring and improving cloud trustworthiness.
This book was largely written before the onset of COVID-19, a health 
crisis that is transforming how we live, work and interact with each other. 
The day to day lives of organisations and individuals have been compro-
mised in such a way that technologies such as cloud computing are critical 
for ensuring that economies and society persists, albeit sub-optimally. 
While the benefits of cloud computing have never been more evident, so 
are the risks. Massive rapid transition to remote working introduces new 
and significant security and privacy threats and concerns. COVID-19 has 
accelerated digital transformation in ways unforeseen a year ago. Against 
this backdrop, this book provides a timely reference for considering how 
we will assure privacy and build trust in such a hyper-connected digitally 
dependent world.
Dublin, Ireland Theo Lynn
Malibu, CA  John G. Mooney
Dublin, Ireland  Lisa van der Werff
Dublin, Ireland  Grace Fox
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CHAPTER 1
Understanding Trust and Cloud Computing: 
An Integrated Framework for Assurance 
and Accountability in the Cloud
Theo Lynn, Lisa van der Werff, and Grace Fox
Abstract Trust is regularly cited as one the main barriers for increased adop-
tion of cloud computing, however conceptualisations of trust in cloud com-
puting literature can be simplistic. This chapter briefly introduces the trust 
literature including definitions and antecedents of trust. Following an over-
view of cloud computing, we discuss some of the cited barriers to trust in 
cloud computing, and proposed mechanisms for building trust in the cloud. 
We present a high-level framework for exploring assurance (trust building) 
and accountability (trust repair) in the cloud and call for a more integrated 
multi-stakeholder approach to trust research in this multi-faceted context.
T. Lynn (*) • L. van der Werff • G. Fox 
Irish Institute of Digital Business, DCU Business School,  
Dublin, Ireland
e-mail: theo.lynn@dcu.ie; lisa.vanderwerff@dcu.ie; Grace.Fox@dcu.ie
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1.1  IntroductIon
Trust. A word that, while commonly used, is a complex concept that 
means different things to different people in different contexts. Technology 
is no different. “We don’t trust the cloud” is a common phrase used to 
describe consumer or industry reluctance to adopt cloud computing. You 
will find it, or wording to the same effect, in numerous scholarly studies, 
industry surveys, and media, new and old. No matter what part of the 
economy, society, or world that you are in, you can find a report or survey 
suggesting that significant proportions of the public, businesses of all 
sizes, and the public sector do not or should not trust the cloud. Similarly, 
there are a myriad of, often conflicting, proposals and ‘solutions’ for over-
coming trust issues in cloud computing. These include greater regulation, 
increased certification, stronger security, anonymity, trust by design, pri-
vacy by design, and so on. Indeed the importance of establishing trust in 
the cloud has been highlighted time and time again both in industry and 
academic discourse, with trust heralded as a solution to ease any concerns 
related to privacy and security on the cloud.
The objective of this book is to make some progress in teasing out what 
trust means in the context of cloud computing through a variety of 
lenses—psychology, law, ethics, information systems, and computing. The 
remainder of this chapter briefly introduces the trust literature including 
definitions and antecedents of trust. Next, we provide an overview of 
cloud computing and some of the reported trust-related barriers to cloud 
adoption and proposed solutions. Finally, we present a high-level frame-
work for exploring assurance and accountability in the cloud.
1.2  trust
Trust is generally defined as a willingness to accept vulnerability based on 
positive expectations of another party (Rousseau et al. 1998). This defini-
tion has two critical elements—first, the psychological state of willingness 
to be vulnerable which represents a volitional choice or decision (van der 
Werff et  al. 2019a). Second, there are positive expectations of another 
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party, which refers to the influence of proximal antecedents or drivers of 
trust. Thus far, the trust literature has focused predominantly on a rela-
tively small subset of proximal trust antecedents known as trustworthiness 
(Baer and Colquitt 2018). Trustworthiness is an aggregate perception of 
the characteristics of another party along three sub-dimensions: ability, 
integrity, and benevolence (Mayer et al. 1995). These concepts have been 
applied within the context of technology and appear regularly in the infor-
mation systems literature (see van der Werff et al. 2018 for a review). This 
section will provide an overview of several potential antecedents of trust in 
cloud computing organised into two broad categories: knowledge based 
antecedents, including trustworthiness, and heuristic antecedents.
1.2.1  Knowledge Based Antecedents
The two aspects of trustworthiness most commonly studied in the trust in 
technology literature are ability and integrity. Ability or competence refers 
to a perception that the other party possesses the skills and knowledge to 
complete the tasks expected. This aspect of trustworthiness is readily 
applicable to perceptions of technology in terms of its performance levels 
including accuracy, capability and functionality (McKnight et  al. 2011; 
Söllner et al. 2016). That is, can this cloud service do what I need it to do 
well? Integrity generally refers to the perception that another party adheres 
to a set of principles that the trustor finds acceptable, acts honestly and 
fulfils their promises (Mayer et al. 1995; McKnight et al. 1998). In the 
technology environment, this concept has typically been translated as a 
perception of reliability and consistency in performance. For instance, will 
this cloud service do what I need it to do every time I use it? In this setting 
in particular, the conceptualisation of integrity is expanded to integrate 
aspects of predictability and the extent to which it is possible to anticipate 
the other party’s behaviour accurately (van der Werff et  al. 2018). 
Interestingly, as they are applied in the computer science literature (see 
Chap. 7), these aspects of trustworthy cloud computing are sometimes 
portrayed as an objective feature of the technology rather than a more 
subjective user’s perception of the technology as the original trust theory 
intended. This difference has particularly important implications in situa-
tions where the decision maker is not a technology expert and so subjec-
tive perceptions of trustworthiness are likely to differ significantly from 
any objective reality.
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The third aspect of trustworthiness, benevolence, has received less 
attention in the cloud computing literature. As a perception of the extent 
to which another party will act in your best interests, benevolence incor-
porates aspects of agency and motivation into calculations of trustworthi-
ness. Does the other party want to act in my best interests? At the moment, 
cloud services are not likely to act with either agency or motivation and 
benevolence perceptions have been applied in this context as a perception 
of alignment between user needs and the technology’s purpose, helpful-
ness and responsiveness (McKnight et  al. 2011; Söllner et  al. 2016). 
However, while we may have some way to go before cloud services are 
automated to the point of agency, for many users anthropomorphisation 
of technology is common and perceptions of its motives and intentions are 
likely to play a role in trust decisions (Shank and DeSanti 2018).
1.2.2  Heuristic Antecedents
The use of knowledge based cues for trust is sometimes described as trust 
based on “good reasons” or rational decision making (Lewis and Weigert 
1985, p. 970). However, a growing body of theoretical work and empiri-
cal evidence suggests that trust processes can be influenced by less rational 
antecedents and by beliefs about other related entities. The idea that such 
factors impact trust has gained traction over the last decade particularly in 
relation to trust in new or unknown other parties (e.g. Baer et al. 2018; 
Kramer and Lewicki 2010; McKnight et al. 1998) and trust in technology 
(e.g. McKnight et al. 2011). This section will briefly discuss four anteced-
ents that may have a heuristic influence on trust in cloud computing: situ-
ational normality, aesthetics, structural assurances, and relational context.
The concept of situational normality was originally introduced to the 
trust literature by McKnight et al. (1998) who proposed that feeling like 
a situation was normal, familiar or as expected could be a powerful heuris-
tic in building trust in unknown other parties. Since then, empirical evi-
dence has repeatedly demonstrated the utility of situational normality as 
an antecedent of trust in organisations (Baer et  al. 2018), e-commerce 
(Gefen 2000), recommendation agents (Komiak and Benbasat 2006) and 
software using speech (Lee 2010). The concept of situational normality is 
also readily observable in the context of cloud computing where cloud 
storage solutions integrate with other software on a user’s personal com-
puter to make the transition from personal to cloud storage as normal and 
un-noteworthy as possible.
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A second heuristic influence on trust is aesthetics. This cue for trust 
relies on the halo effect which began as a concept in the social psychology 
literature to describe how immediately observable positive attributes such 
as physical attractiveness influence perceptions of other attributes. It has 
since been applied to the trust literature and used to explain everything 
from the outcomes of elections (Todorov et al. 2005) and new employees 
trust in organisations (Baer et al. 2018) to trust in websites (Cyr et al. 
2010) and mobile commerce (Li and Yeh 2010). Regardless of the refer-
ent, the general principle of aesthetics cues is that other parties who are 
seen as aesthetically appealing are also likely to be seen as trustworthy, 
particularly in the early stages of a relationship.
Structural assurance is a cue for trust that is based less on a perception 
of the trust referent itself but more on a perception of the environment 
within which an interaction takes place. Kramer and Lewicki (2010) refer 
to this type of trust as rule based trust influenced by a perception that 
some form of checking or restraint in the environment will prevent another 
party from acting in a way that is not trustworthy. Again this concept, has 
proved useful in understanding trust in technology and evidence suggests 
that the effectiveness of regulatory and assurance systems can influence 
consumer trust in technology (e.g. Gefen and Pavlou 2006).
The final cue that has received attention in the literature also relates to 
the wider context of the trust relationship. Recent theory suggests that the 
immediate relational context plays a significant role in creating trust moti-
vation or a desire to trust another party on the basis of the social function 
of the relationship (van der Werff et al. 2019a). In essence, if a technologi-
cal artefact fulfils an important role for us in terms of depending on it to 
do something necessary, enjoying interacting with it or seeing it as being 
in line with our identity and personal values, we are more likely to trust it. 
Many relationships take place in a wider context or chain of interrelated 
parties. A growing body of evidence suggests that information about par-
ties at another level in that chain can be used as a cue for trust (De Cremer 
et al. 2018; Lipponen et al. 2020) and that trust in one party can be trans-
ferred to referents at another level (Stewart 2003). It is likely in the tech-
nology context that information regarding other parties in a chain and the 
trust this information engenders can lead to trust in other parties.
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1.3  cloud computIng
Despite its ubiquity, cloud computing, as we know it today, is a recent 
phenomenon. It is hard to relate to the idea that when a company known 
for selling books online, Amazon, launched Amazon Web Services in 
2006, it would help create a public cloud computing market worth nearly 
US$200 billion by 2019 (IDC 2019). In its most widely referenced defi-
nition, NIST define cloud computing as:
…model for enabling ubiquitous, convenient, on-demand network access to a 
shared pool of configurable computing resources (e.g., networks, servers, storage, 
applications, and services) that can be rapidly provisioned and released with 
minimal management effort or service provider interaction. This cloud model 
is composed of five essential characteristics, three service models, and four deploy-
ment models. (Mell and Grance, p. 2)
For the most part, the cloud model defined by Mell and Grance and the 
subsequent cloud reference architecture introduced by Liu et al. (2011) 
continue to be the basis of cloud computing industry. However, it would 
be wrong to say that cloud computing has not evolved. In particular, the 
emergence of the Internet of Things and Big Data, has led to the intro-
duction and increasing adoption of a new service model, Function-as-a- 
Service, and two new computing paradigms, fog computing and edge 
computing (Lynn et al. 2017; Iorga et al. 2018). While further discussion 
is beyond the scope of this chapter, it is useful to be aware of these con-
cepts and technology paradigms when considering trust and privacy issues, 
not only in this chapter but throughout the book. It is also important to 
note that these are not the only developments in cloud computing but the 
most influential at the time of writing. Table 1.1 below provides a brief 
definition of these some of the key concepts in cloud computing.
The essential characteristics of cloud computing, provide a wide range 
of benefits to businesses including increased infrastructure reliability and 
scalability (up and down), improved cashflow through reduced capital 
expenditure (CapEx) and operational expenditure (OpEx), as well provid-
ing competitive capabilities through increased agility, faster time-to- 
market, and new revenue streams (Lynn 2018). The induced effect for 
consumers is better quality of service and quality of experience, at lower or 
no financial cost. In the last two decades, advances in the coverage, speed, 
and reliability of global telecommunications networks has made the large 
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Table 1.1 Definitions of key concepts in cloud computing
Concept Cloud essential characteristics Source
On-demand 
self-service
A consumer can unilaterally provision 
computing capabilities, such as server time 
and network storage, as needed, 
automatically without requiring human 
interaction with each cloud service 
provider.
Mell and Grance (2011)
Broad network 
access
Capabilities are available over the network 
and accessed through standard mechanisms 




The cloud service provider’s computing 
resources (e.g. storage, processing power, 
network bandwidth) are pooled to serve 
multiple consumers using a multi-tenant 
model, with different physical and virtual 
resources dynamically assigned and 
reassigned according to consumer demand.
Rapid elasticity Capabilities can be elastically provisioned 
and released, to scale rapidly outward and 
inward commensurate with demand.
Measured service Cloud systems automatically control and 
optimize resource use by leveraging a 
metering capability at some level of 
abstraction appropriate to the type of service.
Cloud service models
Software as a 
Service (SaaS)
The capability provided to the consumer is 
to use the provider’s applications running 
on a cloud infrastructure and accessible by 
a client interface.
Mell and Grance (2011)
Platform as a 
Service (PaaS)
The capability provided to a consumer to 
deploy onto the cloud infrastructure 
consumer-created or acquired applications 
created using development technologies 
provided by the provider.
Mell and Grance (2011)
Infrastructure as 
a Service (IaaS)
The capability provided to the consumer to 
provision processing, storage, networks, and 
other fundamental computing resources to 
deploy and run arbitrary software.
Mell and Grance (2011)
Function as a 
Service (FaaS)
The capability provided to the consumer to 
execute lightweight, single purpose 
stateless functions that can be executed on 
demand, typically through an API, without 
consuming any resources until the point of 
execution.
Glikson et al. (2017) and 
Lynn (2018)
(continued)
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Table 1.1 (continued)
Concept Cloud essential characteristics Source
Cloud deployment models
Private cloud Cloud infrastructure is provisioned for 
exclusive use by a single organization 
comprising multiple consumers. It may be 
owned, managed, and operated by the 
organization, a third party, or some 
combination of them, and it may exist on 
or off premises.
Mell and Grance (2011)
Community 
cloud
Cloud infrastructure is provisioned for 
exclusive use by a specific community of 
consumers from organizations that have 
shared concerns. It may be owned, 
managed, and operated by one or more of 
the organizations in the community, a third 
party, or some combination of them, and it 
may exist on or off premises.
Mell and Grance (2011)
Public cloud Cloud infrastructure is provisioned for 
open use by the general public. It may be 
owned, managed, and operated by a 
business, academic, or government 
organization, or some combination of 
them. It exists on the premises of the cloud 
provider or their designated datacentre 
provider.
Mell and Grance (2011)
Hybrid cloud Cloud infrastructure is a composition of 
two or more distinct cloud infrastructures 
(private, community, or public) that remain 
unique entities, but are bound together by 
standardized or proprietary technology 
that enables data and application 
portability.
Mell and Grance (2011)
Related computing paradigms
Fog computing Fog computing is a layered model for 
enabling ubiquitous access to a shared 
continuum of scalable computing 
resources. The model facilitates the 
deployment of distributed, latency- aware 
applications and services, and consists of 
fog nodes (physical or virtual), residing 
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scale outsourcing of information systems a reality. Consequently, more 
and more organisations are migrating from on-premise infrastructure to 
the cloud to focus on their core capabilities and to exploit potential IT 
efficiencies and business agility offered by the cloud (Kim 2009).
1.4  trust BarrIers to cloud adoptIon
Cloud computing is a form of outsourcing where organisations, and 
indeed albeit at a smaller scale, consumers, outsource some or all of their 
IT infrastructure (hardware, software, networks etc.) to one or more cloud 
service providers (CSP) on a metered basis. In return for fees, the CSP 
agrees to provide access to the cloud service at agreed service levels, typi-
cally contained in a Service Level Agreement (SLA).
Like all outsourcing, the decision to adopt cloud computing involves 
organisations assuming four main risks—relational, performance, compli-
ance and regulatory, technological risks. Relational risk typically involves 
Concept Cloud essential characteristics Source
Edge computing Edge computing is the network layer 
encompassing the end devices and their 
users, to provide, for example, local 
computing capability on a sensor, metering 
or some other devices that are 
network-accessible.
Iorga et al. (2018)
Dew computing Dew computing is an on-premises 
computer software- hardware organization 
paradigm in the cloud computing 
environment where the on-premises 
computer provides functionality that is 
independent of cloud services and is also 
collaborative with cloud services.
Wang (2016)
Mist computing Mist computing is an optional lightweight 
and rudimentary form of computing power 
that resides directly within the network 
fabric at the edge of that fabric, the fog 
layer closest to the smart end-devices, using 
microcomputers and microcontrollers to 
feed into fog computing nodes and 




1 UNDERSTANDING TRUST AND CLOUD COMPUTING: AN INTEGRATED… 
10
poor cooperation and opportunistic behaviour (Das and Teng 1996). As a 
by-product of both the on-demand nature of cloud computing and domi-
nance of a relatively small number of hyperscale CSPs, standard form con-
tracts are commonplace. Only the largest customers or those customers a 
CSP considers strategic, for example governments, have room to negoti-
ate terms, or to develop a personal relationship with these providers. In 
the absence of a personal relationship, cloud computing relies largely on 
rule- or calculus-based trust, represented by these agreements. As will be 
discussed later in Chap. 2, not only do cloud computing contracts typi-
cally favour the service provider but cloud customers can find themselves 
locked-in from a technical perspective and dependent on the CSP for busi-
ness continuity with important implications for trust.
Historically, performance risk has been the primary concern with cloud 
computing as evidenced by the focus of industry and scholars on service 
levels and SLAs. Clearly, availability and access are critical if one outsources 
IT infrastructure to the cloud. This is often further complicated by uncer-
tainty related to the functioning of the cloud services, transparency on 
how service levels are calculated and of the underlying cloud systems and 
associated system data, and exceptions included in cloud contracts. Again, 
given the disparity in dependence and impact in the vendor-customer rela-
tionship, the risk of failure is significantly higher on the part of the 
customer.
The third risk, compliance and regulatory risk is where a customer fails 
to adhere to regulatory standards due to the provider’s errors (Anderson 
et al. 2014). Increasingly but not exclusively, the primary barriers to cloud 
adoption, by organisations and consumers alike, relate to data, and more 
specifically the location, integrity, portability, security and privacy of data 
(Lynn et al. 2014; Leimbach et al. 2014; Eurostat 2016). Cloud comput-
ing is a largely location-independent technology and is built on a chain of 
service provision which is largely opaque to the customer. Data may be 
stored, processed, and transported across borders, and/or come in to con-
tact with a wide range of partners, without the knowledge of the cus-
tomer. Furthermore, CSPs, no matter what size are not immune from 
security vulnerabilities. Each service model, deployment model, and archi-
tecture, and combination and configuration thereof has its own discrete 
set of security issues. For SaaS models alone, Subashini and Kavitha (2011) 
identify 14 security elements that need to be considered independently of 
the PaaS and IaaS infrastructure upon which these are situated. At and 
within each layer, different parties may be responsible and accountable for 
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the security of different elements. This is particularly pertinent in the con-
text of data protection laws, such as the General Data Protection Regulation 
(GDPR), where misuse or mismanagement of data can result in significant 
fines and penalties, independent of the loss of reputation, and potential 
loss of corporate value associated with data and other security breaches 
(Goel and Shawky 2009).
Against this backdrop and in the absence of a personal relationship or 
knowledge, prospective customers and users of the cloud are faced with a 
relatively stark choice: To stay or go. The former involves assuming the 
risk laid out, relying on the contracts provided, and the competence, 
benevolence, and integrity of the CSP, while mitigating risks by other 
means, if possible or desirable. The alternative is to forego the benefits of 
the cloud altogether.
1.5  exIstIng approaches to overcomIng trust 
BarrIers to cloud adoptIon
In addition to contracts, a variety of trust-building mechanisms have been 
proposed by policymakers, industry, and scholars. These include regula-
tion, standardization, certification, communication, and technological 
innovation. For over a decade, the European Commission has sought to 
mitigate the impact of the risks outlined above through the activities lead-
ing to and from the 2012 European Cloud Strategy (European Commission 
2012) and subsequent initiatives including the new European digital strat-
egy, Shaping Europe’s Digital Future (European Commission 2020). In 
addition to the GDPR, consumer protection regulations are in place to 
protect them from behaviour and contracts prejudicial to their consumer 
rights (see Chap. 2). Similarly, there have been numerous efforts to sup-
port standards not only for cloud system interoperability and data porta-
bility, but also for SLAs (see for example C-SIG-SLA 2014), however 
these are not mandatory. More recently, there has been a renewed focus 
on certification as a means of assurance.
Assurance involves expert practitioners evaluating an CSP against 
agreed criteria to improve the degree of confidence of intended users. In 
effect, this involves a cloud service provider redesigning their security and 
management processes to meet the requirements of a certification scheme, 
and then being audited by an independent third party to assess compliance 
periodically (Tecnalia 2016). This approach provides an opportunity for 
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rule-based trust to develop and, in situations where the providers of the 
certification are trusted, the potential for trust transfer to occur. In a 
report for the European Commission published in 2018, Tecnalia identi-
fied over 20 such schemes, the most popular being compliance with ISO 
27001; others included CSA Star, PCI-DSS, ENISA-CCM and the SOC 
(ISAE-3402) (Tecnalia 2016). A major limitation of the certification 
approach is the timeliness and the depth of the audit. In-depth audits may 
only take place every three years with light-touch reviews annually. 
Similarly, given the complexity of cloud computing, the level of detail that 
a certification or an auditor can go to is limited.
Three common methods are used to communicate trust in CSPs—
website design, feedback mechanisms, and third party endorsements 
(Lynn et al. 2016). There is a substantial body of literature on the direct 
and indirect impact of visual website appearance on trust including colour 
choice and design symmetry which represent powerful heuristic cues for 
trust. However, aesthetic preferences in website design tend to vary across 
demographic characteristics and thus may have limited practical utility for 
CSPs trying to communicate trust (Cyr et al. 2010; Tuch et al. 2010). 
Feedback mechanisms or reputation systems are an increasingly popular 
alternative mechanism for communicating trust. As cloud and API mar-
ketplaces have emerged, such as Salesforce AppExchange, Microsoft Azure 
Marketplace and RapidAPI, so too have market-driven feedback systems 
within these marketplaces. Ratings, reviews, and vendor ecosystem status 
all act as a signal to consumers that the vendor has an incentive to behave 
in an appropriate manner and that they have been informally certified by 
previous consumers (Pavlou and Gefen 2004). Again, these mechanisms 
are likely to impact trust by providing a level of structural assurance and 
cues regarding the rules governing trustworthy behaviour. Independently 
of the cloud sector, a plethora of general reputation and review systems, 
such as Feefo and Trust Pilot, have emerged in recent years that seek to 
provide prospective customers, both business-to-business (B2B) and 
business- to-consumer (B2C), with similar signals on an independent basis 
by aggregating ratings, surveys and reviews (Banerjee et  al. 2020). 
Increasingly, these are integrated not only in to a vendor’s website but 
into search engine ranking algorithms, providing additional incentives for 
vendors to behave. Notwithstanding their widespread and increasing use, 
feedback and reputation systems have been criticised for their vulnerability 
to false, manipulated or biased feedback (Sabater and Sierra 2005).
 T. LYNN ET AL.
13
A third approach to communicating trust in CSPs involves the use of 
assurance seals or trustmarks that combine certification and communica-
tion to dispel consumer concerns about risk and communicate adherence 
with best practice, a code of conduct, or certification scheme using a third- 
party mark or symbol (Aiken and Boush 2006). Like certification, trust-
mark holders are typically subject to periodic third party verification. 
However, in addition to recognition and lack of information depth, trust-
marks suffer from the same limitations as certification in general. They have 
been criticised for reliance on human intervention, limited scope, timeli-
ness, lacking warranties, and subject to co-optation risk (Aiken et al. 2003).
Technological innovation to build trust in cloud computing largely 
revolves around designing clouds that meet the three pillars of trustwor-
thy computing—security and privacy, reliability, and business integrity 
(Mundie et al. 2002). Chapter 7 discusses this topic in detail. It is impor-
tant to note, however, that technical innovation in trustworthy computing 
overwhelmingly focuses on the first two pillars, security and privacy, and 
reliability. Research on the former focuses on the provision of effective 
attack resilient systems, typically using encryption techniques of increasing 
strength and complexity. Reliability research focuses on the design, moni-
toring, and measurement of highly reliable systems. Both domains are 
largely hidden from end-users. Business integrity is more nuanced and 
suffers from a lack of inter-disciplinary research. As such, it focuses largely 
on monitoring key service level metrics and ranking services based on this 
data. One of the main limitations of purely technological approaches, is 
that by and large, customers are human. Their decisions to trust are based 
on a vast array of conscious and subconscious signals that are often forgot-
ten about in purely technological approaches and solutions.
In attempt to address this gap and marry the various approaches to 
mitigating trust issues in cloud computing, we have previously proposed 
an active dynamic online trust label (Lynn et al. 2014; Lynn et al. 2016; 
Emeakaroha et al. 2016; van der Werff et al. 2019b). Inspired by nutri-
tional labels, these labels present consumers with corporate information, 
policies, and historic and near real-time service level metrics based on data 
from CSP monitoring systems (Emeakaroha et al. 2016). The system can 
allow for third party independent certification and could allow for corpo-
rate attestation using digital signatures. Based on an experimental study 
with 227 business decision makers, the proposed cloud trust label com-
municated trustworthiness effectively (van der Werff et al. 2019b). While 
these results are promising, such a system requires widespread support to 
be effective. Until then, it remains an academic exercise.
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1.6  assurance and accountaBIlIty Framework
In general, mechanisms to build trust in cloud computing fall in to two 
main categories—assurance and accountability. Standards, certification, 
and communication strategies seek to assure the consumers by providing 
cues of CSP competence, integrity, and benevolence, and to some extent 
consistency. Regulation and contractual mechanisms seek to hold CSPs 
accountable in the event of a trust violation. A key problem is that these 
initiatives are currently highly fragmented, with multiple initiatives by as 
many stakeholders, but no particular comprehensive, coordinated, and 
holistic framework of activity that provides direction for policy makers, 
users, cloud service providers, and indeed researchers.
Figure 1.1 below presents an integrated multi-stakeholder framework 
for assurance and accountability for cloud-based trust building. It extends 
the chain of accountability concept first proposed by Pearson and 
Wainwright (2013) to provide transparency and clarity on liability in the 
event of a data breach in the cloud. While Pearson and Wainwright (2013) 
envisaged a set of mechanisms for mitigating risk (preventative controls), 
monitoring and identifying risk and policy violations (detective controls), 
and providing redress (corrective controls), their approach is largely built 
on calculative trust-based model whereby accountability is both quantita-
tive and absolute. The goal is to eliminate distrust or mitigate the negative 
impact of a trust violation. In effect, it is an ab initio pre-emptive trust 
repair approach.
In contrast, we propose, a more positive approach couched in theories 
of trust building and repair. The focus is on trust building mechanisms; 
trust repair mechanisms only initiate when a trust violation occurs. Based 
on our work in Lynn et  al. (2014), we suggest that cloud consumers 
should have control of their data, how it is used, where it is used, and who 
should use it, and this should be auditable by all involved. They should 
have a say, if they want it, but as a default standard declarations should be 
weighed towards the best interests of the consumer, and neither prejudi-
cial to consumer rights, nor contrary to government policy. As such, we 
propose that in addition to preventative controls, there are declarative 
controls where all parties can declare their policies and expectations irre-
spective of contracts or policies which seek to circumvent local laws and 
regulation. Furthermore, there are confirmative controls that report and 
alert stakeholders that these policies and expectations are being met. In 
this way, trust is not only being built on the basis on rules and transac-
tions, but proactive mechanisms are in place so that knowledge-based 
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trust is being built between all stakeholders. These two assurance based 
controls are necessities. Accountability mechanisms are contingent; they 
only come in to effect when a trust violation occurs. Furthermore, when 
initiated, these mechanisms are not mere objective features of the system 
but recognise the psychological impact of trust violation and largely follow 
accepted theory for repairing trust including immediate response, diagno-
sis, intervention performance, and evaluation (Gillespie and Dietz 2009). 
Specifically, the framework includes actions that are effective for repairing 
violations of different types of trust, whether competence-, benevolence- 
or integrity-based. The framework is technology-agnostic and in this way, 
can not only accommodate technological solutions to building and repair-
ing trust, but new use cases and evolutions of cloud computing including 
the Internet of Things.
By recognising that policymakers and regulators, users and providers, 
have different priorities and perceptions of what trust means in the context 
of cloud computing, all stakeholders start on the basis of building trust 
rather than waiting for that trust to be violated. Ultimately, this should 
lead to greater understanding of the needs of different stakeholders, lon-
ger and deeper relationships, and innovation so that when a violation does 
occur, and it will, the relationship will be strong enough to survive.
1.7  conclusIons
This chapter introduces trust, cloud computing, and discusses some of the 
issues that present challenges to building trust in cloud computing, and 
wider and deeper adoption thereof. While there has been extensive work 
done to mitigate relational, performance, and compliance and regulatory 
risks, these initiatives are highly fragmented and lack cohesion. They are 
based on a conceptualisation of trust portrayed as an objective feature of 
cloud computing technology rather than either policymaker or user per-
ceptions of trust. We suggest that all stakeholders in the cloud computing 
ecosystem need to come together and focus on how to build trust rather 
than focusing on what to do when there is a violation of trust, a reposition 
to assurance first, then accountability only when needed. To this end, we 
reiterate the need for an integrated multi-stakeholder approach to assur-
ance and accountability, and related inter-disciplinary research to support 
the adoption of such approaches.
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CHAPTER 2
Dear Cloud, I Think We Have Trust Issues: 
Cloud Computing Contracts and Trust
Theo Lynn
Abstract Cloud computing is the dominant paradigm in modern com-
puting, used by billions of Internet users worldwide. It is a market domi-
nated by a small number of hyperscale cloud service providers. The 
overwhelming majority of cloud customers agree to standard form click- 
wrap contracts, with no opportunity to negotiate specific terms and condi-
tions. Few cloud customers read the contracts that they agree to. It is clear 
that contracts in cloud computing are primarily an instrument of control 
benefiting one side, the cloud service provider. This chapter provides an 
introduction to the relationship between psychological trust, contracts 
and contract law. It also offers an overview of the key contract law issues 
that arise in cloud computing and introduces some emerging paradigms in 
cloud computing and contracts.
Keywords Contract law • Terms of service • Cloud computing 
• Cloud contracts • Trust
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Since the 1990s, outsourcing information systems has been a staple of 
business strategists. They argue that firms should focus on their core com-
petencies and outsource all other activities to optimise resource allocation 
(Lambert and Peppard 2013). The emergence of what the International 
Data Corporation (IDC 2013) term the ‘Third IT Platform’ comprising 
cloud computing, social media, mobile and big data/analytics technolo-
gies has accelerated the outsourcing of critical information systems.
Cloud computing has emerged as the dominant computing paradigm 
of the twenty-first century. It is defined as a “a model for enabling ubiqui-
tous, convenient, on-demand network access to a shared pool of configu-
rable computing resources that can be rapidly provisioned and released 
with minimal management effort or service provider interaction” (Mell 
and Grance 2011, p.  2). Enterprise cloud IT expenditure consistently 
exceeds non-cloud expenditure for enterprises of all sizes (IDC 2020). 
Despite the ubiquity of cloud computing, a small number of hyperscale 
cloud service providers (CSPs) dominate the public cloud market. In 
2018, five companies accounted for nearly 77% of the global Infrastructure-
as-a- Service (IaaS) market—Amazon, Alibaba, Google, IBM, and 
Microsoft (Gartner 2019). As cloud computing is the basis of the Internet, 
including most social networking sites, search engines, and mobile appli-
cations, over 3.6 billion Internet users rely on cloud computing for one or 
more services. For firms, the benefits of increased IT efficiencies, agility, 
and scalability (both up and down) must be weighed against the risks that 
these technologies pose to firm performance, relationships, and compli-
ance (Lynn and Rosati 2017). Similarly, for individuals, they must weigh 
up the utility of the functionality they receive from the applications that 
they subscribe to, and the risk to their data privacy.
For the most part, cloud computing contracts are standard form and 
click-wrap in nature, with only the largest corporate and government cus-
tomers in a position to negotiate tailored terms and conditions (Bradshaw 
et  al. 2013). As part of this click-wrap procedure and before payment, 
prospective clients are typically presented with either (1) a scrollable agree-
ment, or (2) a link to a webpage or downloadable agreement, based on 
the specific cloud service and configuration that they have selected. They 
are encouraged to review the text of the agreement, and asked to com-
municate assent to the terms and conditions by clicking on an interactive 
‘I agree’ button. For the overwhelming majority of CSP clients, these 
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click-wrap contracts are standardised wholly electronic contracts giving 
the clients little or no opportunity to negotiate specific terms and condi-
tions. As such, the vast majority of cloud customers need to balance the 
tension of the advantages of the cloud against the disadvantages of boiler-
plate terms and conditions designed by global firms with legal resources 
several orders of magnitude greater than even the largest law firms, as well 
as the perceived and actual loss of control. In the absence of alternatives, 
cloud customers may feel that they have no choice but to rely on these 
contracts to eliminate distrust or mitigate the negative impact of a trust 
violation, in effect a form of what Lewicki et al. (2006) refer to as calcula-
tive trust. Similarly, they may simply agree to the terms and conditions as 
an anxiety avoidance mechanism (Weber et al. 2004; van der Werff et al. 
2019). Either way, a trust issue arises.
This chapter provides an overview of common terms and conditions in 
general form cloud computing click-wrap contracts. To avoid repetition, 
we assume the general definitions of trust and cloud computing presented 
in Chap. 1. The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows. Following 
a brief discussion on the theoretical relationship between trust, contracts 
and contract law, the structure of cloud computing contracts is intro-
duced. This is followed by an overview and discussion of the key terms and 
conditions in cloud computing contracts and the issues that these present. 
Then, we discuss briefly how the nature of cloud computing and contracts 
are evolving before concluding with a brief discussion of the trust implica-
tions resulting from these issues.
2.2  trust, contracts and contract Law
Trust and distrust are inextricably linked to the moral and legal underpin-
nings of Anglo-American contract law. The purpose of this chapter is not 
to justify trust as a theoretical building block of contract law but rather 
outline contractual issues in cloud computing and how these might impact 
trust in cloud computing and CSPs. However, understanding the relation-
ship between trust, contracts and contract law, even at a high level, may 
provide insights in to the role of cloud computing contracts play in the 
relationship between CSPs and their clients. At the core of a contract is a 
promise where “a person invites another to trust, and to break a promise 
is to abuse that trust” (Bellia Jr 2002, p. 25). But, what is the nature of 
this trust? And what is the relationship between trust, contracts, and con-
tract law?
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As discussed in Chap. 1, psychologists suggest that when we trust 
someone, we accept vulnerability based on positive expectations of the 
future behaviour of that party (Rousseau et  al. 1998). Inherent in this 
trust, is the assumption that the other party (1) possesses the necessary 
skills and capabilities to deliver on the promise (ability); (2) has the trus-
tor’s interests at heart (benevolence); and (3) will adhere to a set of mutu-
ally acceptable principles for behaviour (integrity) (Mayer et al. 1995).
Kimel (2001) suggests that while promises draw on the same reliance 
and expectation of fulfilment that exists in personal trust, contracts are 
different than promises and exist outside of the framework of personal 
relationships. He argues that contracts, in fact, undermine the concept of 
psychological trust and human relationships and, in effect, exist as a sub-
stitute to trust (Kimel 2001). In contrast, Bellia Jr (2002) argues that the 
intrinsic value of a promise, regardless of enforceability, does not lie in its 
capacity to reinforce trust relationships but rather in the knowledge that 
certain promises need to be enforced. Similarly, Lumineau (2017) posits 
that a lack of trust does not necessarily signify distrust, and indeed argues 
that both trust and distrust can result in positive and negative outcomes.
Legal theorists use similar constructs to argue why the law should 
enforce a contract. Trust is conceptualised in a number of different ways 
in contract law theory. For example, autonomy theory argues that the 
enforcement threat in contract law exists to enhance the freedom of the 
promisor and respects the trust of the promise, while welfare-economic 
theorists argue it exists to maximise individual or social well-being (Bellia 
Jr 2002). In reality, contract law exists to perform a variety of trust-related 
functions including enabling parties to make and enforce a promise, avoid 
conflicts, and regulate coordination and cooperation between them (Bellia 
Jr 2002).
2.3  the Form oF GeneraL cLoud 
computInG contracts
The contractual relationship between CSPs, their clients, and crucially 
their clients’ end users, are typically set out in a standard form click-wrap 
contract comprising the following four components:
• Terms of Service (TOS)—the TOS set out the provisions that define 
and regulate the overall relationship between a CSP and the client.
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• Service Level Agreement (SLA)—the SLA details the level of service 
to be provided, often in the form of specific quality of service (QoS) 
metrics, and the mechanisms for auditing service delivery and QoS, 
and compensating clients for underperformance.
• Acceptable Use Policy (AUP)—sometimes called a ‘fair use policy’, 
the AUP is a policy to protect CSPs from the actions of clients, and 
in the case of enterprise clients, their end users, by detailing prohib-
ited uses of the contracted cloud service.
• Privacy Policy—this details the CSP’s policy for handling and pro-
tecting personal data, in line with data protection law requirements.
Click-wrap contracts are part of a common cloud service subscription 
procedure made over the Internet. As part of this procedure and before 
payment, prospective clients are typically presented with either (1) a scrol-
lable agreement, or (2) a link to a webpage or downloadable agreement, 
based on the specific cloud service and configuration that they have 
selected. They are encouraged to review the text of the agreement, and 
asked to communicate assent to the terms and conditions by clicking on 
an interactive ‘I agree’ button. For the overwhelming majority of CSP 
clients, these click-wrap contracts are standardised wholly electronic con-
tracts giving the clients little or no opportunity to negotiate specific terms 
and conditions. Bradshaw et  al. (2013) notes three distinctions within 
cloud computing contracts—(1) free vs paid services, (2) US v EU juris-
dictions, and (3) IaaS v Software-as-a-Service (SaaS). First, they note that 
some terms and conditions for paid services are more likely to be open to 
negotiation depending on the bargaining power of the prospective client 
e.g. large multinational corporations or Governments. In these cases, 
depending on the standing of the CSP in the market or the specific seg-
ment, there may be a relationship of interdependence rather than depen-
dence (McKnight et al. 2002). This is particularly evident cloud application 
and API marketplaces (Paulsson et al. 2020). Second, contracts offered 
under US law have more extensive disclaimers of warranty and limitations 
of liability than those offered under European Union (EU) law (Bradshaw 
et  al. 2013). Thirdly, terms and conditions offered by IaaS providers 
would seem to be more similar than those offered by SaaS providers 
(Bradshaw et al. 2013).
In contract law, the so-called ‘informed minority’ hypothesis has been 
used to justify the avoidance of regulation of standard form contracts 
(Bakos et  al. 2014). This hypothesis posits that there is generally a 
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significant number of informed consumers in any given market to make an 
informed decision on the terms of a standard-form contract, and that 
while a substantial number, if not the majority, of consumers may remain 
uninformed, the former is of significant size to discipline abuse by the 
market (Schwartz and Wilde 1978). Extant research has found that 
Internet users consistently do not read such click-wrap contracts. For 
example, Bakos et al. (2014) found only 0.2% shoppers access a product’s 
end-user license agreement for at least one second. As mentioned earlier, 
this may be due to a combination of dependency and anxiety avoidance on 
behalf of the cloud consumer (Weber et  al. 2004; van der Werff et  al. 
2019). To counter this, policymakers have sought to mandate both disclo-
sure of terms and conditions, and acceptance (van der Wees et al. 2014). 
Notwithstanding this, research suggests accessibility and mandatory 
acceptance do not result in significant increases in reading click-wrap con-
tracts, and even those who have read the contracts, do not change their 
decision or behaviour (Marotta-Wurgler 2012). While there is a paucity of 
similar research on firm behaviour with regards to click-wrap contracts, it 
is likely to be similar, particularly for smaller organisations. The reality is 
accepting click-wrap contracts has become a habitual and an inevitable 
part of cloud computing. By not reading the terms and conditions of these 
click-wrap agreements, there is no incentive for CSPs to provide anything 
more than the minimum legal requirements. As such, most cloud con-
tracts are extremely one-sided (Bradshaw et al. 2013) and would not seem 
to be subject to the informed minority rule (Schwartz and Wilde 1978).
The enforceability of electronic click-wrap agreements has been upheld 
by courts worldwide for both business-to-consumer and business-to- 
business transactions, and for paid and free services, tending towards sup-
porting the position of the service provider (see for example, Rudder v 
Microsoft Corp, Caspi v Microsoft Network, and El Majdoub v CarsOnTheWeb.
Deutschland GmbH). The main arguments are both freedom of contract 
arguments i.e. that clients have the opportunity to make themselves famil-
iar with the terms and conditions and that they provide consent, and eco-
nomic arguments i.e. rendering click-wrap contracts ineffectual, even 




2.4  common chaLLenGes and Issues In GeneraL 
cLoud computInG contracts
2.4.1  Choice of Law
By definition, cloud computing is a distributed model. Data can be, and 
most likely will be, stored and processed across multiple data centres, 
potentially in different jurisdictions, and even where stored and processed 
in one jurisdiction, may be transferred across borders and accessed in dif-
ferent jurisdictions. It is possible that the provider and the end user are 
unaware of where the data is processed. For enterprise clients, the TOS 
increasingly allow data residency in a specific region; a region may be a 
country or a larger area such as the European Union. While consumer 
cloud users may not have that choice, with the transposition of the General 
Data Protection Regulation (Directive 95/46/EC) (GDPR), CSPs typi-
cally store European data within the EU for compliance reasons. 
Notwithstanding this, a recent survey of 322 cloud TOS and privacy poli-
cies, suggested that 267 CSPs indicated that the US was the preferred 
jurisdiction, and specifically Californian law (Martic 2017).
Chapter 3 will discuss jurisdictional issues in greater detail, however it is 
important to highlight that choice of law can favour one side or the other 
in a cloud contract. For example, EU law does not allow the exclusion or 
limitation of liability to the same extent that US law might, and similarly 
the GDPR introduces significant responsibilities and penalties on data con-
trollers and processors. Courts will consider a number of factors when 
deciding on the actual jurisdiction for a cloud contract including: (1) the 
choice of law in the TOS; (2) the nature and quality of the CSP’s commer-
cial activity in the jurisdiction; (3) whether the CSP is actively aware that 
they are making sales to client resident in a particular jurisdiction; (4) the 
jurisdiction that clients are resident or domiciled in; (5) the location where 
the cloud service is consumed; (6) the location whether the data is stored 
and processed; (7) the location of the CSP’s offices; and (8) whether the 
CSP markets or solicits business in a given jurisdiction. If the answer to one 
or more of these questions is affirmative, a court may enforce jurisdiction.
In Europe, CSPs and enterprise clients often seek to use and rely on 
standard contract clauses, so-called EU model clauses, to manage data 
transfer outside the EU.  However the applicability of these have been 
challenged in the recent case of Data Protection Commissioner v Facebook 
Ireland (Schrems II). The judgment for this case was delivered in July 
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2020 with the CJEU largely following the advice of the Advocate General 
i.e. that model clauses should not be invalidated and that reliance on such 
clauses requires firms undertake additional measures to assure compliance. 
However, the CJEU, somewhat unexpectantly, decided to examine and 
rule the EU-U.S. Privacy Shield framework invalid thus requiring organ-
isations relying on this mechanism to urgently consider and put in place 
alternatives.
2.4.2  Service Level Agreements and Limitation of Liability
The SLA outlines the CSP’s commitments on availability, reliability, and 
performance levels for the specific cloud service contracted. These are 
typically presented as quantifiable targets for the standard of service, how 
such targets are calculated, mechanisms for auditing service delivery, and 
the level and procedure for compensation in the event of under- 
performance (Leimbach et al. 2014). The exclusions in SLAs can be quite 
broad and typically include an amount of scheduled downtime per annum 
(e.g. for maintenance) but also factors outside of the CSP’s immediate 
control. Again, these are rarely negotiable on the grounds that the tradi-
tional cloud computing business model is based on multi-tenancy and 
commoditisation; negotiation is only available for those with significant 
bargaining power (Weber and Staiger 2014; Hon et al. 2012).
CSPs, reflecting a general practice in the wider IT industry, attempt to 
minimise their liability for any loss—direct, indirect, or consequential—
that may arise from the provision of the service. In cloud computing, 
indemnities and liabilities are usually related to privacy and security 
breaches and resulting data loss, data misuse and associated regulatory 
penalties, but may also include service interruptions or outages, or other-
wise failing to meet agreed service levels (Hon and Millard 2018; Leimbach 
et al. 2014; Bradshaw et al. 2013). It should be noted that CSPs, typically 
attempt to compensate, where possible, for underperformance through 
service credits. Obviously, this goes to the heart of trust, particularly where 
critical systems have been outsourced to a CSP. Trust literature suggests 
that trust repair is more effective when complemented with substantive 
actions including admission of fault and penance signals (Bachmann et al. 
2015). However, in practice, it may be more nuanced. Where a cloud 
service is unavailable and business is adversely impacted, service credits for 
the same service are unlikely to be desirable or adequate compensation. 
Furthermore, CSPs will often seek to exclude a wide range of 
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under- performance and impose limitations on how service credits can be 
used (Bradshaw et al. 2011).
As discussed above, CSPs may try to achieve such limitations on their 
liability by specifying a preferential jurisdiction in the TOS. For example, 
US courts have enforced such limitations on liability for click-wrap agree-
ments (see, for example, Treiber & Straub, Inc. v. United Parcel Service, 
Inc.). Given that the research referred to above suggests that consumers 
are not aware of the detail of the contracts they are agreeing to, and if they 
were, for the most part would still proceed, authors have suggested that 
the US courts should rejuvenate the doctrine of unconscionability to help 
cloud clients avoid waiving important legal rights (Calloway 2012). 
Notwithstanding this, EU law provides some protection against the exclu-
sion of liability (see GB Gas Holding v Accenture). For individual consum-
ers, the EU Unfair Terms Directive (Directive 93/13/EC) requires that 
contracts must be drafted in such a way to prevent the imposition of terms 
prejudicial to consumer rights. It introduces the notion of "good faith" in 
order to prevent significant imbalances in the dealing of consumers and 
suppliers. Article 5 of the Directive requires contract terms be drafted in 
plain and intelligible language and states that ambiguities will be inter-
preted in favour of consumers. Similarly, the EU Consumer Rights 
Directive (Directive 2011/83/EU) highlights the requirement for suppli-
ers to provide specific information in a “clear and comprehensible man-
ner.” It also provides formal requirements and withdrawal rights for 
distance contracts. In 2022, new protections for consumers will be intro-
duced as part of the Digital Content Directive (Directive 2019/770/EU) 
when they purchase digital services or digital content, or particularly rel-
evant in the case of cloud services, when they exchange personal data that 
goes beyond the minimum necessary to provide the service. As a final 
comment, in Europe, data protection is a fundamental right set out in 
Article 8 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. Article 82 of the 
GDPR provides for compensation for persons suffering damage due to 
unlawful processing or of an act incompatible with national data protec-
tion law.
2.4.3  Acceptable Use Policies
AUPs are typically incorporated or referenced in the TOS, and are used by 
CSPs, nominally, to protect themselves in the event of misconduct by their 
client, and their clients’ end users. In effect, AUPs set out a largely homog-
enous list of prohibited activities and behaviours and the consequences for 
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misuse (O’Byrne 2019; Bradshaw et  al. 2011). Common categories of 
prohibited activities include:
 1. activities that engage in, foster, solicit or promote illegal, abusive or 
irresponsible behaviour e.g. fraud, hacking, hosting and distributing 
viruses, or abusive, offensive or morally repugnant content e.g. child 
pornography, excessive violence, hate speech etc.;
 2. high risk use where the failure or fault of the cloud service could 
result in death or serious bodily or to physical or environmental 
damage e.g. use in air transportation, nuclear or chemical facilities;
 3. non-consensual e-mail, advertising, tracking or other uses of per-
sonal data e.g. using cloud services to spam third parties with email 
or advertising; and
 4. abusive or offensive behaviour towards a member of the CSP staff.
This is not an exhaustive list, yet one can see that many of these activi-
ties could preclude perfectly legal activities, e.g. healthcare, and many 
involve a judgment by the CSP, the basis of which is typically unclear. 
AUPs are often neglected by clients yet can result in suspension or termi-
nation of end user accounts or indeed the client’s overarching agreement. 
Furthermore, CSPs often retain the right to vary the terms of the AUP 
independently of the main TOS. For enterprise clients, aligning their AUP 
and their CSP’s AUP is critical, otherwise an end user may have an account 
terminated by the CSP while the enterprise client is still accountable for 
delivering the service (Hon et al. 2012). Ideally, enterprise clients should 
negotiate a process that may be more appropriate for their needs, e.g. that 
they, the enterprise client, should inform their end users of AUPs, end user 
account suspensions, or terminations. Hon et al. (2012) note that such 
negotiations would seem to be the exception rather than the rule.
2.4.4  Data Protection and Privacy Policies
Issues relating to data protection and privacy can be found in the TOS, 
SLA, AUP and, of course, the privacy policy. It is worth noting that the 
privacy policy often primarily relates to CSP collection and use of 
personally- identifiable data. Chapters 3, 4, and 5 discuss data protection 
and privacy in much greater detail, however three contractual aspects are 
worthy of note, namely data protection, data integrity and data availability.
CSPs are required to comply with data protection regulations. Under 
the GDPR, CSPs are typically “data processors” but may be “data 
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controllers” in their own right; similarly, CSP clients are typically data 
controllers. Article 32 of the GDPR requires the data controller and the 
data processor “to implement appropriate technical and organisational 
measures to ensure a level of security appropriate to the risk…[including] 
measures to protect data from accidental or unlawful destruction, loss, 
alteration, unauthorised disclosure of, or access to personal data transmit-
ted, stored or otherwise processed”. Article 44 deals with transfers outside 
the EU and only allows such data transfer subject to the GDPR. Under 
the GDPR, the contract between a CSP and their client must stipulate that 
the data processor will only act on the instructions from the data control-
ler. One area of potential friction is that of security. The extent to which a 
client can instruct a CSP on their security policies in a multi-tenant com-
moditized infrastructure is limited and CSPs have relied on adherence to 
industry certifications or best practice frameworks to overcome client and 
regulator concerns e.g. PCI-DSS, ISO27001, COBIT etc. At the same 
time, CSPs, typically reserve the right to change their security policies 
unilaterally (Leimbach et al. 2014). While such certifications are envisaged 
by the GDPR under Article 42, they are not obligatory. Being ‘certified’ 
does not equate to GDPR compliance; it merely certifies that the afore-
mentioned technical and organizational measures are in place. Indeed, the 
issue of certification would seem to be an area still couched in ambiguity. 
The European Data Protection Board only issued guidelines on GDPR 
certification in June 2019 and it is unclear whether certification commonly 
cited by CSPs meets these guidelines at the time of writing (EDPB 2019).
Data integrity is often referred to but poorly defined. For example, 
there are ambiguities even between information and data integrity (Boritz 
2005). Notwithstanding this, it is widely accepted that it is synonymous 
with representational faithfulness. In contrast, data availability is the extent 
to which an organisation’s full set of computational resources are accessi-
ble and usable (Jansen and Grance 2011). Extant pre-GDPR research sug-
gests that, at least historically, CSPs attempted to place responsibility for 
preserving data integrity and backup with the client (Bradshaw et al. 2011; 
Hon et al. 2012). Article 32 (1) of the GDPR requires data controllers 
and data processors to have the ability (1) to ensure the ongoing confiden-
tiality, integrity, availability and resilience of processing systems and ser-
vices; and (2) to restore the availability and access to personal data in a 
timely manner in the event of a physical or technical incident. While the 
GDPR applies to personal data, this does not guarantee the integrity and 
availability of all data, for example non-personal business data, and only 
applies to data within the definition of the GDPR. As such, care should be 
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taken by organisations seeking to outsource operations to the cloud, par-
ticularly where one of the motivations is that the cloud is a safe way to 
back up data.
2.4.5  Variation in Terms
As referenced earlier, CSPs typically reserve the right to change contract 
terms and policies unilaterally. Such variation may be communicated by 
reference to an updated version of the TOS, the AUP, the SLA and the 
privacy policy on the CSP’s website. This is particularly the case in con-
sumer and free cloud services and can result in changes to the specific 
services being consumed or the service levels (Michels et  al. 2019; 
Kamarinou et al. 2015; Hon et al. 2012; Bradshaw et al. 2011). In many 
of these cases, the only option for clients and end users is to take it or leave 
it. Clients may or may not be notified of changes.
2.4.6  Intellectual Property
A number of issues arise in relation to intellectual property (IP) rights that 
should be addressed in cloud computing contracts. Spulber (2018) posits 
that current contracts based on tangible services are not suitable for mod-
ern technological paradigms, such as cloud computing, as they neither 
fully recognise the complete spectrum of IP, exclusion of access, and trans-
ferability of non-rivalrous intangible assets, nor do they address problems 
that arise from intentional or unintentional cooperative contribution to 
the creation of intangible assets. Cloud computing raises significant issues 
in relation to the four main categories of IP, namely—trade secrets, pat-
ents, trademarks and copyright.
The complexity of the chain of service provision in cloud computing 
complicates IP management. In addition to the primary client outsourc-
ing systems to the CSP, a wider number of stakeholders may be involved 
in the transport, processing and storage of data, many of which may not 
be privy to the initial agreement with the client. Excluding access to this 
data while meeting SLAs may not be feasible. This may result in inadver-
tent disclosure of trade secrets and confidential information generally and 
result in civil and criminal liabilities. In the case of patents, the distribution 
of confidential information relating to a proposed invention may consti-
tute a form of public knowledge of prior art and can invalidate a patent. 
Given the opaqueness of the chain of service provision in cloud 
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computing, such an infringement may be difficult to prove. CSPs make 
use of a wide range of proprietary, third party and open source software in 
the delivery of their services, and will often attempt to exclude warranties 
on IP relating to such software, and particularly open source software 
(Hon et al. 2012). At the same time, AUPs will often include infringe-
ment of IP as a prohibited activity. Again, software indemnities tend to be 
one-sided in cloud contracts favouring the CSP.
Despite persistent rumours that social networking sites and other CSPs 
are attempting to claim rights in images loaded on to their systems, recent 
research suggests that CSPs do not seek to have copyright assigned to 
them but in many cases explicitly acknowledge that the end user retained 
the copyright (Michels et  al. 2019). The ownership of metadata is less 
clear. Metadata is data about data and is often a by-product generated 
from the interaction of the clients and their end users with the cloud ser-
vice. In this way, new data (which may be of value and therefore be an 
intangible asset) is created by the cooperation of the client, or their end 
users, and the CSP. While some data is used for cloud service optimisation, 
other data may be collected with no specific purpose in mind. This data, 
sometimes referred to as ‘exhaust data’ or ‘digital data exhaust’, may have 
significant value to third parties through data mining, aggregation or 
other data analytics techniques. Reed (2010) suggests that data generated 
by the CSP for its own internal purposes belongs to them, however if the 
data contains client data protected under copyright, the client may have an 
infringement claim—if the client is aware of such use at all. Reed (2010) 
suggests CSPs need to pay careful attention that they do not take unfair 
advantage of clients nor infringe copyrighted works. But what of digital 
data exhaust? Who owns this data? CSPs are typically silent on this. Indeed, 
it may be a case of ‘don’t ask, don’t tell’. Nonetheless, contracts should 
state clearly whether such data is being collected and for what use.
Hon et al. (2012) identify similar issues relating to the ownership of 
software applications developed by clients or end users on a CSP’s IaaS or 
PaaS platform where the CSPs integration tools are used or the software is 
designed for specific use only with that CSP’s software, and is therefore 
tied to the CSP’s IP. The emergence of cloud service brokerage (CSB) 
models, and in particular consumer app marketplaces (e.g. Google Play 
and Apple AppStore), B2B cloud application and API marketplaces (e.g. 
Salesforce AppExchange and RapidAPI), and indeed Marketplace as a 
Service models (Paulsson et al. 2016; Paulsson et al. 2020), complicate 
these matters further. In these cases, independent software vendors build 
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their businesses with near-total dependency on a small number of large 
cloud ecosystems where the underlying CSP holds disproportionate bar-
gaining power and data. The degree of trust involved is near total. Similarly, 
where clients or end users suggest or actually implement improvements or 
bug fixes, it may not be clear where IP ownership lies (Leimbach 
et al. 2014).
2.4.7  Termination
Contracts may come to a natural and expected conclusion, or be unnatu-
rally terminated due to breach of contract or some other event rendering 
them invalid. On termination, the contract should make adequate provi-
sion for the consequent handling of the client data including defining the 
term of service and (non-) renewal of service; termination events; data 
preservation; data deletion; and data transfer, following termination 
(Leimbach et al. 2014). The treatment of termination has legal and eco-
nomic implications. CSPs can use data preservation, in particular, as a 
means of vendor lock-in by making data transfer to another service time- 
consuming or cumbersome. In the event of unnatural termination, clients 
will want to ensure that they have adequate time to access their data and 
transfer their data from the incumbent CSP to an alternative. At the end 
of a service contract, CSPs may (1) immediately delete the data, (2) pro-
vide a grace period, or (3) offer a hybrid approach neither obliging the 
deletion nor preservation of data, nor undertaking to delete data and 
offering a grace period at their discretion (Bradshaw et al. 2011). In real-
ity, few CSPs delete the data on termination. However against the back-
drop of data protection legislation, deleting personal data as soon as 
possible may be prudent to mitigate GDPR-related risk. At the same time, 
Hon and Millard (2018) have suggested that regulators are seeking maxi-
mum periods after which personal data must be deleted.
Leimbach et al. (2014) also note that clients should understand what 
happens to metadata relating to their account on termination; this issue 
would seem to be contentious not only from a termination perspective but 
also from an ownership perspective and is worthy of attention by cloud 
clients. As discussed above, the line between the metadata that a CSP rea-
sonable owns and that which the client owns can be blurry and ownership 
uncertain. A CSP generates, stores, analyses and may replicate system and 
network usage, data transfer and other logs as part of the activities inher-
ent in the delivery and future development of the service. It may not be 
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possible or desirable for CSPs to delete this data; similarly, clients may not 
wish inferences about them or their activities inferred from this data.
As a final comment on termination, while CSPs do not have a duty to 
make off-boarding easy or free, and indeed there is a palpable difference 
between the quality of on-boarding tools and support and off-boarding 
ones, they are not the only cause of delays. Customisation of cloud ser-
vices, for example Salesforce.com, can result in both vendor lock-in and 
data portability issues. As such, cloud clients need to be aware of how 
integrated and dependent they are becoming on their CSP over time and 
the implications on termination.
2.4.8  Dispute Settlement
The overwhelming majority of CSPs include provisions for dispute resolu-
tion in their TOS however specific dispute resolution clauses may feature 
in other documents e.g. privacy policies (Martic 2017). CSPs may stipu-
late courts or arbitration to settle disputes and stipulate a choice of law in 
one or more jurisdictions (for example, see Ryanair dac v SC Vola.ro srl) 
or specific arbitration rules e.g. AAA or ICC rules. Research suggests that 
the preference is for courts as the exclusive adjudicative method (Martic 
2017). As discussed previously, the determination of choice of law can 
favour one side or the other. For example, EU consumers can avail of the 
EU Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) Directive and the EU-wide 
Online Dispute Resolution (ODR) platform.
2.5  Future oF cLoud contracts
Current literature and thinking on contract law and cloud computing is 
based on relatively static conceptualisations of both cloud computing and 
contracts. The majority of legal research focuses on a conceptualisation of 
cloud computing from over a decade ago, primarily focussing on IaaS and 
SaaS services, and to a much lesser extent, Platform as a Service (PaaS). 
Recent work has suggested that the cloud is increasingly more abstracted, 
heterogeneous, composable, and automated (Lynn et al. 2020). First, the 
emergence of containerisation and serverless computing (including 
Function-as-a-Service) are enabling portability and a separation of con-
cerns between CSPs and independent software vendors and clients (Lynn 
et al. 2020). These paradigms reduce vendor lock-in and create clear lines 
of demarcations between responsibilities and technology ownership in 
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ways not envisaged by traditional cloud computing. Similarly, cloud com-
puting is becoming more heterogeneous and composable with a wider 
variety of customisable configurations available to clients that impact per-
formance and complicate service level expectations, thus pushing 
performance- related decisions to the client, and requiring more nuanced 
agreements. Furthermore, with the advent of the Internet of Things, the 
cloud is becoming more decentralised and distributed across a cloud-to- 
thing (C2T) continuum. This has resulted in new computing paradigms 
including fog, mist and edge computing (Iorga et al. 2018). Processing 
and storage may take place in the cloud, at the edge or somewhere in 
between (the fog).
This new decentralised, abstract, heterogeneous, and composable cloud 
introduces complexity at several orders of magnitude higher than today. It 
is beyond human capabilities to manage such infrastructure manually. As a 
result, the cloud is becoming even more automated and intelligent. 
Artificial Intelligence for IT Operations (AIOps) algorithms and machine 
learning monitor, operate, and maintain distributed systems (Cordoso 
2019). The emergence of self-organising and self-learning systems repre-
sents a significant evolution in cloud infrastructure decision-making. 
Outsourcing decision-making to AI provides substantial technical, legal 
and trust challenges, not least the black box nature of AI decision making. 
It is foreseeable that the actions of AI will result in cloud under- performance 
at some time in the future and addressed in accordance with existing legal 
provisions. However commentators have noted that AI may not be recog-
nised as a subject of law, and as a result, may not be held personally liable 
for the damage it causes (Čerka et  al. 2015). Cloud contracts need to 
evolve to reflect this changing and more nuanced cloud.
At the same time, the nature of contracts is developing, albeit at a much 
slower pace. Spulber (2018) has proposed a new framework for ‘intellec-
tual contracts’, a form of “…agreement to create, develop, share, or apply 
intangible assets involved in technological change.” In his conceptualisa-
tion, Spulber attempts to overcome the shortcomings of traditional con-
tracts with respect to the completeness, excludability, and transferability of 
intangible assets while recognising that IP arises from intentional and 
unintentional cooperation, and rights in such outputs needs to be 
addressed in contracts. Similarly, there has been renewed discussions on 
the value of smart contracts in cloud computing with the emergence and 
hype around Blockchain. Smart contracts are not new; in effect they are 
agreements whose execution is automated and self-enforceable. Vending 
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machines are cited as common examples. In the mid-nineties, Szabo 
(1996) envisioned a computerised transaction protocol that implements 
the terms of a contract. While Szabo (1996) foresaw self-enforcing con-
tracts based on conditions being met, Blockchain addressed a number of 
issues in smart contracts, and contracts more generally, not least the verifi-
ability of conditions and performance. In the language of trust, Blockchain 
verifies integrity. Blockchain has been proposed as a solution to a number 
of cloud-related contract issues including verifiability of performance 
(Dong et al. 2017), GDPR compliance (Corrales et al. 2019), and digital 
rights management (Finck and Moscon 2019). Despite the benefits of 
smart contracts, significant questions remain unanswered regarding their 
enforceability (Savelyev 2017). Indeed, the extent to which either smart 
contracts or intellectual contracts can be easily adapted and integrated in 
to current contract law frameworks, or indeed need to, is open to debate.
2.6  concLusIon
This chapter provides an overview of some of the key contract law issues 
that arise in cloud computing. It is not exhaustive. It is clear that contracts 
in cloud computing are used primarily as an instrument of control and, to 
a lesser extent, coordination. While larger commercial and governmental 
organisations, may make rational choices based on calculus-based trust in 
full knowledge of the contract they are entering in to, it is clear that for the 
vast majority of firms do not have the opportunity or bargaining power to 
negotiate with cloud service providers. A rational, albeit disadvantageous 
decision, to either ‘take it or leave it’, remains. Given the homogeneous 
nature of cloud computing terms and conditions and the dominance of a 
small number of hyperscale players in the public cloud market, organisa-
tions, and particularly smaller ones, are left on the poorer side of a one- 
sided power relationship. While CSPs may possess undeniable competence, 
this imbalanced relationship does not foster trust. The evidence of the 
terms and conditions reviewed in this chapter suggest CSPs are not benev-
olent and their integrity can only be judged on their post hoc performance. 
Based on their approaches to limitation of liability, warranties, compensa-
tion, amongst others, one could understand how firms might tend towards 
scepticism. Such scepticism or lack of trust need not be a negative, it may 
be constructive resulting in enterprise customers developing healthy vigi-
lance behaviours e.g. increasing monitoring, ensuring compliance, and 
preventing potential exploitation (Lumineau, 2017).
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In contrast, individual consumers, by and large, do not make rational 
decisions with regards to entering in to contracts with cloud service provid-
ers. Research suggests that they do not read the terms and conditions in 
advance of using cloud services, and if they do, this does not change their 
decision. In this way, their decisions may be non-calculative and habitual, 
or reflect a perceived lack of options and/or a desire to avoid anxiety. At 
the same time, this is not their problem in one sense, but a regulatory one. 
There has been much progress to correct imbalances in contractual terms 
in consumer cloud computing, not least the GDPR. Unfortunately, regula-
tory responses are not uniform worldwide. Borderless technologies such as 
cloud computing provide significant challenges particularly in a highly glo-
balised world. The rejuvenation of the doctrine of unconscionability as 
proposed by Calloway (2012) may be worthy of consideration, particularly 
in the US, the choice of law for so many cloud service providers.
Evolutions in cloud computing are overcoming the sources of legal fric-
tion between demand and supply. Containerisation and serverless comput-
ing introduce a separate of concerns that institutionalise a trust 
compartmentalisation of sorts in line with Lumineau (2017). At the same 
time, heterogeneity, AIOps, and the Internet of Things, further complicate 
the relationship between supply and demand, accountability and assurance, 
and as a result, trust and distrust. Innovations in contracts, whether intel-
lectual or smart, remain at an early stage of conceptualisation. Indeed, it is 
unclear whether they are enforceable and can be adapted in to a legal infra-
structure designed around traditional notions of tangible intellectual prop-
erty and, even so, whether lawmakers will consider it necessary at all.
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CHAPTER 3
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Abstract Borderless cloud computing technologies are exacerbating ten-
sions between European and other existing regulatory models for data 
privacy. On the one hand, in the European Union (EU), a series of data 
localisation initiatives are emerging with the objective of preserving 
Europe’s digital sovereignty, guaranteeing the respect of EU fundamental 
rights and preventing foreign law enforcement and intelligence agencies 
from accessing personal data. On the other hand, foreign countries are 
unilaterally adopting legislation requiring national corporations to disclose 
data stored in Europe, in this way bypassing jurisdictional boundaries 
grounded on physical data location. The chapter investigates this twofold 
dynamic by focusing particularly on the current friction between the EU 
data protection approach and the data privacy model of the United States 
(US) in the field of cloud computing.
E. Celeste (*) • F. Fabbrini 
School of Law and Government, Dublin City University, Dublin, Ireland
e-mail: edoardo.celeste@dcu.ie; federico.fabbrini@dcu.ie
44
Keywords Cloud computing • Data privacy • Data protection • Data 
localisation • Data residency • Digital sovereignty
3.1  IntroductIon
Over the past decade, the right to privacy and the protection of personal 
data have been increasingly recognised as fundamental values at global 
level (Greenleaf 2019; Bygrave 2014; Solove 2008). Yet, their under-
standing still varies significantly among jurisdictions. One apparent exam-
ple is offered by the different approach to data privacy in the European 
Union (EU) and the United States (US). In Europe, data protection is a 
constitutionalised fundamental right, and a comprehensive set of legisla-
tion has been put in place to make the regulation of personal data process-
ing uniform across member states. Conversely, in the US, data privacy is 
not explicitly enshrined in the federal constitution, and is regulated only in 
selected pieces of legislation targeting specific sectors considered worthy 
of intervention.
Divergence in legal frameworks of data protection is certainly not a 
novelty of the last decade. However, the recent development of borderless 
digital technologies, such as cloud computing, amplifies the risk of ten-
sions between different regulatory models. When data are stored in the 
cloud, it becomes more difficult to identify the applicable law easily. In 
response to this phenomenon, data localisation initiatives requiring data to 
be physically stored in servers located within national boundaries have 
recently emerged as a regulatory trend to avoid conflicts of law, enhance 
the level of data privacy protection, limit the risk of access from foreign 
intelligence agencies, and facilitate domestic law enforcement.
This chapter investigates this twofold dynamic by focusing on the cur-
rent friction between the EU data protection approach and the US data 
privacy model in the context of cloud computing. The chapter is struc-
tured as follows. In Sect. 4.2, we discuss the main areas of divergence 
between EU and US approach to data privacy. Then, in Sect. 4.3 we 
explain how these differences create a series of regulatory challenges in the 
context of cloud computing. Section 4.4 analyses how recent legal and 
policy developments on both sides of the Atlantic are addressing these 
issues, with a particular focus on data localisation initiatives and strategies 
to preserve digital sovereignty. The chapter concludes with the 
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proposition that data localisation does not represent a panacea for resolv-
ing tensions between competing jurisdictions in the field of cloud comput-
ing, and that transnational cooperation and effective international 
agreements are needed now, more than ever.
3.2  data PrIvacy across the atlantIc
In Europe and the US, data privacy law emerged almost simultaneously in 
the 1970s (Jones 2017). Both legal systems recognise the importance of 
protecting personal data and the potential risks deriving from a misuse of 
such data. Yet, on the two sides of the Atlantic, two different regulatory 
models have emerged in the field of data privacy (Schwartz and Solove 
2014; Tourkochoriti 2014).
In Europe, the respect of privacy and the protection of personal data 
are recognised as fundamental rights. In 1950, as a reaction to intrusive 
surveillance practices of totalitarian regimes that afflicted Europe in the 
first half of the twentieth century, the European Convention on Human 
Rights enshrined the individual right of respect for private and family life, 
home and correspondence (Article 8). In its case law, the European Court 
of Human Rights, which is the competent jurisdiction for the interpreta-
tion of the Convention, has affirmed that the concept of private life must 
be construed broadly in order to protect all aspects of human personality, 
including individual personal data (Council of Europe 2019; Fabbrini 
2015). In 2000, the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights explicitly 
enshrined the right to privacy and data protection in two distinct provi-
sions, Articles 7 and 8, respectively. Although originally lacking binding 
legal value with the transposition of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009, the Charter 
was recognised as having a primary legal status in the hierarchy of EU legal 
sources, at the same level of EU founding treaties (Fabbrini 2015).
The US is often referred to as the cradle of the right to privacy. Back in 
1890, Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis authored a seminal article pub-
lished on the Harvard Law Review in which they advocated for the recog-
nition of a broad conceptualisation of the right to privacy and the 
protection of the individual against external intrusions (Warren and 
Brandeis 1890). However, in contrast to the EU, in the US, at least at 
federal level, there is no explicit constitutional provision protecting the 
right to privacy or data protection. Indeed, the US Constitution dates to 
1787 and its Bill of Rights was added only three years later, so well before 
privacy became an issue. The case law of the US Supreme Court 
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progressively recognised different aspects of privacy, regarded both as a 
negative right against State intrusion and as a positive right to self-deter-
mination in a variety of contexts, including the choice of using contracep-
tives or terminating pregnancy (Flaherty 1991). Lacking an explicit 
reference, the US Supreme Court had to find a constitutional support for 
the right to privacy in the “emanations” and “penumbras” of the Bill of 
Rights (Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 484). In particular, they exam-
ined the Fourth Amendment, protecting citizens against unreasonable 
search and seizures (Solove 2001), and the Fourteenth Amendment, sub-
jecting any deprivation of life, liberty and property to due process rules 
(Cate and Cate 2012).
Besides the different constitutional frameworks, the EU and the US 
also developed alternative regulatory models in the field of data privacy. 
Over the past few decades, the EU has introduced a fully comprehensive 
set of legislation governing the processing of personal data, both in the 
private and in the public sector (Fabbrini 2015). In 2016, the EU replaced 
the 1995 Data Protection Directive, which represented the core piece of 
legislation adopted to harmonise national statutes in the field, with a 
General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), whose provisions are 
directly binding in all member states (Albrecht 2016). Conversely, the US 
have rejected a similar all-encompassing approach, in favour of exclusively 
regulating specific sectors which were felt to be more in need of interven-
tion (Schwartz and Solove 2014). Although being a pioneer in the data 
privacy field, having adopted the Privacy Act 1974, which regulates data 
processing by federal agencies, the US never introduced a unitary and 
comprehensive piece of legislation in the field of data privacy, and only few 
US states have. At the federal level, US data privacy law is a mosaic of 
normative instruments covering a variety of issues, spanning from chil-
dren’s privacy to the use of data in financial services (Schwartz and 
Solove 2014).
In Europe, the basic presumption is that processing personal data rep-
resents an interference with the right to data privacy that can be tolerated 
only if it satisfies certain legal conditions. In the US, instead, data process-
ing is considered fully legitimate in so far as it is not prohibited by law, and 
a strong emphasis is placed on the role of individual consent as a basis to 
process personal data (Tourkochoriti 2014). European data protection 
law, in order to reduce the risk of circumvention and ensure an even level 
of protection across member states, has introduced provisions extending 
its application to data controllers that are not established in the EU, but 
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nevertheless process data related to EU residents (Article 3 GDPR; 
Christopher Kuner 2015; Svantesson 2015; de Hert and Czerniawski 
2016). In the US, data privacy statutes do not have a similar extraterrito-
rial effect.
Lastly, in contrast to US legislation, EU data protection law also regu-
lates international data transfers. Article 44 GDPR establishes that per-
sonal data can freely circulate among member states, but cannot be 
transferred to third countries unless they provide an adequate level of pro-
tection. Article 48 of the GDPR even explicitly prohibits any data disclo-
sure requested by a foreign authority, unless based on an international 
treaty. The European Commission can adopt a decision certifying the 
adequacy of the level of data protection of a third country (Article 45 
GDPR). Countries like Israel, Argentina, Uruguay, and recently Japan, 
have been certified as providing an adequate level of protection (European 
Commission 2019). Conversely, the Commission has only issued a partial 
adequacy decision in relation to the United States.
In 2000, the European Commission adopted Decision 2000/520/EC 
(so called “Safe Harbor”) which established the adequacy of US data pro-
tection rules: in particular, US corporations that are subject to the supervi-
sion of the Federal Trade Commission could self-certify their respect of 
the Safe Harbor Principles (Greer 2011). However, in the aftermath of the 
Snowden revelations about the existence of US mass surveillance pro-
grammes, this decision was invalidated by the European Court of Justice 
(ECJ). In the Schrems case (C-362/14), decided in 2015, the ECJ held 
that the Commission, by certifying the adequacy of the Safe Harbor 
scheme, failed to take into account the power of US law enforcement 
authorities to access on a generalised basis EU data transferred under the 
Safe Harbor scheme (Cole and Fabbrini 2016; Padova 2016). According 
to the ECJ, such a model of bulk surveillance cannot be tolerated as it 
compromises the essence of the right to privacy protected by the EU 
Charter of Fundamental Rights (para 94 of the judgment; see Ojanen 2017).
The Safe Harbor scheme was promptly replaced by the so-called 
“Privacy Shield”, which was negotiated between the European Commission 
and the US authorities in 2016 and entered into force with Decision 
2016/1250. The new system is very similar to the Safe Harbor in terms of 
functioning, but has been accompanied by a series of further guarantees, 
especially in relation to the individual right of redress (Tracol 2016; cf. 
Bender 2016). Moreover, after the Snowden revelations, the US started a 
progressive revision of its law enforcement legislation (Cole and Fabbrini 
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2016). Nevertheless, recently, a new legal challenge was made against the 
EU-US Privacy Shield and in July 2020 the ECJ declared also this instru-
ment invalid for breach of EU data privacy law. (Case C-311/18, Data 
Protection Commissioner v Facebook Ireland Limited, Maximilian Schrems). 
In its ruling, the ECJ emphasized the same problem as in Schrems I: the 
level of protection of EU data in the US is still contested.
The Schrems I and Schrems II cases both represent examples of circum-
stances in which the EU and US data protection frameworks enter in con-
flict. This situation arises when transnational processing of data is involved, 
and is highly problematic both from a EU and US perspective. On the one 
hand, EU data protection law imposes limits to the free transfer of per-
sonal data to third countries that are not deemed to offer an adequate level 
of protection of personal data. On the other hand, US authorities are loath 
of bending their sovereign decisions to EU requests in the field of data 
privacy as a result of the so-called Brussels effect (Bradford 2012). As the 
next section will explain, cloud computing, by ordinarily involving trans-
border data processing, represents a particularly challenging area.
3.3  regulatIng Borderless cloud comPutIng
Cloud computing denotes “flexible, location-independent access to com-
puting resources that are quickly and seamlessly allocated or released in 
response to demand” (Hon et  al. 2011a, p.  6). This broad definition 
encompasses three models of cloud computing: Infrastructure as a Service 
(IaaS), Platform as a Service (PaaS), and Software as a Service (SaaS). 
These models, as is apparent from their denomination, differ on the basis 
of the service offered, spanning from the mere provision of infrastructure 
to the supply of software (Hon et al. 2011a). These paradigms, however, 
are not mutually exclusive. It is conversely possible that a cloud computing 
service is composed of infrastructure, platform or service layers at the same 
time (Hon et al. 2011a). Just to mention some familiar examples in the 
academic context, Dropbox, the Google apps and Microsoft 365 repre-
sent commonly used Software as a Service cloud computing services.
A further classification of cloud computing models takes into account 
their users: one can distinguish between public, private or hybrid cloud 
computing models (Esayas 2012; see also Varadi et al. 2012). In the first 
case, cloud computing services are available to the general public, an 
example being the social network Facebook; in the second case, their use 
is restricted to a limited number of users, such as in tailored cloud services 
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for corporations or institutions; lastly, the third case represents an interme-
diary solution.
Using computing resources which are available in “the cloud” is advan-
tageous for a series of reasons (Hon et al. 2011a; Esayas 2012). First of all, 
cloud computing can provide services which are tailored to the end user. 
Secondly, cloud computing can flexibly respond to changes in users’ 
demand. And lastly, but certainly not least, cloud computing is signifi-
cantly cheaper than developing and maintaining individually owned infra-
structure, platforms or software. Those resources are centralised, and 
thanks to their virtual character, they are shared according to the specific 
needs of potential users.
From a technical perspective, this is possible thanks to the so-called 
“sharding” (Hon et al. 2011a). Data are not concentrated in a single vir-
tual cloud, but are fragmented into a series of “shards”, replicated, and 
stored in different locations. This procedure, which is entirely automated, 
allows the cloud computing service to maximise its performance. On the 
one hand, smaller pieces of information can be accessed more quickly. On 
the other hand, their replication enhances the security of the system by 
reducing the risks of node failures or data loss.
The technical architecture of cloud computing creates a series of chal-
lenges from a data protection perspective. First of all, cloud computing 
providers may be unaware of the fact that they are processing personal 
data. Hon et al. talk of the “cloud of unknowing” (2011a, p. 1). Secondly, 
the multi-layered structure of cloud computing services may create issues 
in relation to the correct identification of the data controller and proces-
sor, and the consequent allocation of responsibilities. For example, it has 
been contended that cloud service providers merely offering infrastructure 
as a service can even hardly be considered as data processors (Hon et al. 
2011b). Thirdly, cloud computing models may involve a continuous 
transfer of data on a global scale, and therefore potentially interesting a 
multiplicity of states. The “sharding” procedure, on which cloud comput-
ing relies, partitions and transfers data automatically.
The introduction of the GDPR has removed a series of jurisdictional 
problems existing under the Data Protection Directive. The GDPR is 
immediately legally binding in all EU member states. As a consequence, at 
least if the transfer occurs within the EU, the data controller will have one 
single legislative reference point instead of multiple different domestic 
pieces of legislation. Moreover, the GDPR has eliminated the reference to 
the use of equipment situated in an EU member state as a criterion to 
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define its scope of application. The idea of linking the applicability of EU 
data protection law to the physical use of an equipment no longer corre-
sponded to the technological reality (Hon et  al. 2012; Esayas 2012; 
Christopher Kuner 2010). The GDPR now regulates data controllers who 
are not established in the EU, but offer goods or services in the EU or 
monitor the behaviour of European data subjects (Article 3 GDPR). 
However, the GDPR has not substantially modified the data transfer 
regime involving third countries. Therefore, data controllers should still 
ensure that, when using cloud computing services, European data are not 
transferred to third countries which do not guarantee an adequate level of 
protection, or without appropriate safeguards (Hon and Millard 2012).
The existence of these regulatory obstacles to the free flow of personal 
data from the EU to third countries has led cloud computing providers to 
offer services storing personal data on servers exclusively located in the 
EU (Hon and Millard 2012). EU data protection law has been one of the 
main drivers behind the creation of “regional” clouds besides cross-border 
ones (Svantesson and Clarke 2010). A tension therefore emerges between, 
on the one hand, the economic and technological dimensions that push 
towards the offer of cloud computing services on a global scale in order to 
maximise efficiency and minimise costs, and, on the other hand, regula-
tory and policy initiatives that conversely impose boundaries and de facto 
limit the free flow of data for privacy rights reasons. Since the main cloud 
computing providers are based in the US and, as pointed out above, the 
EU and US are adopting different approaches in relation to data privacy, 
this situation raises several challenges. The next section will examine a 
series of initiatives that are emerging on both sides of the Atlantic to 
address these problems.
3.4  data localIsatIon and dIgItal sovereIgnty
Over the past few years, data localisation—which is the requirement to 
store data in servers located within a given jurisdiction—has also emerged 
as a regulatory trend at global level (Mishra 2015; Selby 2017). To men-
tion a successful example, in 2014 Russia introduced a statute requiring 
citizens’ personal data to be stored in the national territory (Hon et al. 
2016; Selby 2017). The objectives of these kinds of legislation are dispa-
rate. Safeguarding data privacy and ensuring effective law enforcement at 
domestic level are the two most recurrent explicit justifications of these 
initiatives (Mishra 2015; Hon et  al. 2016). The timing of this 
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phenomenon, which has thrived after the Snowden revelations about the 
US mass surveillance programmes, also suggests that data localisation is 
emerging as a response to the risk of data access from foreign intelligence 
agencies (Hon et al. 2016).
In Europe too, a series of data localisation initiatives has recently 
emerged. Since 2011, ideas of a Europe-only cloud, if not even a “virtual 
Schengen area”, have been circulating (Kuner et  al. 2015; Hon et  al. 
2016). In 2013, the German telecommunications operator, Deutsche 
Telekom announced a plan to create a German “Internetz”, by ensuring 
that traffic data are only routed nationally (Hon et al. 2016). Similarly, 
after Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, Estonia explored the possi-
bility of creating a “data embassy” via a combination of a physical diplo-
matic seat in a friend country to locate data centres, and a “virtual embassy” 
in a private cloud to store critical data (Millard 2015).
More recently, the European Commission has launched a European 
Cloud Initiative in the context of its Digital Single Market Strategy 
(European Commission 2016). This policy includes the creation of a 
European Open Science Cloud, which aims to offer European researchers 
a safe environment to store and share data, and a European Data 
Infrastructure, which would provide the necessary super-computing solu-
tions. Moreover, in 2019, the German Ministry for Economic Affairs and 
Energy has officially presented ‘Gaia-X’, the project for a European feder-
ated cloud-based data infrastructure (Federal Ministry for Economic 
Affairs and Energy (BMWi) 2019).
These initiatives show that the concept of “digital sovereignty” has 
recently emerged as a common thread in the European debate on data 
localisation. Originally, proposals such as the virtual Schengen area were 
politically justified by the need to ensure a sufficient level of security in the 
digital environment (Hon et al. 2016). The protection of human rights, 
and in particular the rights to privacy and data protection, has been the 
second main driver of discussions about data localisation in Europe. In the 
Digital Rights Ireland case, for example, the ECJ invalidated Directive 
2006/24/EC, compelling telecommunications operators to retain all 
users’ metadata for a fixed period of time, on the basis, inter alia, that it 
failed to require the storage of personal data in Europe (Digital Rights 
Ireland 2014, para. 68; Celeste 2019). According to the ECJ, the Data 
Retention Directive, by allowing telecommunications operators to store 
retained meta-data outside Europe, undermined the power of member 
states’ national data protection authorities to control data processing, as 
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expressly prescribed by Article 8(3) of the EU Charter of Fundamental of 
Rights (Digital Rights Ireland 2014, para. 68; cf. Tele2 Sverige 2016, 
para. 122).
More recently, in the summer 2019, the data protection authority of 
the German Land of Hessen temporarily ordered Hessian schools not to 
use Microsoft Office 365 (Der Hessische Beauftragte für Datenschutz und 
Informationsfreiheit 2019a; cf. Walden 2011). The decision followed 
Microsoft’s announcement that the company would not ensure data stor-
age on the German cloud only. The supervisory authority found that the 
risk of allowing US authorities to access European children’s data without 
appropriate guarantees made the use of Microsoft’s software unacceptable 
from a fundamental rights perspective (Der Hessische Beauftragte für 
Datenschutz und Informationsfreiheit 2019a, para. 2). The Hessian ban, 
which was originally extended to Google and Apple cloud applications 
(Der Hessische Beauftragte für Datenschutz und Informationsfreiheit 
2019a, para. 5), was subsequently lifted a month later following an intense 
phase of dialogue with Microsoft. The supervisory authority, however, 
stated that the investigation would have continued in light of several legal 
and technical issues still to be solved (Der Hessische Beauftragte für 
Datenschutz und Informationsfreiheit 2019b).
The first decision of the Hessian data protection authority justified the 
ban of Microsoft Office 365 to preserve the state’s “digital sovereignty” 
(Der Hessische Beauftragte für Datenschutz und Informationsfreiheit 
2019a, para. 2). Digital sovereignty is a concept that permeates the recent 
debate on data localisation in Europe widely and particularly in Germany. 
For example, it is the primary goal of the Gaia-X Project launched in 2019 
by the German Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy (Federal 
Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy (BMWi) 2019, p. 6). In the 
Ministry’s document, digital sovereignty is defined both as “indepen-
dence” and as “self-determination” (Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs 
and Energy (BMWi) 2019, p. 7). Remarkably, this concept is not uniquely 
linked to the state dimension, encompassing also the power of companies 
to freely determine the use and structure of their digital systems, data and 
processes (Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy (BMWi) 
2019, p. 7). In this way, digital sovereignty is presented as a solution to the 
European dependence from foreign companies and infrastructures, as well 
as to offer an opportunity to abide by and affirm European values.
Yet, the project of achieving European digital sovereignty is not immune 
from the typical criticism characterising data localisation legislation 
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(Mishra 2015). First, implementing a similar policy means increasing costs 
due to the relocation of data centres and services in Europe, and subvert-
ing global economic trends. Moreover, digital sovereignty could not be a 
panacea vis-à-vis the issue of security. As the Estonian project of creating a 
virtual data embassy shows, centralising data may enhance the level of 
vulnerability, while delocalisation, as the sharding procedure in the con-
text of cloud computing services demonstrates, can actually strengthen 
system resilience. Lastly, initiatives aiming to preserve digital sovereignty 
are often criticised as ways to conceal a form of protectionism (Mishra 
2015; Millard 2015; C. Kuner et al. 2015). Digital sovereignty would not 
merely lead to a balkanisation of the digital realm for the sake of preserv-
ing European fundamental rights, but also to allow European companies 
to fill the economic gap distancing them from American and Asiatic tech-
nology giants.
While Europe is seeking to strengthen its digital sovereignty, however, 
analogous trends are emerging also elsewhere. In 2018, for example, the 
US introduced the CLOUD Act, a new legislation enabling US law 
enforcement authorities to require US corporations to disclose data, inde-
pendently of their physical location (Abraha 2019). The statute was pur-
posefully adopted as a response to a case in which Microsoft contested a 
search warrant aiming to gather data stored on its Irish servers (Svantesson 
and Gerry 2015). Microsoft lamented that, under the Electronic 
Communications Privacy Act 1986, the US government was not explicitly 
authorised to serve extraterritorial warrants. The introduction of the 
CLOUD act in 2018 mooted the dispute against Microsoft, which had 
meanwhile reached the US Supreme Court (Abraha 2019). The new stat-
ute empowers US law enforcement authorities to require data in the ‘pos-
session, custody and control’ of a US corporation, notwithstanding such 
information may be physically located outside the US (Abraha 2019).
Data localisation is not just a US and European phenomenon. In 2017, 
in the context of the increasing trade war with the US, China passed a new 
National Intelligence Law obliging companies to collaborate with Chinese 
intelligence agencies (Yang 2019). This legislation produced strong criti-
cism in the US (Lian 2019; The White House 2019; cf. Doffman 2019). 
Yet it reveals a drift towards growing fragmentation of the digital space to 
impose national sovereignty, which raises significant challenges for cloud 
computing.
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3.5  conclusIon
Borderless cloud computing technologies are exacerbating existing ten-
sions between EU and US approaches to data privacy. On the one hand, a 
series of European initiatives are progressively exercising a centripetal 
force on data held by companies operating in the EU. Their main objec-
tive would be to preserve Europe’s digital sovereignty by guaranteeing the 
respect of European fundamental rights and preventing foreign law 
enforcement and intelligence agencies from accessing personal data of EU 
citizens and residents. On the other hand, foreign countries are unilater-
ally adopting legislation requiring national corporations to disclose data 
stored in Europe, in this way bypassing jurisdictional boundaries grounded 
in physical data location. Both the US and Chinese recently adopted stat-
utes represent two paradigmatic examples of this trend, and clearly high-
light how a conflict between European rules and foreign laws is emerging.
From a European standpoint, it is therefore evident that data localisa-
tion alone cannot represent the universal remedy for all the existing risks. 
In a globalised digital environment, even investigating about a domestic 
crime may likely entail accessing data held in different jurisdictions. 
Erecting permanent barriers to the free flow of data could eventually 
amount to a Sisyphean labour, difficult and ultimately futile. For this rea-
son, enhancing cooperation and establishing more functional agreements 
with third states, making sure that the protection of digital rights becomes 
a shared concern transnationally and globally, still seems to be the best 
choice for the EU.
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CHAPTER 4
Understanding and Enhancing Consumer 
Privacy Perceptions in the Cloud
Grace Fox
Abstract The recent increase in highly publicised cloud breaches, cou-
pled with issues surrounding transparency and control in the cloud, high-
lights the importance of understanding and addressing privacy in this 
context. The extant cloud privacy literature has a tendency to focus on 
technical solutions to address security and privacy together, but a small 
emerging body of literature acknowledges the importance of consumers’ 
privacy perceptions in the context of cloud computing. Given the breadth 
of cloud applications and the situational nature of privacy, it is imperative 
to unpack the role of privacy in this complex domain. This chapter lever-
ages the broader privacy literature in the Information Systems field to 
identify potential measures to enhance consumer privacy in the cloud con-
text and highlights a number of paths for research to further our knowl-
edge of consumer privacy perceptions in the various cloud contexts.
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4.1  IntroductIon
The cloud offers many advantages to organisations including greater effi-
ciency and reduced data storage costs. The market for cloud computing is 
forecast to continue growth in 2020 with Gartner predicting a 17% 
increase to US$266.4 billion including an increase in the value of cloud 
management and security services from US$12 billion to US$13.8 billion 
(Gartner 2019). Today, we see cloud applications in all industries, at the 
consumer application level to city-wide infrastructures. However, the 
increasing ubiquity of cloud computing also represents new risks, not least 
information security and privacy vulnerabilities. Indeed, we have seen an 
alarming number of high-profile cloud data breaches including the largest 
cloud service providers. Most recently, the open Google database exposed 
the personal details of 200 million people (Forbes 2020). While the cloud 
itself is arguably more secure than physical infrastructures, human error is 
often the cause of these incidents. For instance, misconfiguration of cloud 
databases has resulted in an estimated 196 breaches from 2018–2019, 
leaving 33 billion records at risk, and costing organisations an estimated 
US$5 trillion over the two year period (DivvyCloud 2020). A single 
breach incident can be hugely costly to organisations. For example, 
Marriott could potentially be fined up to US$123 million in Europe alone 
for its recent cloud breach, which left the details of 5.2 million people at 
risk (Whittaker 2020). In addition to monetary costs, it is important to 
consider other implications for organisations involved in such breaches 
such as consumer perceptions of privacy and trust in the organisation itself.
This chapter focuses on exploring how organisations can avail of the 
advantages offered by the cloud, while preserving consumer privacy and 
addressing any privacy concerns consumers may have. The chapter pro-
ceeds with an outline of the importance of privacy and security in the 
cloud computing context. Next, the extant literature related to privacy in 
this domain and the broader Information Systems (IS) field are discussed. 
Potential solutions for enhancing privacy perceptions in the cloud and 
directions to empirically explore these solutions are outlined in the final 
sections of the chapter.
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4.2  cloud computIng: prIvacy and SecurIty ISSueS
Continual advances in information technology are furthering the prolif-
eration of cloud computing in many new domains. The emergence of big 
data, and recent advances in areas such as IoT (Internet of Things) has 
massively increased the volumes of data generated by most organisations 
leading to an increasing need to outsource data storage to cloud service 
providers (Lowry et al. 2017). On the consumer level, the popularity and 
number of mobile applications downloaded by users has also resulted in a 
dependence on cloud computing to relieve storage issues; this is com-
monly referred to as mobile-cloud computing (Shropshire et al. 2015). 
This greater reliance on the cloud significantly exacerbates the risk of pri-
vacy and security incidents while also heightening the risks associated with 
more traditional security vulnerabilities (Lowry et al. 2017).
Privacy and security represent important challenges and potential barri-
ers, both for organisations considering adopting and those currently rely-
ing on cloud services and cloud service providers (Alashoor 2014; Fauzi 
et al. 2012). A host of researchers have stressed the importance of address-
ing privacy in the cloud computing context (e.g. Pearson 2012; Wood 
2012; Nikkhah et al. 2018). Indeed, the security and privacy issues within 
the cloud computing domain are far greater than those present when data 
is stored in a single location (Ramireddy et al. 2010). This is partly attrib-
uted to the fact that data stored in the cloud is often in unencrypted form 
and thus open to many vulnerabilities (Senarathna et  al. 2016). 
Furthermore, the use of cloud computing often involves the movement of 
data beyond international borders requiring consideration of legal require-
ments in different jurisdictions while also complicating the organisation’s 
ability to observe and manage data flows and preserve consumer privacy 
(Lowry et al. 2017). Privacy also represents an important consideration 
for cloud end users, with recent research illustrating that consumers are 
willing to pay to limit data collection and to ensure deletion from a cloud 
database (Shropshire et al. 2015).
While Chap. 3 in this book outlines the legal requirements across dif-
ferent jurisdictions, this chapter focuses on the consumer aspect of privacy 
in the cloud computing context. In addition to the undeniable importance 
of privacy in this context, it is important to note the intertwined nature of 
privacy and security within existing academic discussions. While, the focus 
here is on privacy, it is worthwhile to differentiate and highlight important 
parallels between these concepts. Both security and privacy have been 
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described as human constructed abstract notions which vary according to 
context and other factors (Lowry et  al. 2017). For the purpose of the 
chapter, both concepts are defined and discussed in terms of their perti-
nence to cloud.
4.2.1  Information Security
Information security refers to the preservation of the three tenets of secu-
rity; the confidentiality of information, the integrity information, and the 
availability of information, while also considering other risks such as reli-
ability, authenticity, and accountability (Pearson 2012; ISO 2005). In the 
cloud computing context, the key security vulnerabilities warranting con-
sideration include trust, encryption, multi-tenancy, and reliability 
(Ramireddy et al. 2010). In addition, these vulnerabilities result in serious 
security risks related to data integrity, confidentiality, data loss, and data 
authentication (Subashini and Kavitha 2011). Research has provided some 
initial support for the relevance of these risks. For example, in their study 
of the factors impacting public sector cloud adoption in South Africa, 
Scholtz et al. (2016) found that data accessibility was a concern for 90% of 
participants and cyberattacks represented a concern for 76% for partici-
pants. Security and privacy are inextricably linked, as any security incident 
puts the privacy of the individual’s data at risk (Sonehara et al. 2011). In 
addition, these security issues may lead to intangible risks or concerns such 
as loss in confidence of the reliability of the cloud and fears around access 
to personal data (Paquette et al. 2010).
4.2.2  Information Privacy
Privacy has been the subject of academic discourse for over two centuries 
in disciplines such as law, sociology and IS. Indeed, the first academic dis-
cussions of privacy are often credited to the 1890 Harvard Law Review 
article by Warren and Brandeis, in which they discuss privacy in terms of 
the need to balance individuals’ rights to be free from intrusion with the 
information needs of society (Warren and Brandeis 1890). From a socio-
logical perspective, the seminal definition of privacy was developed by 
Alan Westin (1967, p. 7), who described privacy as “the claim of individu-
als, groups, or institutions to determine for themselves when, how, and to 
what extent information about them is communicated to others.” These 
seminal works are the building blocks of conceptualisations across 
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multiple disciplines, many of which place control at the centre (Kesan 
et al. 2013). However, advances in technology have shifted the focus from 
a predominantly physical construct to a digital one, and from organisa-
tional control to an individual’s control of their personal information. 
While discussions regarding the potential security and privacy issues within 
cloud computing are largely centered around adoption at an organisa-
tional level, there are many consumer issues which warrant consideration 
(Alashoor 2014). This chapter focuses on privacy from the IS perspective 
where privacy is defined as an individual’s ability to personally control 
information about themselves and how it is disseminated (Smith et  al. 
1996; Bélanger and Crossler 2011).
In the cloud computing context, there are many privacy issues that 
organisations should consider and seek to address including issues sur-
rounding control, unauthorised secondary use of data, and improper 
access (Senarathna et al. 2014; Pearson and Benameur 2010). However, 
the majority of extant privacy research in the cloud computing domain 
focuses on the technical solutions to secure data in the cloud from both 
design and architectural perspectives (Nikkhah et al. 2018). It is impor-
tant to move beyond this and understand the role of the privacy percep-
tions of consumers on their adoption and use of cloud computing.
4.3  examInIng prIvacy perceptIonS In the cloud
The broader privacy literature within IS is well developed with a large 
number of studies conducted across multiple contexts over the past three 
decades. As privacy cannot be objectively measured or quantified, proxies 
are utilised to examine the role of privacy, with privacy concern represent-
ing the dominant approach in existing literature (Bélanger and Crossler 
2011). Conceptualisations of privacy concern also differ across the myriad 
of existing studies with the emphasis often placed on fears around loss of 
privacy (Xu et al. 2011), or possible improper uses such as one’s personal 
data being disclosed online (Son and Kim 2008). As summarized in 
Table 4.1 below, four scales are predominantly used to measure informa-
tion privacy concerns in the IS literature (Alashoor et  al. 2017). While 
there is an absence of agreement on the most appropriate scale, each of 
these scales have been rigorously tested, validated and adapted to other 
contexts. Furthermore, across these scales six dimensions of concern are 
consistently included.

























































































































































































































































































































While these privacy measures are commonly deployed in other con-
texts, the majority of extant cloud computing privacy studies do not use 
validated measures of privacy concern but instead explore privacy and 
security issues together using open-ended questions or single-item rank-
ing questions. For example, in a study conducted by Scholtz et al. (2016), 
90% of participants rated the privacy of data as important or very impor-
tant. However, two related studies adapted Dinev and Hart’s (2006) PC 
measure (Nikkhah et al. 2018; Nikkhah and Sabherwal 2017). Validated 
measures of information privacy concern warrant consideration in future 
cloud computing privacy studies to provide a more nuanced view of pri-
vacy in the cloud and to allow comparisons to be drawn with privacy con-
cerns in other contexts. Indeed, many of these dimensions represent core 
privacy issues highlighted by cloud researchers (e.g. Pearson and Benameur 
2010). However, the extant empirical literature has not yet encompassed 
these dimensions. The relevance of these dimensions is briefly noted in 
terms of understanding consumers’ perceptions of privacy.
The collection dimension focuses on individuals’ concerns regarding an 
organisation’s collection and storage of a great deal of their personal infor-
mation (Smith et al. 1996). Consumers often lack an awareness of how 
their data stored in the cloud is used and disseminated, and whether it is 
used for purposes other than those it was collected for (Nikkhah et  al. 
2018). For example, in some cases such as Google Drive or Dropbox, the 
storage of personal information in the cloud is the primary purpose of the 
service and therefore use is transparent. Other applications such as those 
in the Internet of Things (IoT) domain, are less clear. Data may be stored 
on the device, somewhere locally, or in the cloud, or a combination of one 
or more these. Consumers may not even be aware of where data is stored. 
It is important to explore whether cloud data storage generates consumer 
privacy concern and how this differs across applications and informa-
tion types.
The Unauthorised Secondary Use dimension focuses on individuals’ 
concerns that information collected for one purpose is subsequently used 
for a secondary purpose without obtaining the individual’s permission 
(Smith et al. 1996). Consumer perceptions of unauthorised secondary use 
in the cloud context are highlighted in extant research (Pearson and 
Benameur 2010). The Improper Access dimension covers individuals’ 
concerns that an organisation does not have the measures in place to pre-
vent unauthorised individuals from accessing their information (Smith 
et al. 1996). The recent media coverage around large cloud data breaches 
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may heighten consumer awareness of potential improper access to their 
data stored in the cloud, and consequently, increase their concerns around 
such access. The Errors measure of concern focuses on individuals’ con-
cerns that the organisation storing their personal information does not 
have the measures in place to prevent and correct errors in the data (Smith 
et al. 1996). This dimension may not be relevant in all consumer cloud 
contexts, but issues around controlling data flows which are inherent in 
the cloud may cause concern around organisations’ ability to track infor-
mation, and as a result their capabilities to identify and remedy errors.
The Control dimension focuses on individuals’ concerns regarding the 
lack of control they have over their personal information (Malhotra et al. 
2004). Issues around control over data has been highlighted as an impor-
tant cloud privacy issue that warrants exploration (Sun et al. 2011; Pearson 
and Benameur 2010). The Awareness dimension centres around individu-
als’ concerns regarding their lack of awareness of how an organisation uses 
and protects their personal information (Malhotra et al. 2004). Awareness 
represents another core concern in the cloud context, with lack of trans-
parency around where data is stored and the protection mechanisms in 
place (e.g. Singh et al. 2015). It is important to therefore examine (1) if 
consumers lack awareness of privacy practices in the cloud and (2) if a lack 
of awareness heightens concerns for the privacy of one’s personal 
information.
The broader privacy literature offers a rich theoretical base from which 
the role of privacy in cloud computing can be advanced. Privacy theories 
are typically discussed from five perspectives—(1) drivers of privacy con-
cern, (2) behavioural consequences, (3) trade-offs, (4) institutional drivers 
and (5) individual factors (Li 2012). In contrast to the broader literature, 
the privacy research in the cloud context is relatively nascent. A review of 
the literature did not identify any studies leveraging theories in four of 
these five categories. However, two related studies drew on privacy calcu-
lus theory (PCT), a theory commonly utilised to understand the trade- 
offs between the benefits and the risks associated with the behaviour in 
question such as information disclosure or using a new technology (Culnan 
and Armstrong 1999). PCT posits that individuals engage in a cognitive 
comparison of the benefits and potential negative outcomes which may 
result from using a certain technology (Culnan and Armstrong 1999). 
According to this theory, individuals will utilise the technology as long as 
their perceptions of the benefits outweigh their risk perceptions (Culnan 
1993). The first study focused on consumers’ willingness to disclose 
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information in cloud-based mobile applications and found that privacy 
concerns reduced willingness to disclose information, whereas perceived 
usefulness of the apps and perceived trustworthiness both positively influ-
enced willingness to disclose (Nikkhah and Sabherwal 2017), thereby sup-
porting the use of PCT in this context. The second study focused on 
consumers’ intentions to continue use of cloud-based mobile applications 
and found that security and privacy interventions reduce privacy concerns 
and increase trust, and privacy and security concerns both indirectly influ-
ence willingness to continue to use apps through trust (Nikkhah et  al. 
2018), furthering support for PCT. These studies support the potential of 
privacy theories to advance our understanding of the role of privacy in this 
context and point to the need to further leverage this rich theoretical base.
4.4  enhancIng prIvacy perceptIonS In the cloud
The focus of much of the privacy literature in the cloud domain has been 
on technical measures to secure data to enhance security in the hope of 
negating privacy issues. These are discussed further in Chap. 7 of this 
book. These studies focus on reviewing the efficacy of measures such as 
different approaches and anonymisation mechanisms (Sonehara et  al. 
2011). Recent works have also highlighted important security consider-
ations in emerging cloud contexts such as IoT, stressing the need to con-
sider secure communications, data identification measures, and certification 
approaches for example (Singh et al. 2015).
Drawing from the existing research in the cloud context and the 
broader privacy literature, it can be argued that organisations need to 
address three related consumer perceptions; (1) control (2) awareness and 
(3) trust. The first two perceptions relate specifically to privacy concern 
while the third represents a broader perception of the technology (as dis-
cussed in detail in Chap. 1). All three consumer perceptions can negatively 
influence individuals’ willingness to adopt new technologies (Li 2012) 
and as such, represent an important barrier to the continued success of 
cloud computing.
Perceived control is a primary concept within the information privacy 
literature. However, it is important to note that privacy and control are 
conceptually distinct (Laufer and Wolfe 1977) and negatively correlated. 
Control is a perception based variable and has been defined as an individ-
ual’s beliefs in their ability to manage the collection and use of their per-
sonal data (Xu et al. 2011). In the cloud context, it has been noted that 
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consumers are afforded little or no control over their information 
(Alashoor 2014). In other contexts, a lack of perceived control can 
heighten privacy concerns (Dinev and Hart 2004), whereas if perceived 
control is high, individuals may be empowered to adopt technologies and 
disclose more personal information (Palmatier and Martin 2019). Closely 
related to control is consumers’ awareness of how their information is 
protected and used in the cloud. A lack of transparency is a commonly 
cited issue in the cloud context with many noting that cloud providers 
should engage in transparent communications to increase consumer 
awareness of how their personal data is used (Kesan et al. 2013). Awareness 
not only encompasses understanding of how data is protected, but where 
data is stored and how it is used.
Trust is often incorporated into privacy studies including those in the 
cloud context (e.g. Nikkhah et al. 2018). Consumers’ beliefs regarding 
the trustworthiness of an organisation relate to perceptions of the organ-
isation’s benevolence, integrity and competence (van der Werff et  al. 
2019; Bélanger et al. 2002). In privacy contexts, trust often focuses on an 
individual’s willingness to be vulnerable when transacting or sharing per-
sonal information with an organisation (McKnight et  al. 2002). In the 
cloud context, research supports the importance of trust in influencing 
consumers’ willingness to use cloud-based mobile applications and the 
relationship between privacy concern and trust (Nikkhah et al. 2018).
Central to addressing these consumer perceptions is improving organ-
isational communications with consumers and building knowledge. 
Organisation’s current communication efforts largely involve privacy poli-
cies. Currently, privacy policies tend to be quite lengthy and difficult to 
read (Kelley et al. 2010). Indeed, the time to read the privacy policies of 
all websites visited by an average American Internet user was estimated as 
201 hours annually (McDonald and Cranor 2008). Furthermore, when 
consumers read privacy policies, they often do not understand the con-
tents (Martin 2015). These issues with readability and understandability, 
as well as lack of user engagement with privacy policies, has led to calls to 
develop new communication methods which better inform consumers 
how their information is used (Park et  al. 2012). In addition to how 
organisations communicate, it is important to ensure consumers are 
equipped with the privacy knowledge needed to interpret these communi-
cations. Indeed, gaps in consumers’ privacy knowledge and self-efficacy 
has recently been highlighted as an important area to address in order to 
empower informed decision making (Crossler and Bélanger 2017). Thus, 
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we present three approaches organisations can use to influence consumer 
perceptions related to privacy in the cloud namely institutional assurances, 
just-in-time interventions, and building privacy knowledge. The first two 
approaches directly relate to communication methods and the third 
approach focuses on building consumers’ privacy literacy and as a result 
their capacity to engage with organisation consumers regarding their pri-
vacy practices.
4.4.1  Institutional Assurances
Institutional assurances or privacy disclosures are communication efforts 
from organisations to consumers, regarding the organisation’s data pri-
vacy practices. Institutional assurances are often heralded as a solution to 
addressing privacy concerns, improving perceptions of control and enhanc-
ing trust beliefs in many contexts (Culnan and Armstrong 1999; Wu et al. 
2012). Institutional assurances include privacy policies and visual 
approaches which combine text and icons such as privacy labels and trust 
labels. The privacy literature has found effective privacy policies address 
awareness issues by increasing perceptions of control (Xu et al. 2011) and 
improving understanding of privacy practices (Kelley et  al. 2010). 
However, the weaknesses inherent in existing privacy policies led to the 
emergence of the nutritional privacy label (Kelley et  al. 2010). In the 
cloud context, a cloud trust label providing relevant institutional assur-
ances and privacy information has been found to impact decision makers’ 
perceptions of the trustworthiness of cloud service providers (van der 
Werff et al. 2019). The nutritional label is one possible approach to insti-
tutional assurances which could serve as a fruitful avenue for both cloud 
service providers and organisations leveraging the cloud. This approach 
should include all information required in GDPR compliant privacy 
notices and inform consumers of how their data is used, stored, protected, 
and the controls they can exercise over their data. In addition, the label 
should address the three dimensions of trust (benevolence, integrity and 
competence), and the core security considerations in the cloud context. 
The label approach combines many recommendations for effective com-
munication from the UK Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO) 
including the use of recognisable icons and layering formats (ICO 2017). 
The content of the label should differ depending on the organisation and 
whether the label is consumer facing or used to influence perceptions of 
key decision makers in organisations. Based on findings in the cloud and 
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other contexts, these labels may build awareness and strengthen percep-
tions of control and trustworthiness. Privacy labels are likely to be useful 
as a communication tool for prospective customers, and should be acces-
sible to existing customers within the application or website settings.
4.4.2  Just-in-Time Interventions
In addition to detailed communication approaches such as privacy labels 
and notices, there is also a need for additional transparent communica-
tions with consumers as the need arises. The ICO advocates the use of 
just-in-time notices to inform consumers of changes in an organisation’s 
privacy practices (ICO 2017). For example, if an organisation plans to 
migrate to the cloud, they should inform their consumers of this change 
in a transparent manner. Additional reasons for just-in-time interventions 
include cases when an additional use arises for personal data and consumer 
consent is sought, as well as requests for updates to personal information, 
or requests for more information. In these interventions, organisations 
should be transparent and focus on explaining why the data is needed. The 
format of these interventions will vary depending on the level of the 
change and the technology in question. For mobile applications, a pop-up 
notification could be utilised to request consumer consent or additional 
data disclosure. For websites, individuals could be prompted to provide 
the requested information at log-in. The purpose of just-in-time interven-
tions is similar to the privacy label approach in that they seek to overcome 
issues with awareness, while reminding consumers of the controls they 
have and seeking to enhance trust beliefs through transparency.
4.4.3  Building Privacy Knowledge
As repeatedly noted throughout this chapter, cloud consumers often lack 
awareness of how their data is stored and used. In the broader privacy lit-
erature, Crossler and Bélanger (2019) advocate the importance of under-
standing and addressing consumers’ privacy knowledge-belief gaps and 
the need to develop contextualised privacy self-efficacy i.e. individuals’ 
perceptions that they have the knowledge and skills needed to protect the 
privacy of their data as required. This work builds on findings around the 
privacy paradox, wherein consumers express high privacy concerns but do 
not engage in behaviours to protect their information privacy (Bélanger 
and Crossler 2011). In their recent study, Crossler and Bélanger (2019) 
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found that context-specific privacy knowledge and privacy self-efficacy 
influence individuals’ privacy-protective behaviours. There is a need for 
organisations to consider consumers’ privacy knowledge and self-efficacy 
both for potential and existing customers. Any communication, be it a 
privacy label or app notification regarding privacy should consider the 
consumers’ knowledge, and be framed in ways which enhance their knowl-
edge as opposed to obfuscate improper practices. In addition, organisa-
tions should provide supplementary information and resources which 
empower consumers to develop their privacy knowledge and self-efficacy. 
It is argued that this level of transparency will heighten perceptions of 
control and trustworthiness while building consumers’ privacy self- efficacy 
and thereby facilitating informed decision making.
4.5  Future reSearch dIrectIonS
As discussed earlier, consumer perceptions of privacy are influenced by 
past experience and the context in question (Li 2011). As such, pertinent 
privacy issues are likely to vary across different cloud contexts (Pearson 
2012). At a high level, more privacy research is required that focuses on 
consumer perceptions of privacy in the cloud in general, among different 
cloud service provision models, in public/private cloud settings, and in 
different domains such as IoT.  Table  4.2 below outlines a number of 
potentially fruitful directions for research that may enrich our understand-
ing of privacy in the cloud. As per Li (2012), relevant theories popularised 
in other privacy contexts are listed alongside each area. These research 
directions represent an initial step in unravelling the role of the complex 
privacy construct in this multifaceted and evolving context.
4.6  concludIng remarkS
The need to address privacy concerns in order to ensure the success of new 
information technologies has been argued in the broader privacy literature 
(Hong and Thong 2013). The importance of addressing privacy and secu-
rity in the cloud is also well established (Wood 2012). However, literature 
focused on understanding consumer perceptions regarding privacy in the 
cloud is still emerging. This chapter argues for the need to move beyond 
technical solutions which address security first and privacy second, towards 
a focus on understanding and addressing the privacy perceptions of con-
sumers. Given the proliferation of cloud computing, the potential privacy 
4 UNDERSTANDING AND ENHANCING CONSUMER PRIVACY PERCEPTIONS… 
72
Table 4.2 Future research directions
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 •  Further unravelling the 
trade-offs between 
perceived benefits and 
risks in different cloud 
domains.





 •  Privacy calculus 
theory
 •  Social contract 
theory
•  Protection 
Motivation theory
Much of the privacy 
literature in other 
contexts follows the 
APCO model 
developed by Smith 




outcomes in a given 
context. Little is 
known about the 
important drivers of 
concern, dimensions 
of concern or 






 •  Developing privacy 




customers e.g. end 
users and business 
decision makers.
•  Examining the 
influence of these 
assurances on potential 
consumers’ perceptions 
of privacy and trust.
•  Examining the 
influence of these 
assurances on existing 
customers perceptions 
and willingness to 
continue use.
•  Communication 
privacy management 
theory
•  Procedural fairness 
theory






documented in other 
contexts. There is a 
need to unravel their 
effectiveness in the 
cloud context given 
the breadth of 
applications and 
technologies relying 
on the cloud to some 






Focus Areas of focus Guiding theories Rationale
Role of 
regulation
•  Examining consumer 
perceptions of 
regulatory protections 
in the cloud context.
•  Investigating 
regulatory expectations 
across cultures and 
cloud contexts.
•  Regulatory focus 
theory
The issue of data 
location is a primary 
concern in the cloud 





has been found to 
influence privacy in 
other contexts (Li 
2011). Little is 
known in terms of 
consumers’ 
regulation knowledge 




•  Examine the impacts of 
cloud privacy breaches 
on consumer 
perceptions regarding 
the cloud generally and 
the affected 
organisation.
•  Explore the efficacy of 
breach responses in 
rebuilding trust and 
privacy perceptions
•  Psychological 
contract breach
•  Communication 
privacy management 
theory
The growth of 
privacy breaches in 
the cloud has been 
widely publicised. It 
is important to 
explore how these 
incidents influence 
consumer 






 •  Explore consumers 
existing privacy 
knowledge and 
self-efficacy in different 
cloud contexts.




•  Explore the 
relationship between 
self-efficacy, privacy 
concern and behaviours 
in different cloud 
contexts.




Consumers lack of 
awareness of how 
their data is used in 
the cloud context 
coupled with the 
growth of cloud data 
breaches point to the 
need to understand 
and develop privacy 
knowledge and 
self-efficacy among 
consumers. As a 
result, it is important 
to empirically explore 
the efficacy of any 
such knowledge 
building efforts.
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implications span multiple industries, and privacy may pose different chal-
lenges for each industry or application. Proactive approaches to commu-
nicate with consumers such as privacy labels can be useful in addressing 
privacy concerns, enhancing perceptions of control and building trust 
beliefs. In addition, efforts are needed to build the privacy literacy and 
self-efficacy of consumers in this context. The recommendations presented 
in this chapter emphasises the importance of organisations proactively 
understanding and positively influencing consumer privacy perceptions, 
over and above the compliance with legal requirements such as the 
GDPR. It is hoped that this chapter provides some useful recommenda-
tions for practice and presents some interesting avenues for research in 
this domain.
reFerenceS
Alashoor, T. (2014). Cloud Computing: A Review of Security Issues and Solutions. 
International Journal of Cloud Computing, 3(3), 228–244.
Alashoor, T., Fox, G., & Jeff Smith, H. (2017). The Priming Effect of Prominent 
IS Privacy Concerns Scales on Disclosure Outcomes: An Empirical Examination. 
Pre-ICIS Workshop on Information Security and Privacy.
Bélanger, F., & Crossler, R. E. (2011). Privacy in the Digital Age: A Review of 
Information Privacy Research in Information Systems. MIS Quarterly, 35(4), 
1017–1042.
Bélanger, F., Hiller, J. S., & Smith, W. J. (2002). Trustworthiness in Electronic 
Commerce: The Role of Privacy, Security, and Site Attributes. The Journal of 
Strategic Information Systems, 11(3–4), 245–270.
Crossler, R. E., & Bélanger, F. (2017). The Mobile Privacy-Security Knowledge Gap 
Model: Understanding Behaviors. Proceedings of the 50th Hawaii International 
Conference on System Sciences.
Crossler, R. E., & Bélanger, F. (2019). Why Would I Use Location-Protective 
Settings on My Smartphone? Motivating Protective Behaviors and the Existence 
of the Privacy Knowledge–Belief Gap. Information Systems Research, 
30(3), 995–1006.
Culnan, M.  J. (1993). “How Did They Get My Name?” An Exploratory 
Investigation of Consumer Attitudes toward Secondary Information Use. MIS 
Quarterly, 17, 341–363.
Culnan, M.  J., & Armstrong, P.  K. (1999). Information Privacy Concerns, 
Procedural Fairness, and Impersonal Trust: An Empirical Investigation. 
Organization Science, 10(1), 104–115.
 G. FOX
75
Dinev, T., & Hart, P. (2004). Internet Privacy Concerns and Their Antecedents- 
Measurement Validity and a Regression Model. Behaviour & Information 
Technology, 23(6), 413–422.
Dinev, T., & Hart, P. (2006). An Extended Privacy Calculus Model for 
E-Commerce Transactions. Information Systems Research, 17(1), 61–80.
DivvyCloud. (2020). 2020 Cloud Misconfigurations Report. Retrieved from 
https://divvycloud.com/misconfigurations-report-2020/
Forbes. (2020). Beware—This Open Database On Google Cloud ‘Exposes 200 
Million Americans’: Are You at Risk?. Retrieved from https://www.forbes.
com/sites/zakdof fman/2020/03/20/stunning-new-google-cloud- 
breach-hits-200-mil l ion-us-cit izens-check-here-i f-youre-now-at-
risk/#1737e9528587
Fauzi, A. A. C., Noraziah, A., Herawan, T., & Zin, N. M. (2012, March). On 
cloud computing security issues. In Asian Conference on Intelligent Information 
and Database Systems (pp. 560–569). Springer, Berlin: Heidelberg.
Gartner. (2019). Gartner Forecasts Worldwide Public Cloud Revenue to Grow 
17% in 2020. Retrieved from https://www.gartner.com/en/newsroom/
press-releases/2019-11-13-gartner-forecasts-worldwide-public-cloud-reve-
nue-to-grow-17-percent-in-2020
Hong, W., & Thong, J. Y. L. (2013). Internet Privacy Concerns: An Integrated 
Conceptualization and Four Empirical Studies. MIS Quarterly, 37(1), 275–298.
ICO. (2017). Privacy Notices, Transparency and Control. A Code of Practice on 
Communicating Privacy Information to Individuals. Retrieved from https://
ico.org.uk/for-organizations/guide-to-dataprotection/privacy-notices-transparency- 
and-control/
ISO 27001. (2005). Information Security Management—Specification with 
Guidance for Use.
Kelley, P. G., Cesca, L., Bresee, J., & Cranor, L. F. (2010). Standardizing Privacy 
Notices: An Online Study of the Nutrition Label Approach. Proceedings of the 
SIGCHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems, pp. 1573–1582.
Kesan, J. P., Hayes, C. M., & Bashir, M. N. (2013). Information Privacy and Data 
Control in Cloud Computing: Consumers, Privacy Preferences, and Market 
Efficiency. Washington and Lee Law Review, 70, 341.
Laufer, R. S., & Wolfe, M. (1977). Privacy as a Concept and a Social Issue: A 
Multidimensional Developmental Theory. Journal of Social Issues, 33(3), 22–42.
Li, Y. (2011). Empirical Studies on Online Information Privacy Concerns: 
Literature Review and an Integrative Framework. CAIS, 28, 28.
Li, Y. (2012). Theories in Online Information Privacy Research: A Critical Review 
and an Integrated Framework. Decision Support Systems, 54(1), 471–481.
Lowry, P. B., Dinev, T., & Willison, R. (2017). Why Security and Privacy Research 
Lies at the Centre of the Information Systems (IS) Artefact: Proposing a Bold 
Research Agenda. European Journal of Information Systems, 26(6), 546–563.
4 UNDERSTANDING AND ENHANCING CONSUMER PRIVACY PERCEPTIONS… 
76
Malhotra, N. K., Kim, S. S., & Agarwal, J. (2004). Internet Users’ Information 
Privacy Concerns (IUIPC): The Construct, the Scale and a Causal Model. 
Information Systems Research, 15(4), 336–355.
Martin, K. (2015). Privacy Notices as Tabula Rasa: An Empirical Investigation 
Into How Complying with a Privacy Notice is Related to Meeting Privacy 
Expectations Online. Journal of Public Policy & Marketing, 34(2), 210–227.
McDonald, A. M., & Cranor, L. F. (2008). The Cost of Reading Privacy Policies. 
Information System: A Journal of Law and Policy for the Information Society, 
4(3), 543–568.
McKnight, D.  H., Choudhury, V., & Kacmar, C. (2002). Developing and 
Validating Trust Measures for e-commerce: An Integrative Typology. 
Information Systems Research, 13(3), 334–359.
Nikkhah, H. R., & Sabherwal, R. (2017). Mobile Cloud-Computing Applications: 
A Privacy Cost-Benefit Model. Proceedings of the Twenty-third Americas 
Conference on Information Systems, Boston.
Nikkhah, H. R., Grover, V., & Sabherwal, R. (2018). Why Do Users Continue to 
Use Mobile Cloud Computing Applications? A Security-Privacy. Proceedings of 
the 13th Pre-ICIS Workshop on Information Security and Privacy, Vol. 1.
Palmatier, R.  W., & Martin, K.  D. (2019). The Intelligent Marketer’s Guide to 
Data Privacy. Springer.
Paquette, S., Jaeger, P. T., & Wilson, S. C. (2010). Identifying the Security Risks 
Associated with Governmental Use of Cloud Computing. Government 
Information Quarterly, 27(3), 245–253.
Park, Y. J., Campbell, S. W., & Kwak, N. (2012). Affect, Cognition and Reward: 
Predictors of Privacy Protection Online. Computers in Human Behavior, 28(3), 
1019–1027.
Pearson, S. (2012). Privacy, Security and Trust in Cloud Computing, pp. 1–57. 
Retrieved from https://www.hpl.hp.com/techreports/2012/HPL-2012- 
80R1.pdf
Pearson, S., & Benameur, A. (2010, November). Privacy, Security and Trust Issues 
Arising from Cloud Computing. 2010 IEEE Second International Conference 
on Cloud Computing Technology and Science (pp. 693–702). IEEE.
Ramireddy, S., Chakraborty, R., Raghu, T. S., & Rao, H. R. (2010). Privacy and 
Security Practices in the Arena of Cloud Computing-A Research in Progress. In 
AMCIS, p. 574.
Scholtz, B., Govender, J., & Gomez, J. M. (2016). Technical and Environmental 
Factors Affecting Cloud Computing Adoption in the South African Public 
Sector. CONF-IRM, p. 16.
Senarathna, I., Yeoh, W., & Warren, M. (2014). Security and Privacy Concerns for 
Australian SMEs Cloud Adoption. WISP 2014 Proceedings.
Senarathna, I., Yeoh, W., Warren, M., & Salzman, S. (2016). Security and Privacy 
Concerns for Australian SMEs Cloud Adoption: Empirical Study of 
 G. FOX
77
Metropolitan vs Regional SMEs. Australasian Journal of Information 
Systems, 20, 1–20.
Shropshire, J., Campbell, M., & Bob, S. (2015). Overcoming Privacy Challenges in 
Mobile-Cloud Computing. SAIS 2015 Proceedings, p. 28
Singh, J., et  al. (2015). Twenty Security Considerations for Cloud-Supported 
Internet of Things. IEEE Internet of things Journal, 3(3), 269–284.
Smith, H.  J., Dinev, T., & Xu, H. (2011). Information Privacy Research: An 
Interdisciplinary Review. MIS Quarterly, 35(4), 989–1016.
Smith, H. J., Milberg, S. J., & Burke, S. J. (1996). Information Privacy: Measuring 
Individuals’ Concerns about Organizational Practices. MIS Quarterly, 
20, 167–196.
Son, J.-Y., & Kim, S. S. (2008). Internet Users’ Information Privacy-Protective 
Responses: A Taxonomy and a Nomological Model. MIS Quarterly, 
32(3), 503–529.
Sonehara, N., Echizen, I., & Wohlgemuth, S. (2011). Isolation in Cloud 
Computing and Privacy-Enhancing Technologies. Business & Information 
Systems Engineering, 3(3), 155.
Subashini, S., & Kavitha, V. (2011). A Survey on Security Issues in Service Delivery 
Models of Cloud Computing. Journal of Network and Computer Applications, 
34(1), 1–11.
Sun, D., Chang, G., Sun, L., & Wang, X. (2011). Surveying and Analysing 
Security, Privacy and Trust Issues in Cloud Computing Environments. Procedia 
Engineering, 15, 2852–2856.
van der Werff, L., Fox, G., Masevic, I., Emeakaroha, V. C., Morrison, J. P., & 
Lynn, T. (2019). Building Consumer Trust in the Cloud: An Experimental 
Analysis of the Cloud Trust Label Approach. Journal of Cloud Computing, 8(1), 6.
Warren, S. D., & Brandeis, L. D. (1890). The Right to Privacy. Harvard Law 
Review, 193–220.
Westin, A. (1967). Privacy and Freedom. New York: Atheneum.
Whittaker, Z. (2020). Marriott Says 5.2 Million Guest Records Were Stolen in 
Another Data Breach. TechCrunch. Retrieved from https://techcrunch.
com/2020/03/31/marriott-hotels-breached-again/
Wood, K. (2012). Exploring Security Issues in Cloud Computing. UKAIS.
Wu, K.-W., Huang, S. Y., Yen, D. C., & Popova, I. (2012). The Effect of Online 
Privacy Policy on Consumer Privacy Concern and Trust. Computers in Human 
Behavior, 28(3), 889–897.
Xu, H., et  al. (2011). Information Privacy Concerns: Linking Individual 
Perceptions with Institutional Privacy Assurances. Journal of the Association for 
Information Systems, 12(12), 798–824.
4 UNDERSTANDING AND ENHANCING CONSUMER PRIVACY PERCEPTIONS… 
78
Open Access This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons 
Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/
by/4.0/), which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction 
in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original 
author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons licence and 
indicate if changes were made.
The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the 
chapter’s Creative Commons licence, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to 
the material. If material is not included in the chapter’s Creative Commons licence 
and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the 
permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the copy-
right holder.
 G. FOX
79© The Author(s) 2021
T. Lynn et al. (eds.), Data Privacy and Trust in Cloud Computing, 
Palgrave Studies in Digital Business & Enabling Technologies, 
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-54660-1_5
CHAPTER 5
Justice vs Control in Cloud Computing: 
A Conceptual Framework for Positioning 
a Cloud Service Provider’s Privacy 
Orientation
Valerie Lyons
Abstract The continued rise in frequency and magnitude of cloud-based 
privacy breaches brings to the fore the challenges experienced by cloud 
service providers (CSPs) in balancing the need to maximize profit with the 
need to maintain data privacy. With a backdrop of the ineffectiveness of 
regulatory approaches to protecting privacy, this chapter explores privacy 
from a non-regulatory perspective—instead exploring a CSP’s approach to 
privacy as dynamics of control and justice. We apply control theory to 
represent the CSP’s compliance with privacy legislation and power over 
data, and we apply justice theory to represent the CSP exceeding compli-
ance. Control theories, such as social contract theory, have frequently 
V. Lyons (*) 




been applied to explore privacy challenges between organizations and 
consumers, as too have justice theories e.g. procedural and distributive 
justice. However, few studies have combined these theoretical concepts to 
provide a balanced view of these tensions in the cloud computing land-
scape. Integrating concepts from these theories, we construct a framework 
that can help to explain and position a CSP’s privacy orientation. Four key 
privacy orientations emerge in our framework, namely: Risk Managers, 
Integrators, Citizens and Warriors. We discuss the implications of each 
privacy orientation for CSPs. Our framework will enable future research to 
further understand, explore and compare the impact and effectiveness of 
each privacy orientation.
Keywords Cloud computing • Data privacy • Data protection • 
Control theories • Justice theories • Procedural justice • 
Distributive justice
5.1  IntroductIon
The high cost of maintaining internal IT systems that are scalable, robust, 
and fast enough to keep pace with the speed of business, has ushered in 
the era of cloud computing services. Global cloud market revenues are 
predicted to increase from U$180b in 2015 to U$390b in 2020, attaining 
17% annual average growth (Forbes 2017). All indicators for the growth 
of cloud computing, such as data traffic, the number of data centers or the 
amount of cloud service providers (CSPs) are also predicted to grow expo-
nentially (Cisco 2018a). Whether applied to enterprise management sys-
tems, email systems or mobile computing, cloud computing both increases 
efficiency and reduces information technology costs by allowing on- 
demand access to a shared pool of computing resources that can be rapidly 
provisioned and released with minimal management effort (Mell and 
Grance 2011). However, although cloud computing’s benefits are tre-
mendous, security and privacy concerns continue to be the primary obsta-
cles to wide adoption (CSA 2009).
Cloud computing presents particularly challenging issues for privacy as 
it involves the dispersal of data across servers in geographically dispersed 
locations that often cross national and legislative boundaries, together 
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with shared use of resources, making privacy incidents difficult to deter-
mine and detect (Ren et al. 2012). This was evidenced by a recent case in 
2019, when Rubrik, the cloud data management giant, exposed a large 
cache of customer information improperly stored in an Amazon 
Elasticsearch database (Techcrunch 2019). With the rise in high-profile 
privacy incidents, such as Cambridge Analytica in 2018, and Capital One’s 
data breach on AWS (Fortune 2019), cloud service customers (CSCs) 
have also become more aware of the potential risks associated with the 
processing of data outside the traditional on-premise models. There are 
additional tensions arising from the costs of detection, prevention and/or 
remediation of privacy incidents versus the value that can be derived from 
data services (Acquisti 2008; Chen et al. 2012).
Governments, regulators and policymakers respond to such incidents 
by enhancing the specificity and stringency of compliance regulation, 
however the pace of change in cloud computing and the exponential 
growth in data is fast outpacing the legislative lifecycle. Instead of focusing 
on regulation as a response, focusing on privacy from a non-regulatory 
perspective may yield more sustainable solutions for CSPs to address the 
balance of these tensions more effectively. Reflecting this—in this chapter, 
we draw on control theories of privacy (Fried 1984; Moor 1997) to 
explain how CSPs comply with privacy law and exact power over data and 
systems, and we draw on theories of procedural justice (Allan and Tyler 
1988) to explain how CSPs can ‘loosen the leash’ to enable the CSC have 
more control.
It would be highly complex to map cloud computing issues across the 
full panoply of regulatory privacy architectures, such as the California 
Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA), the General Data Protection Regulation 
(GDPR), the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), the 
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) etc. 
However, given the broad reach of GDPR (it jurisdictionally applies to all 
EU CSPs, and to any non-EU CSP processing data of EU residents, or to 
any data processing within an EU territory) and its position as the stron-
gest data protection regime in the world (Consumers-International 2019), 
we focus on GDPR in this chapter as the common reference for privacy 
regulation.
Applying these concepts of control and justice to privacy, we present a 
proposed privacy orientation framework describing the key privacy orien-
tations of CSPs. This framework can help explain different approaches to 
privacy, and to understand their implications. Our framework extends 
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research from Greenaway et al. (2015) to posit a new dimension to privacy 
orientations, which we call the Philanthropic Privacy dimension, where 
organizations undertake privacy activities with the aim of resolving privacy 
as a social issue. This privacy dimension is important, as organizations tak-
ing actions beyond their corporate obligations have been found to experi-
ence less privacy incidents (Accenture and Ponemon 2015).
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: in the next sec-
tion we discuss the tensions arising from privacy, through the lens of con-
trol and justice. Following that section, we provide a brief overview of 
privacy risks in the CSP environment and outline the boundaries of privacy 
responsibilities within cloud computing models. We subsequently describe 
the development of our privacy orientation framework. We conclude this 
chapter with proposals for application of the framework and suggestions 
for further research.
5.2  PrIvacy as a control or JustIce BehavIor
Dinev (2014) suggests that societal discourse has come to equate privacy 
and information privacy, so the terms are used here interchangeably. 
Information privacy is frequently described as a multidimensional concept 
that is dependent on context (Culnan and Williams 2009; Xu et al. 2012). 
The multiple dimensions affecting privacy being harm, protection, provi-
sion, and scope (Mulligan et  al. 2016) and the facets shaping context 
being information sensitivity, industry sector, political sector and techno-
logical applications (Smith et al. 2011).
For over two decades, theories of control or theories of justice have 
been used to explore privacy challenges. Control theories, such as social 
contract theory, have frequently been applied to explore privacy challenges 
between organizations and consumers (Martin 2012, 2016; Wright and 
Xie 2019) as too have justice theories e.g. procedural and distributive jus-
tice (Ashworth and Free 2006; Culnan and Armstrong 1999). However, 
with the exception of Greenaway et al. (2015) no other study has com-
bined these theoretical concepts to provide a balanced view of the privacy 
tensions arising between CSPs and CSCs.
5.2.1  Privacy as Control
While there is no single concept of information privacy that crosses all 
disciplines (Smith et  al. 2011) ‘control over personal information’ is a 
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common theme across many privacy studies (Belanger and Crossler 2011; 
Belanger et al. 2002). Control can refer to the ‘controls’ used to manage 
privacy (Belanger et al. 2002) or refer to the dynamic of ‘power’ over data 
(Johnson 2009). Both CSCs and CSPs implement ‘controls’ to manage 
privacy (Belanger et al. 2002) in the form of privacy enhancing tools, net-
work access controls, authorization and authentication controls, privileged 
identity management controls etc. When privacy controls fail, a privacy 
incident is said to occur (a privacy incident is defined as the loss of control, 
compromise, unauthorized disclosure, unauthorized acquisition, or any 
similar occurrence where an authorized user accesses or potentially accesses 
personal information (DHS 2017, p. 8)). Johnson (2009) on the other 
hand refers to control as an organization’s need for power over informa-
tion, while the consumer has to balance the good achieved through infor-
mation processing against their need for privacy.
Providing the CSC with increased control over their data can result in 
the CSP not being able to maximize data storage efficiency, require the 
implementation of costly technical tools by the CSP, or necessitate costly 
legal indemnification of risk away from the CSP. Greenaway et al. (2015) 
describe this tension as the pursuit of interests such as profitability or mar-
ket share, at the expense of those who provide information or pay for a 
service. This need for a CSP to dominate control is enshrined in the con-
cept of information ownership, and it is this concept of control and power 
that we apply in this chapter, as reflected by Xu et al. (2012) who distin-
guish privacy control between individual and organization, with the orga-
nization increasingly becoming the ‘control agent’.
However, privacy is not solely about control but also about information 
being authorized to flow to specific agents at specific times (Moor 1997). 
Moor (1997) argues that in a highly digital culture it is simply not possible 
to control all information. Therefore, he argues, the best way to protect 
privacy is to ensure the right people have access to relevant information at 
the right time, giving individuals as much control over their data as realis-
tically possible (labelling his theory the “control/restricted access” theory 
of privacy). With the emerging complexity of organizational networks, 
such as those constructed by CSPs, such levels of control are not realisti-
cally possible. Greenaway et al. (2015) classify organizations who provide 
little control to their consumers as ‘low control’. However, aligning to the 
concepts of control that we draw on in this paper, we would classify these 
organizations as ‘high control’, as they essentially dominate ‘power’ over 
the consumers’ information.
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5.2.2  Privacy as Justice
The power-responsibility equilibrium (PRE) model, developed by Davis 
et  al. (1980), states that power (which Laczniak and Murphy (1993) 
define as ‘the ability to control’) should be in equilibrium, where the part-
ner with more power also has the responsibility to ensure an environment 
of trust and confidence. If an organization chooses a strategy of great 
power and less responsibility, it might benefit in the short-term but will 
lose control in the long-term e.g. from increased regulation (Caudill and 
Murphy 2000). Organizations can re-balance the control-equilibrium by 
returning a level of control to the consumer. For instance, in 2019, Apple 
updated its privacy website with a revised declaration of the company’s 
position on privacy.1 This included a new section titled ‘Control’ with a 
subsection titled ‘Take Charge of Your Data’ which outlines:
To give you more control over your personal information, we are rolling out 
a set of dedicated privacy management tools.
This relinquishing of control by an organization is enshrined in the 
concept of information stewardship. Information stewardship implies that 
no matter what an organization does with stakeholders’ information (for 
example, selling it to third parties) the organization always remains respon-
sible and retains oversight of the processing of that information 
(Rosenbaum 2010). Apple offer opportunities to their consumers that 
return a level of transparency and control to the consumer—by providing 
clear and simple explanations of what privacy options are available and 
how to implement them—they provide opportunities to their consumers 
that score highly on the Fair Information Practice Principles (FIPPs) 
scales. The principles of FIPPs are transparency, preference, purpose, min-
imization, limitation, quality, integrity, security, and accountability (DHS 
2008, p. 4). Information privacy and FIPPs have been linked to proce-
dural justice (Culnan and Bies 2003), where an organization’s control 
over personal information is noted as ‘just’ when the information owner is 
vested with the key principles of FIPPs (Culnan and Bies 2003; Greenaway 
et al. 2015). Organizations demonstrating behaviors that exceed compli-
ance obligations to protect information entrusted to them, view them-
selves as information stewards rather than information owners and 




demonstrate a ‘culture of caring’ with regard to privacy (Accenture and 
Ponemon 2015). These types of organizations have also been found to 
experience less privacy incidents (Accenture and Ponemon 2015).
5.3  PrIvacy and cloud comPutIng
Although cloud computing enables reduced start-up costs, reduced oper-
ating costs and increased agility, its architectural features also raise various 
privacy concerns which are shared across several key stakeholders (Takabi 
et al. 2010) such as the CSP, the CSC, the consumer/data subject and 
application developers. Organizations are increasingly concerned about 
the risks of storing their data and applications on systems that reside out-
side of their on-premise data centres (Chen et al. 2010). ENISA (2009) 
define these risks as:
• privacy risks for the CSC e.g. non-compliance to enterprise policies 
and legislation, loss of reputation and credibility and being forced or 
persuaded to be tracked, or give personal information against their 
will (e.g. by governments)
• privacy risks for implementers of cloud platforms e.g. exposure of 
sensitive information stored on the platforms (potentially for fraudu-
lent purposes), legal liability, loss of reputation and credibility, lack of 
user trust and take-up
• privacy risks for providers of applications on top of cloud platforms 
e.g. legal noncompliance, loss of reputation, ‘function creep’ using 
the personal information stored on the cloud, i.e. it might be used 
for purposes other than the original cloud intention
• privacy risks for the data subject e.g. exposure of personal information
However, unlike the traditional on-premise model of computing, 
responsibility for these privacy risks in the cloud computing model is 
shared between the CSC and the CSP, and the balance between the two 
responsibilities changes between cloud service models. This relationship is 
known as the shared responsibility model, and it is the basis for how mod-
ern cloud security and privacy operates with each service model differing 
in the amount of control offered to the CSC (Tripwire 2018). Haeberlen 
(2010) describes how different cloud service models affect the ways that 
privacy responsibilities are shared between CSPs and CSCs:
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• IaaS—the CSP is responsible for the implementation and manage-
ment of privacy controls only within the physical infrastructure. The 
CSC is responsible for all other aspects of privacy.
• PaaS—the CSP is responsible for IaaS. However, CSCs and CSPs are 
jointly responsible for ensuring appropriate privacy controls are 
implemented within the applications deployed on the PaaS 
environment.
• SaaS—the CSC has limited control over privacy and security. CSCs 
will generally maintain responsibility for managing identity and 
access management controls to ensure minimum permissions are 
assigned to roles. The CSP is responsible for ensuring all other pri-
vacy controls are in place.
As a CSC moves from on-premise models to cloud service models, they 
lose control over their data, including control over the privacy of that data. 
Although the shared responsibilities model assumes a level of transparency 
and control for the CSC, CSPs have traditionally lacked transparency 
regarding their privacy policies, strategy, service, thresholds etc. making it 
difficult for CSCs to objectively perform evaluations and risk assessments 
for a CSP service (Cruzes and Jaatun 2015). The implementation of ethi-
cal principles such as those in FIPPs not only mitigate the key privacy risks 
associated with cloud computing (Pearson 2009) but also offer the CSP 
an opportunity to rebalance the control-justice equilibrium for the CSC.
Many CSPs including Amazon, Microsoft, and IBM do offer simple 
breakdowns of performance metrics and responsibilities etc. However, 
some CSPs (e.g. SAAS model CSPs such as Salesforce or Workday) do not 
clearly define these sufficiently (Prüfer 2018). In a recent survey of IT 
decision makers (Netapp 2016) 35% believed responsibility for data sits 
with the CSPs, while 3% did not know who would be responsible. GDPR 
is very clear that responsibility for personal data lies firmly with the data 
controller (GDPR, Article 24). Under GDPR, the CSC is responsible 
(regardless of cloud computing model) for ensuring their own compliance 
requirements are handled effectively by the CSP and ensuring these 
requirements are adequately reflected in legally binding contractual agree-
ments (called Data Processing Agreements, or DPAs) with the 
CSP. However, if a CSP is not transparent for instance, about which core 
IT services they themselves outsource to sub-processors, the CSC is unable 
to properly evaluate risks. In some cases, it may be difficult for the CSC (in 
its role as data controller) to assess the adequacy of the CSP’s data 
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handling practices to ensure that their data is handled in a lawful way. This 
problem is exacerbated in cases of multiple transfers of data e.g. between 
federated clouds. This lack of transparency is linked to decreased levels of 
trust in the CSP, is a key barrier for the adoption of cloud services (Del 
Alamo et al. 2015) and is associated with lack of accountability (Pearson 
2009; Haeberlen 2010).
Finally, CSCs often overlook the on-premise privacy measures that tra-
ditional applications rely on such as on-premise firewall configurations 
that block logins from specific locations (such as embargoed countries), 
intrusion prevention systems, behavior analytics platforms (detecting 
insider threats), log management and alerting solutions (Oracle 2017). 
Since these and other measures protect privacy in applications in the enter-
prise campus, they are often taken for granted in the context of any one 
particular application and the responsibility for their installation and 
upkeep falls squarely on the CSC (Oracle 2017).
Alongside issues of transparency, responsibility and accountability, 
Abed and Chavan (2019) highlight a number of universal privacy issues 
facing CSCs, when considering cloud computing adoption, namely; the 
institutional obligation for disclosure (to governments), breach and inci-
dent disclosure, data accessibility and retention, and physical storage 
location):
• Institutional obligation for disclosure to Governments: Studies have 
shown that CSCs considering cloud adoption are concerned that 
data outsourced to the CSP can be accessed by others, notably public 
authorities with legitimate or illegitimate objectives as well as legal 
and illegal private actors (August et al. 2014). For instance in 2018, 
the Clarifying Lawful Overseas Use of Data Act (CLOUD Act, 
House of Representatives Bill 4943, 2018) enabled law enforcement 
agencies to access data processed by US-based companies, regardless 
of whether the servers were located in the US.
• Breach and incident disclosure: GDPR mandates that a privacy inci-
dent/breach be reported within 72 hours of its discovery. However, 
when the privacy incident/breach occurs in the CSP environment, it 
is very difficult for the CSC to have transparent discovery and disclo-
sure arrangements in place. The breach disclosure requirements are 
defined under Article 28 of the GDPR and need to be incorporated 
into the DPA with the CSP. This contract also needs to clearly define 
the balance of liability in the event of a data breach.
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• Data accessibility and retention: Guaranteeing availability of cloud 
data when migrating from one CSP to another has become a primary 
concern for CSCs (Xue et al. 2017). In the CSP environment, per-
sonal data accessibility, retention and deletion become fundamental 
requirements to prevent CSCs being ‘locked in’ to a given CSP.
• Physical Storage Location: CSPs may store data in multiple geo-
graphically dispersed jurisdictional locations. Often this presents a 
challenge to identify which legislation takes precedence where laws 
conflict, particularly where there is conflict between the laws apply-
ing to the physical location of a CSP data centre and the physical 
location of the CSC (Abed and Chavan 2019).
5.4  the PrIvacy orIentatIon Framework
In the early years of privacy, organizations understood their responsibili-
ties toward privacy to be legal and financial responsibilities. In the 70’s 
discretionary frameworks such as FIPPs emerged—combining privacy 
standards with due process, consumer rights, and equality protections 
(Westin 2003). From the turn of the century Westin (2003) suggests that 
privacy became a first-level social and political issue in response to 9/11, 
the Internet, the cell phone, the human genome project, data mining, 
automation of government public records amongst others. In the last 
decade organizations began to respond to these fundamental changes to 
concern for privacy, with initiatives that exceeded their legal, financial and 
ethical responsibilities—ranging from privacy-by-design standards, devel-
oping open privacy standards, to collaborating with privacy advocacy 
groups. Given their association with justice and improved privacy protec-
tion, our framework was concerned with those privacy behaviors exceed-
ing legislation. Much of the literature investigating privacy beyond 
legislation (Pollach 2011; Allen and Peloza 2015) explored privacy as a 
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR). McWilliams and Siegel (2001) 
define CSR as those actions that appear to further some social good, 
beyond the interests of the organization and ‘beyond that which is required 
by law’.
Carroll’s model of CSR is the most commonly known model for CSR 
(Visser 2006). Carroll (1979) identified four pillars of CSR (financial 
responsibilities, legal responsibilities, ethical responsibilities, and philan-
thropic responsibilities). Privacy is a financial responsibility as organiza-
tions can be fined significant sums of money for non-compliance. Privacy 
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is also a legal responsibility as privacy legislation (e.g. the California 
Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA) or the GDPR) mandates strict governance 
over the processing of personal data. Carroll (1998) suggested that privacy 
not only is a legal and financial responsibility but is also an ethical respon-
sibility, as legislation lags behind ethics, and morality comes into play. 
Privacy also meets Mason’s (1995) test of what constitutes an ethical 
problem i.e. whenever one party in pursuit of its goals engages in behavior 
that materially affects the ability of another party to pursue its goals. In 
2018, the then EU Data Protection Supervisor (Giovanni Buttarelli) 
argued that in order to address this ethical component of privacy, organi-
zations should not overly rely on bare compliance with the letter of law, 
and should adopt a ‘duty of care’ for consumer data (Buttarelli 2018). 
CSR activities are most appropriate where existing legislation requires 
compliance with the spirit as well as the letter of the law and where the 
organization can fool stakeholders through superior knowledge 
(Mintzberg 1983).
Finally, privacy can be described as a philanthropic responsibility, where 
an organization’s privacy behaviors demonstrate a ‘duty of care’ (Buttarelli 
2018) towards data owners and society that exceeds compliance. 
Philanthropy presents itself in many forms e.g. cash contributions or 
employee commitments (Smith 1994) and is often explained by social 
exchange theory (Emerson 1962) where corporations use philanthropy to 
expand the scope of their business initiatives, influence governments, and 
position themselves as influential leaders (Jung et al. 2016). Both Husted 
(2003) and Stannard-Stockton (2011) suggest three classifications of phi-
lanthropy; (1) “check-book philanthropy” i.e. making cash contributions 
to a cause; (2) in-house projects and philanthropic investments; (3) strate-
gic philanthropic collaboration between organizations and non-corporate 
partners. True philanthropy matches the resources of the giver with the 
needs of the recipient through a socially beneficial relation that is mobi-
lized and governed by a force of morally armed entreaty (Schervish 1998).
As we could find no reference in the literature to philanthropic privacy, 
based on definitions of CSR from McWilliams and Siegel (2001) we 
describe it as: ‘Any privacy behavior(s) exceeding legislative requirements, 
that furthers privacy as a societal good, beyond the interests of the organiza-
tion’. Philanthropic privacy behaviors would therefore include behaviors 
such as advising on government policy, developing open privacy standards 
or tools, exceeding privacy laws for employees, even lobbying for strength-
ened privacy on behalf of the consumer or society. Whilst traditional 
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lobbying often aims at shaping rules for privacy in the best interest of the 
organization, some organizations may try to shape the rules in a way that 
favors society’s needs for privacy. The inclusion of the philanthropic 
dimension is important, as organizations taking privacy actions beyond 
their corporate obligations have been found to experience less privacy inci-
dents (Accenture and Ponemon 2015). It therefore seems reasonable to 
suggest that the philanthropic privacy dimension may help identify privacy 
behaviors that could help strengthen privacy protection effectiveness.
Although privacy behaviors ‘beyond that which is required by law’ may 
demonstrate the differentiating behaviors of justice that this chapter is 
keen to explore, it is important to highlight that this concept of ‘beyond 
that which is required by law’ differs from one jurisdiction to another. For 
instance, the GDPR mandates that organizations provide transparency, 
choice, purpose and notice to the data subject. Many other jurisdictions, 
particular large sectors of the US, do not mandate the provision of these 
privacy behaviors through regulation but through industry self-regulation 
and discretionary codes such as FIPPs. Thus, choice for example, would 
be considered a legal requirement within GDPR, and in certain US con-
texts an ethical requirement. This is an important consideration for any 
future application of our framework, as an evaluation of the local privacy 
landscape for a given organization would first be required, in order to 
determine their legal minimums.
5.4.1  Framework Dimensions
Greenaway et al. (2015), combine control and justice theory to form a 
privacy orientation which they call Company Information Privacy 
Orientation (CIPO). Their research forms the starting point for the con-
struction of the privacy orientation framework we develop in this chapter. 
Greenaway et al. (2015) suggest that an organization’s privacy orientation 
is founded on three dimensions namely: information management (i.e. 
how an organization uses information for profit), legal and ethical dimen-
sions. These three dimensions are underpinned by several theoretical com-
ponents: stakeholder theory, stockholder theory, social contract theory, 
information processing theory and cognitive categorization theory 
(Greenaway et  al. 2015). Through triangulation of their three CIPO 
dimensions with the four pillars of CSR from Carroll’s (1979) CSR pyra-
mid of responsibilities (economic, legal, ethical, and philanthropic), we 
extend the CIPO framework with the addition of the philanthropic 
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dimension. Triangulation enables a systematic search for convergence 
among sources of information to form new or revised themes/categories 
representing the state of knowledge for a given subject (Denzin 1978; 
Yardley 2008). See Table  5.1 for the Privacy Orientation Framework 
Table 5.1 Privacy orientation framework dimensions including philanthropy
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Table 5.1 (continued)
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dimensions, adapted from the Greenaway et al. (2015) CIPO framework, 
extended to include details for the Philanthropic dimension.
A CSP may demonstrate a combination of both control-based behav-
iors and justice-based behaviors in varying levels. We therefore position 
control and justice as two continua, where four privacy orientations 
emerge, namely; ‘low-justice, low-control’ orientations (we call CSPs in 
this orientation ‘Compliers’); ‘low-justice, high-control’ (we call CSPs in 
this orientation ‘Integrators’); ‘high-justice, high-control’ (we call CSPs 
in this orientation ‘Citizens’); and ‘high-justice, low-control’ (we call 
CSPs in this orientation ‘Warriors’). We summarize our privacy orienta-
tion framework below in Fig. 5.1.
5.4.1.1  Compliers
Complier CSPs focus on privacy risk mitigation. CSPs in this orientation 
demonstrate privacy behaviors that measure low on justice and low on 
control. This orientation sets compliance as the goal, with privacy gover-

























Fig. 5.1 Privacy orientations framework
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practices are often centred on compliance with laws and industry stan-
dards. These organizations report little more than privacy metrics man-
dated by privacy. They may undertake lobbying towards privacy but only 
where beneficial to the organization. They have no real philanthropic per-
spective with regard to privacy. Compliers tend to provide rudimentary 
transactional services (for instance Cloudways and Digital Ocean). They 
will typically offer security and privacy features at an additional cost, or like 
Amazon AWS, allow the CSC to reconfigure private buckets to be non- 
private. Risk-Managers rarely exceed legislative minimums.
In 2019, Capital One (using AWS as their CSP) suffered a breach 
impacting 100 m customers’ financial data including social security num-
bers (Business Insider 2019). The AWS server used by Capital One was 
vulnerable to a well-known attack (called server-side request forgery 
[SSRF]). AWS denied liability (as their contracts indemnified them) how-
ever—without being legally required to do so, AWS’s largest competitors 
(Google and Microsoft) had already addressed the threat of SSRF attacks 
two years previously.2
5.4.1.2  Integrators
Integrator CSPs offer robust compliance to privacy legislation whilst inte-
grating society’s increasing expectations to address privacy as a social 
responsibility. CSPs in this privacy orientation demonstrate privacy behav-
iors that measure low on justice and high on control. Relinquishing con-
trol (by offering increased justice behaviors) to their CSCs is not important 
to these organizations, as they require widespread access to data and sys-
tems in order to minimize costs and maximize profit. CSPs in this orienta-
tion may actively reflect on ways they can use social issues such as privacy 
to gain competitive advantage. For instance, privacy rights for employees, 
their families, and local communities may be supported. The CSPs objec-
tive in this orientation is to mitigate the erosion of economic value in the 
medium term and to achieve longer-term gains by integrating responsible 
privacy practices into their daily operations (Zadek 2004). These CSPs not 
only want to monetize their cloud service, but they also want to maximize 
data value. Although CSPs in this orientation may appear to demonstrate 





standards, open tools etc. this philanthropy towards privacy is not always 
a ‘felt’ value.
For instance, Google Cloud’s published privacy commitments (Google 
2020) state that “we believe that trust is created through transparency, and 
we want to be transparent about our commitments and what you can expect 
when it comes to our shared responsibility for protecting and managing your 
data in the cloud”. Yet in 2019, Google were fined €50m by the French 
data protection authority for lack of transparency in their privacy policies 
(CNIL 2019).
5.4.1.3  Citizens
Citizen CSPs assume a citizenship role, leading privacy issues and trans-
forming their business models to achieve this objective. Citizen CSPs 
demonstrate privacy behaviors that measure high on justice and high on 
control. They openly acknowledge their new roles and responsibilities 
towards society, and recognize how responsibilities towards private, pub-
lic, and social sectors have become interdependent (Latapi-Agudelo et al. 
2019). The Citizen orientation addresses privacy strategically, where pri-
vacy programs are focused on building and maintaining sustainable rela-
tionships, and often exceed legislative obligations. These organizations 
incorporate privacy as a value held strongly by the organization, associat-
ing their privacy behaviors with other strong values such as trust and 
integrity (Mirvis and Googins 2006). CSPs in the Citizen privacy orienta-
tion broaden their agenda by expanding their privacy concerns and deepen 
the involvement of top management in the leadership addressing privacy 
issues. Organizations form long-term alliance and partnerships with stake-
holders in order to drive change in privacy issues. Caldwell et al. (2010) 
refer to this leadership as a ‘stewardship role’ which generates commit-
ment from other stakeholders and organizations in order to drive change 
in several key privacy issues. CSPs in this orientation consider privacy to be 
a compliance obligation however they also consider privacy to be strategic, 
where privacy is used to build and maintain sustainable relationships, and 
often exceeds legal minimums—reflecting philanthropic privacy.
Microsoft for instance established an online trust centre to respond to 
queries on privacy for all its products, particularly on Office 365. They also 
provide tools to simplify responding to Subject Access Requests mandated 
by GDPR (Microsoft 2018a). Microsoft has also extended the rights avail-
able to Europeans under the GDPR, to all its consumers, noting that 
“GDPR establishes important principles that are relevant globally” 
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(Microsoft 2018b). IBM, as another example, were among the first com-
panies to sign the EU Data Protection Code of Conduct for Cloud Service 
Providers (IBM 2017).
5.4.1.4  Warriors
Warrior CSPs highlight privacy as a societal issue and may even revolt 
against laws in order to support it. CSPs who are positioned in this orien-
tation demonstrate privacy behaviors that measure high on justice, how-
ever unlike those of the Citizen, their behaviors may also measure low on 
control. In terms of philanthropic privacy, Warrior CSPs may lobby gov-
ernment for increased privacy for individuals, knowing it will increase 
organizational costs, reduce shareholder returns and/or marginalize cer-
tain stakeholders. They may stake claims to privacy, to such a degree that 
they will breach laws if they feel that those laws compromise social or 
democratic freedoms.
Apple for example, in 2015 and 2016, refused to comply with, and 
challenged, at least 12 orders issued by the FBI compelling Apple to 
enable decryption of phones involved in criminal investigations and pros-
ecutions. It could be argued that Apple monetize ‘privacy’ as part of their 
brand, however in the US they did not garner widespread support for 
their decision and at that time 51% of American smartphone users were 
against Apple’s decision, while only 38% supported Apples stance (Pew 
2016). Warriors may demonstrate less control than those in the Citizen 
orientation, however in its place they introduce strong privacy governance 
and accountability structures. In Apple for instance, any collection of cus-
tomer data requires sign-off from a committee of three “privacy czars” 
and a top executive (Reuters 2016).
Cisco, as another example, recognized that their systems could be used 
in a manner contrary to their values and state “Cisco technologies are used 
by government agencies to promote public safety, but the same technology can 
be used for surveillance that would violate individuals’ privacy”. (Cisco 
2018c). Cisco issued a position statement opposing government back-
doors and opposing attempts to prohibit public disclosure about new sur-
veillance capabilities demanded by governments (Cisco 2018b). Cisco 
therefore retain a high level of control to ensure that their product cannot 
be misused but also balance this control with a commitment to “build our 
products on the open, global standards we believe are critical to overcoming 
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censorship, protecting privacy, and keeping the world connected” (Cisco 
2018c). Cisco also undertakes several philanthropic privacy activities such 
as the Cisco Privacy Maturity Benchmark Study and sponsoring the 
National Cybersecurity Alliance’s Data Privacy Day (Cisco 2018c).
5.5  conclusIon
Researchers, practitioners, and policymakers need a better understanding 
of how and why organizations differ in their treatment of consumer pri-
vacy. Belanger and Xu (2015) advocate that privacy researchers conduct 
qualitative interpretive research about relationships between privacy ante-
cedents and outcomes. Using this framework, such research could be 
achieved by categorizing and weighing levels of control and justice dem-
onstrated by a CSP’s privacy behaviors and positioning them as one of the 
four orientations in the framework. The framework also presents opportu-
nities for such future research to empirically examine the effectiveness of 
one orientation over another, or the potential impact of an organization’s 
orientation on other variables such as privacy protection effectiveness, 
cybersecurity behaviors, or privacy strategies. The framework can also be 
applied in different contexts—comparing privacy orientations for CSPs in 
different countries, of different sizes, or with different market dependen-
cies on data.
Being able to position a CSP’s privacy orientation allows the CSP to 
establish baselines within their industry and to determine if certain orien-
tations provide more robust security and privacy protection, where privacy 
incidents may be reduced. At the same time, the framework challenges 
CSPs to articulate their ethical, financial, legal, and philanthropic strate-
gies. Moreover, identifying their privacy orientation will assist CSPs to 
better align their actual privacy programs with the CSCs top concerns 
(Chan 2003). If CSPs can use their privacy orientation to enhance and 
make more effective their privacy provisions, then the wider stakeholder 
community, particularly the CSC, and ultimately the data subject, may 
benefit. We hope the framework provides a helpful foundation for future 
theoretical and empirical work.
Acknowledgements This chapter and the work described therein was funded by 
the Irish Research Council’s Employment Based Post-graduate Scholarship 
programme.
5 JUSTICE VS CONTROL IN CLOUD COMPUTING: A CONCEPTUAL… 
98
reFerences
Abed, Y., & Chavan, M. (2019). The Challenges of Institutional Distance: Data 
Privacy Issues in Cloud Computing. Science, Technology and Society, 24(1), 
161–181. https://doi.org/10.1177/0971721818806088.
Accenture and Ponemon. (2015). How Global Organizations Approach the 
Challenge of Protecting Personal Data. Retrieved June 2020, from http://
www.ponemon.org/local/upload/file/ATC_DPP%20report_FINAL.pdf
Acquisti, G. (2008). Identity Management, Privacy, and Price Discrimination. 
IEEE Security and Privacy, 6(1), 46–50. https://doi.org/10.1109/
MSP.2008.35.
Allan, L., & Tyler, T. (1988). The Social Psychology of Procedural Justice. Plenum 
Press New York.
Allen, A., & Peloza, J. (2015). Someone to Watch Over Me: The Integration of 
Privacy and Corporate Social Responsibility. Business Horizons, 58, 635–642. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.bushor.2015.06.007.
Ashworth, L., & Free, C. (2006). Marketing Dataveillance and Digital Privacy: 
Using Theories of Justice to Understand Consumers Online Privacy Concerns. 
Journal of Business Ethics, 67, 107–123.
August, T., Niculescu, M., & Shin, H. (2014). Cloud Implications on Software 
Network Structure and Security Risks. Information Systems Research, 
25(3), 489–510.
Beauchamp, T., & Bowie, N. (1993). Ethical Theory and Business. Chambersburg, 
PA: Prentice Hall.
Belanger, F., & Crossler, R. (2011). Privacy in the Digital Age: A Review of 
Information Privacy Research in Information Systems. MIS Quarterly, 35, 
1017–1041.
Belanger, F., Hiller, J., & Smith, W. (2002). Trustworthiness in Electronic 
Commerce: The Role of Privacy, Security, and Site Attributes. Journal of 
Strategic Information Systems, 11, 245–270.
Belanger, F., & Xu, H. (2015). The Role of Information Systems Research in 
Shaping the Future of Privacy. Information System Journal, 25, 573–578.
Brohman, M., Watson, R., Piccoli, G., & Parasurama, A. (2003). Data 
Completeness: a Key to Effective Net-Based Customer Service Systems. 
Communications of the ACM, 46, 47–51.
Business Insider. (2019). To Prevent Disasters like the Capital One Hack from 
Happening Again, Experts Say Amazon Web Services Could Do More to 
Protect Customers from Themselves. Retrieved from May 2020, from https://
www.business ins ider.com/capita l-one-hack-amazon-aws-breach- 
security-analysts-2019-8?r=US&IR=T
Buttarelli, G. (2018). Interview with the European Data Protection Supervisor 
Giovanni Buttarelli: ‘The GDPR is a Radical Update to the Rulebook for the 
 V. LYONS
99
Digital Age’. Retrieved September 30, 2018, from https://irishtechnews.ie/
interview-with-the-european-data-protection-supervisor-giovanni-buttarelli-
the-gdpr-is-a-radical-update-of-the-rule-book-for-the-digital-age/
Caldwell, C., Hayes, L., & Long, D. (2010). Leadership, Trustworthiness, and 
Ethical Stewardship. Journal of Business Ethics, 96(4), 497–512.
Carroll, A. (1979). A Three Dimensional Conceptual Model of Corporate 
Performance. Academy of Management Review, 4, 497–505.
Carroll, A. (1998). The Four Faces of Corporate Citizenship. Business and Society 
Review, 100, 1–7.
Caudill, E., & Murphy, P. (2000). Consumer Online Privacy: Legal and Ethical 
Issues. Journal of Public Policy and Marketing, 19(1), 7–19.
Chan, Y. (2003). Competing Through Information Privacy. In J.  N. Luftman 
(Ed.), Competing in the Information Age: Align in the Sand (2nd ed., 
pp. 350–361). New York: Oxford University Press.
Chen, H., Chiang, R., & Storey, V. (2012). Business Intelligence and Analytics: 
From Big Data to Big Impact. MIS Quarterly, 36, 1165–1188.
Chen, Y., Paxson, V., & Katz, R. (2010). What’s New About Cloud Computing 
Security? Tech. Report UCB/EECS-2010-5, EECS Department, University of 
California, Berkeley. Retrieved June 2020, from www.eecs.berkeley.edu/Pubs/
TechRpts/2010/EECS-2010-5.html.
Cisco. (2018a). Global Cloud Index White Paper. Retrieved June 2020, from 
https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/solutions/collateral/service-provider/
global-cloud-index-gci/white-paper-c11-738085.html
Cisco. (2018b). Cisco Position Statement on Human Rights and Privacy. Retrieved 
June 2020, from https://www.cisco.com/c/dam/assets/csr/pdf/Human-
Rights-Position-Statements-2018.pdf
Cisco. (2018c). Cisco Corporate Social Responsibility Report. Retrieved May 
2020, from https://www.cisco.com/c/dam/assets/csr/pdf/CSR-
Report-2018.pdf
CNIL. (2019). Commission Nationale D’Information Liberation. (The French 
Data Protection Supervisory Authority). Retrieved from https://www.cnil.fr/
en/cn i l s - r e s t r i c t ed - commi t t e e - impose s - f i n anc i a l -pena l t y -50 - 
million-euros-against-google-llc
Consumers International. (2019). The State of Data Protection Rules Around the 
World: A Briefing for Consumer Organizations. Retrieved May 2020, from 
https://www.consumersinternational.org/media/155133/gdpr-briefing.pdf
Cruzes, D., & Jaatun, M. (2015). Cloud Provider Transparency—A View from 
Cloud Customers. 5th International Conference on Cloud Computing and 
Services Science.
CSA. (2009). Cloud Security Alliance. Security Guidance for Critical Areas of 
Focus in Cloud Computing. Retrieved May 2020, from https://cloudsecurity-
alliance.org/csaguide.pdf
5 JUSTICE VS CONTROL IN CLOUD COMPUTING: A CONCEPTUAL… 
100
Culnan, M., & Armstrong, P. (1999). Information Privacy Concerns, Procedural 
Fairness, and Impersonal Trust: An Empirical Investigation. Organizational 
Science, 10, 104–115. https://doi.org/10.1287/orsc.10.1.104.
Culnan, M., & Bies, R. (2003). Consumer Privacy: Balancing Economic and 
Justice Considerations. Journal of Social Issues, 59, 323–342. https://doi.
org/10.1111/1540-4560.00067.
Culnan, M., & Williams, C. (2009). How Ethics Can Enhance Organizational 
Privacy: Lessons from the ChoicePoint and TJX Data Breaches. MIS Quarterly, 
33, 673–687.
Davis, K., Frederick, W., & Blomstrom, R. (1980). Business and Society (2nd ed.). 
New York, NY: McGraw-Hill.
Del Alamo, J., Trapero, R., Martín, Y., & Yelmo, J. (2015). Assessing Privacy 
Capabilities of Cloud Service Providers. IEEE Latin America Transactions, 
13(11), 3634–3641.
Denzin, N. (1978). Sociological Methods Sourcebook (2nd ed.). NY: McGraw Hill.
DHS. (2008). The Fair Information Practice Principles: Framework for Privacy 
Policy at the Department of Homeland Security. Memorandum Number: 
2008-01. US Department of Homeland Security Privacy Office Publications. 
Retrieved April 2020, from https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/privacy/
privacy_policyguide_2008-01.pdf
DHS. (2017). Handbook for Safeguarding Sensitive Personal Information. Privacy 
Policy Directive 047-01-007, Revision 3. US Department of Homeland 




Dinev, T. (2014). Why Would We Care about Privacy? European Journal of 
Information Systems, 23, 97–102.
Donaldson, T., & Dunfee, T. (1999). Ties That Bind: A Social Contracts Approach 
to Business Ethics. Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press.
Emerson, R. (1962). Power-Dependence Relations. American Sociological Review, 
27(1), 31–41.
ENISA. (2009). Cloud Computing: Benefits, Risks and Recommendations for 
Information Security, by Catteddu, D. and Hogben, G. Retrieved April 2020, 
from www.enisa.europa.eu/act/rm/files/deliverables/cloud-computing-risk-
assessment/at_download/fullReport
Forbes. (2017). Global Cloud Spending Predicted to Reach $390b by 2020. 
Retrieved May 2020, from https://www.forbes.com/sites/louiscolum-
bus/2017/02/11/global-cloud-spending-predicted-to-reach-390b- 
by-2020/#125897191085
Fortune. (2019). Capital One’s Data Breach Could Cost the Company Up to 




Fried, C. (1984). Philosophical Dimensions of Privacy (E.  D. Schoeman, Ed., 
pp. 203–222). New York: Cambridge University Press.
Google. (2020). Privacy on GoogleCloud. Retrieved May 2020, from https://
cloud.google.com/security/privacy
Greenaway, K., Chan, Y., & Crossler, R. (2015). Company Information Privacy 
Orientation. A Conceptual Framework. Information Systems Journal, 
25, 579–606.
Haeberlen, A. (2010). A Case for the Accountable Cloud. SIGOPS Operating 
Systems Review, 44(2), 52–57.
Husted, B. (2003). Governance Choices for Corporate Social Responsibility: To 
Contribute, Collaborate or Internalize? Long Range Planning, 36(5), 481–498.
IBM. (2017). IBM Among the First Companies to Sign EU Data Protection Code 
of Conduct for Cloud Service Providers. BlogPost by Chrstine Capella, CPO 
IBM.  Retrieved May 2020, from https://www.ibm.com/blogs/policy/
eu-cloud-code-of-conduct/.
Jackson, S., & Dutton, J. (1988). Discerning Threats and Opportunities. 
Administrative Science Quarterly, 33(1), 370–387.
Johnson, D. (2009). Computer Ethics (3rd ed.). Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson 
Education Inc. Retrieved May 2020, from https://www.ibm.com/blogs/
policy/eu-cloud-code-of-conduct/
Jung, T., Phllips, S., & Harrow, J. (2016). The Routledge Companion to 
Philanthropy. London, UK: Routledge Press.
Laczniak, G., & Murphy, P. (1993). Ethical Marketing Decisions: The Higher Road. 
Boston: Allyn & Bacon.
Latapi-Agudelo, M., Johannsdottir, L., & Davidsdottir, B. (2019). A Literature 
Review of the History and Evolution of Corporate Social Responsibility. 
International Journal of Corporate Social Responsibility, 4(1), 1–23.
Martin, K. (2012). Diminished or Just Different? A Factorial Vignette Study of 
Privacy as a Social Contract. Journal of Business Ethics, 11(4), 519–539.
Martin, K. (2016). Understanding privacy online: Development of a Social 
Contract Approach to Privacy. Journal of Business Ethics, 137(3), 551–569.
Mason, R. (1995). Apply Ethics to Information Technology Issues. Communications 
of the ACM, 38, 55–57.
McWilliams, A., & Siegel, D. (2001). Corporate Social Responsibility: A Theory 
of the Firm Perspective. Academy of Management Review, 26, 117–127.
Mell, P., & Grance, T. (2011). The NIST Definition of Cloud Computing. US 
National Institute of Science and Technology. Retrieved November 2019, from 
http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-145/SP800-145.pdf
Microsoft. (2018a). Microsoft Trust Centre GDPR Compliance. Retrieved from 
https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/TrustCenter/CloudSer vices/
office365/GDPR
Microsoft. (2018b). Microsoft’s Commitment to GDPR, Privacy and Putting 
Customers in Control of Their Own Data. https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-




Mintzberg, H. (1983). Power In and Around Organizations. Englewood Cliffs, 
NJ: Prentice-Hall.
Mirvis, P., & Googins, B. (2006). Stages of Corporate Citizenship. California 
Management Review, 48(2), 104–126.
Moor, J. (1997). Towards a Theory of Privacy in the Information Age. Computers 
and Society, 27, 27–32.
Mulligan, D., Koopman, C., & Doty, N. (2016). Privacy is an Essentially Contested 
Concept: A Multi-dimensional Analytic for Mapping Privacy. Philosophical 
Transactions. Series A, Mathematical, Physical, and Engineering Sciences, 
374(2083), 20160118.
Netapp. (2016). Retrieved November 2019, from https://www.netapp.co.uk/
company/news/press-releases/news-rel-20160712-103195.aspx
Oracle. (2017). White Paper: “Making Sense of the Shared Responsibility Model”. 
Retrieved November 2019, from http://www.oracle.com/us/solutions/
cloud/platform-as-a-service/shared-responsibility-model-wp-3497462.pdf
Pearson, S. (2009). Taking Account of Privacy When Designing Cloud Computing 
Services. Proceedings of the 2009 ICSE Workshop on Software Engineering 
Challenges of Cloud Computing, pp. 44–52.
Pew. (2016). More Support for Justice Department Than for Apple in Dispute Over 
Unlocking iPhone. Pew Research Center for the People and the Press.
Pollach, I. (2011). Online Privacy as a Corporate Social Responsibility: An 
Empirical Study. Business Ethics: A European Review, 20, 88–103.
Prüfer, J. (2018). Trusting Privacy in the Cloud. Information Economics and 
Policy, 45, 52.
Ren, K., Wang, C., & Wang, Q. (2012). Security Challenges for the Public Cloud. 
IEEE Internet Computing., 16(1), 69–73.
Reuters. (2016). Apple Privacy Czars Grapple With Internal Conflict Over User 
Data. Retrieved October 2019, from https://www.reuters.com/article/
us-apple-encryption-privacy-insight-idUSKCN0WN0BO
Rosch, E. (1978). Principles of Categorization. In E. Rosch & B. Lloyd (Eds.), 
Cognition and Categorization. Lawrence Elbaum Associates. ISBN 
0835734048, 9780835734042.
Rosenbaum, S. (2010). Data Governance and Stewardship: Designing Data 
Stewardship Entities and Advancing Data Access. Health Services Research, 45, 
1442–1455.
Savitz, A. (2013). The Triple Bottom Line: How Today’s Best-Run Companies Are 
Achieving Economic, Social and Environmental Success—and How You Can Too. 
San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass Press.
Schervish, P. (1998). Philanthropy. In R. Wuthnow (Ed.), Encyclopaedia of Politics 
and Religions (pp. 600–603). Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly.
 V. LYONS
103
Smith, C. (1994). The New Corporate Philanthropy. Harvard Business Review, 
72(3), 105–116.
Smith, H., Dinev, T., & Xu, H. (2011). Theory and Review of Information Privacy 
Research: An Interdisciplinary Review. MIS Quarterly, 35, 989–1015.
Smith, H., & Hasnas, J. (1999). Ethics and Information Systems: the Corporate 
Domain. MIS Quarterly, 23, 109–127.
Stannard-Stockton, S. (2011). The Three Core Approaches to Effective 
Philanthropy. Stanford Social Innovation Review. Retrieved from https://ssir.
org/articles/entry/the_three_core_approaches_to_effective_philanthropy#
Takabi, H., Joshil, J., & Ahn, G. (2010). Security and Privacy Challenges in Cloud 
Computing Environments. IEEE Computer and Reliability Societies.
Techcrunch. (2019). Data Management Giant Rubrik Leaked a Massive Database 
of Client Data. Retrieved May 2020, from https://techcrunch.
com/2019/01/29/rubrik-data-leak/
Tripwire. (2018). Cloud Security Shared Responsibility Model Explained. 
Retrieved September 2019, from https://www.tripwire.com/state-of-secu-
rity/security-data-protection/cyber-security/cloud-securitys-shared- 
responsibility-model-explained/
Tushman, M., & Nadler, D. (1978). Information Processing as an Integrating 
Concept in Organizational Design. Academy of Management Review, 
3, 613–624.
Visser, W. (2006). Revisiting Carroll’s CSR Pyramid: An African Perspective. In 
E.  Pedersen & M.  Huniche (Eds.), Corporate Citizenship in Developing 
Countries (pp. 29–56). Copenhagen Business School Press.
Westin, A. (2003). Social and Political Dimensions of Privacy. Journal of Social 
Issues, 59(2), 431–453.
Wright, S., & Xie, G. (2019). Perceived Privacy Violation: Exploring the 
Malleability of Privacy Expectations. Journal of Business Ethics, 156(1), 
123–140. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-017-3553.
Xu, H., Tan, B., & Agarwal, R. (2012). Effects of Individual Self-Protection, 
Industry Self-Regulation, and Government Regulation on Privacy Concerns: A 
Study of Location-Based Services. Information Systems Research, 23, 
1342–1363.
Xue, L., Ni, J., & Shen, J. (2017). Provable Data Transfer from Provable Data 
Possession and Deletion in Cloud Storage. Journal of Computer Standards and 
Interfaces, 54(1), 46–54.
Yardley, L. (2008). Demonstrating the Validity of Qualitative Research. The 
Journal of Positive Psychology, 12, 295–296.
Zadek, S. (2004). The Path to Corporate Responsibility. Harvard Business Review, 
82(12), 125–132.
5 JUSTICE VS CONTROL IN CLOUD COMPUTING: A CONCEPTUAL… 
104
Open Access This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons 
Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/
by/4.0/), which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction 
in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original 
author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons licence and 
indicate if changes were made.
The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the 
chapter’s Creative Commons licence, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to 
the material. If material is not included in the chapter’s Creative Commons licence 
and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the 
permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the copy-
right holder.
 V. LYONS
105© The Author(s) 2021
T. Lynn et al. (eds.), Data Privacy and Trust in Cloud Computing, 





Abstract While the benefits of cloud computing are widely acknowl-
edged, it raises a range of ethical concerns. The extant cloud computing 
literature reports specific ethical perspectives on focussed topics in this 
domain, but does not explicitly refer to a specific ethical conception or 
reference point. This chapter provides an overview of ethics and ethical 
theories, which can be used to analyse the use of cloud technology and the 
complex multi-stakeholder structure of the industry. It is critical that 
cloud providers and users recognise that they effectively shape the moral-
ity of the cloud computing context through their interactions with other 
providers and users, and with the platform itself. Both stakeholder sets 
must be accountable for the possibilities offered by the technology. While 
pertinent regulation is continuously evolving, it is unlikely to advance at a 
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similar rapid pace to that of innovation in the cloud computing industry. 
It is therefore essential that ethics is carefully considered to orient cloud 
computing towards the good of society.
Keywords Ethics • Cloud computing • Ethical analysis • Ethics of 
technology • Data ownership • Data privacy • Green computing • 
Organisational ethics • Personal ethics
6.1  IntroductIon
The many benefits and risks associated with the adoption of cloud com-
puting technology have been widely reported by computer scientists. 
However, the same cannot be said in relation to ethical issues associated 
with the adoption of this technology: while voices caution that cloud tech-
nologies may traverse the boundaries of what is morally desirable for indi-
viduals, business, and society, few academics with ethics expertise have 
actually analysed the ethical issues associated with cloud computing. 
Contributions on ethical concerns connected with this new technology 
have been published mainly in computer science journals and have been 
discussed at conferences with a similar audience—sometimes privileging 
the explanation of technical aspects over the depth of the ethical analysis.
In light of this, the chapter aims to review selected ethical issues related 
to cloud computing, arising from the nature and use of the technology 
and the way in which the industry is structured, making reference to the 
existing literature on the topic. Section 6.2 provides an overview on ethics 
and some prominent ethical theories. It establishes the significance of ethi-
cal analysis when applied to a particular domain, such as cloud computing. 
The section concludes by questioning the depth of ethical analysis con-
ducted in relation to cloud computing. It also details how the remainder 
of the chapter is organized, in accordance with recurring themes in exist-
ing literature; however, these do not take into explicit consideration par-
ticular schools of ethics when describing ethical issues associated with 
cloud computing, as the literature to date has failed to do so. Section 6.3 
categorizes existing literature specifically related to cloud computing in 
accordance with three different and interrelated perspectives: it critically 
reviews ethical perspectives related to data, it then examines the ethical 
perspectives pertinent to providers of cloud computing services, and it also 
explores ethical issues related to the final users of cloud computing 
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services. Each of these sub-sections presents literature within the context 
of ethical analysis as outlined in Sect. 6.2; it should however be noted that 
due to the limitations previously outlined on the depth of ethical analysis, 
the section is sometimes presented as a critical collection of existing con-
tribution on the theme. The Conclusions section hosts final reflections 
and outlines avenues for further research; ultimately, it suggests that ethi-
cal analysis pertinent to cloud computing needs to be more ethically 
grounded, if it seeks to contribute authoritatively to wider ethical debates 
regarding the ethics of new technologies.
6.2  An overvIew of ethIcs And ethIcAl theorIes 
for AnAlysIs of cloud computIng
Before reviewing existing literature about the ethics of cloud computing, 
it is important to understand what ethics is, and who the main thinkers 
that nourished the debate in this branch of philosophy are. Throughout 
history, many thinkers devoted attention to human actions and asked fun-
damental questions about their meaning and purpose, reaching very dif-
ferent—and even contrasting—conclusions. For example, Aristotle 
regarded ethics as a discipline to study the way human beings live and act 
in order to achieve a life worth living. Aristotle’s inquiry was not only 
theoretical, but also eminently practical: he focused his attention to study-
ing the habitual dispositions that human beings can develop when work-
ing towards the realization of their good, which he called virtues (Aristotle 
2000). He is considered one of the fathers of Virtue Ethics, one of the 
most prominent ethical theories. Other thinkers studied questions similar 
to those of Aristotle, but arrived at different conclusions. The seminal 
work of Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill, as well as Immanuel Kant, 
considered to be the fathers of Utilitarianism and Deontological Ethics, 
respectively, is also very significant. For Bentham, the guiding principle for 
human actions was the principle of utility, which he first formulated as the 
achievement of the greatest good for the greatest number of people 
(Crimmins 2019). Utilitarianism established itself as one of the most per-
vasive normative ethical theories and considers as “right” that which 
achieves the satisfaction of the highest number of people possible. Its main 
focus is on the consequences of human actions, up to the point of consid-
ering undesirable actions as “right” if they can in turn achieve desirable 
outcomes. Despite recognized shortcomings, Utilitarianism inspired many 
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theoretical constructs, particularly in economics and law, thereby influenc-
ing economic and societal life. The proponent of the third highlighted 
approach, Kant, formulated categorical imperatives for every human being 
to obey, whatever the circumstances and whatever the outcome of the 
actions following these imperatives. This perspective, more widely known 
as Deontological Ethics, focused more on rules that need to be respected 
than on the outcome of actions (Hill 2006). Kant’s approach has been 
highly influential in relation to applied and professional ethics. The chal-
lenge pertaining to this approach relates to the identification of both the 
rules to be followed and who is in charge of setting them.
According to the philosopher Julia Annas (Annas 1993), the main dif-
ference between the abovementioned approaches to ethics is that ancient 
ethical theories (i.e. Aristotelian Virtue Ethics) tend to be centred on the 
agent, considering the life of the acting person as a narrative unity with a 
telos, a purpose. This agent-centred perspective also characterizes the work 
of the later Neo-Aristotelian philosophers (such as Anscombe or 
MacIntyre). On the other hand, more modern ethical theories (i.e. 
Utilitarianism and Deontological Ethics) are centred on particular actions, 
and tend to perceive morality as ‘punitive or corrective’ (Annas 1993, p. 4).
This chronological and thematic overview of the three most prominent 
approaches to ethics provides a foundation for ethical analysis of cloud 
computing. However, in reviewing existing contributions which claim to 
devote their attention to ethical issues related to cloud computing, it 
appears that these existing contributions: (i) do not explicitly align to a 
particular school of ethics; (ii) do not offer an explicit or exhaustive 
account of what ethics is, i.e. do not select a particular definition or 
approach to ethics; and (iii) do not disclose conceptions of what is “good” 
or what is “right,” which should be the starting point for an analysis which 
seeks to determine the boundary of what is acceptable (or not) within a 
professional or business domain.
As a consequence, the structure of the chapter does not reflect the dif-
ferences between the abovementioned approaches to ethics. The next sec-
tion, Sect. 6.3, appraises recurring topics in the literature that generally 
deal with ethical issues related to cloud computing: Section 6.3.1 exam-
ines recurring ethical issues linked to the collection, storage and usage of 
data, Sect. 6.3.2 analyses the perspective of providers of cloud computer 
services, while Sect. 6.3.3 explores issues related to one of the key stake-
holders in the cloud computing industry—the final users of cloud com-
puting services.
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6.3  ethIcs And cloud computIng
The previous section introduced ethics and some guiding principles for 
conducting an ethical analysis according to three prominent ethical 
approaches. This section reviews existing literature describing ethical con-
cerns related to cloud computing. De Bruin and Floridi (2017) refer to 
the environment, governments, investors, private and business cloud 
users, and individuals and corporations interacting with private and busi-
ness users, as key stakeholders of the cloud computing industry. The litera-
ture examined in this section addresses the ethical issues faced by the cloud 
computing industry when dealing with this complex multi-stakeholder 
context. The three areas reviewed concern data and the perspective of 
both providers and users.
6.3.1  The Ethics of Data in Cloud Computing
If Aristotle, Bentham or Kant were alive today, they would probably study 
the manner in which human beings deal with the vast amounts of data 
currently collected, stored and managed via the cloud. Each would likely 
promote a different perspective in relation to the best way of dealing with 
data ethics. Herschel and Miori conducted such an exercise and effectively 
analysed the ethics pertaining to data according to selected perspectives, 
including Virtue Ethics, Deontological Ethics and Utilitarianism (Herschel 
and Miori 2017). They highlight how, from a Kantian perspective, the lack 
of consent for the collection and use of data would be a clear violation of 
autonomy, and contrary to Kant’s understanding of human beings always 
as ends in themselves, never as means. They also argue that, from a 
Utilitarian perspective, the analysis of the ethics of data would be very dif-
ficult to perform. They assert that it would be particularly difficult to cal-
culate in a unitary way all the pros and cons of the use of data, and of the 
ultimate beneficiaries of data usage. In relation to the perspective of Virtue 
Ethics, this task does not seem to be any easier, given that a Virtue Ethics-
based ethical analysis would need to consider how a virtuous person could 
make the best possible use of data while becoming the best version of 
themselves.
It would seem that the task of a comprehensive ethical analysis using 
prominent ethical approaches is particularly difficult, to the point that 
“data ethics” is now constituting itself as a new branch of applied ethics 
(Floridi and Taddeo 2016), which is developing its own language and 
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tools, highly correlated with the ethics of algorithms (Mittelstadt et  al. 
2016). The analysis conducted in this growing—but still very young—
field can be applied, mutatis mutandis, to the ethics of data in cloud com-
puting. However, the contributions examined in this section make use of 
a more legalistic framework, strongly influenced by abundant studies in 
relation to data ownership, and data safety and privacy. As a result, this 
section offers an overview of these areas related to the ethics of data in 
cloud computing, which, in the future, will need to incorporate more 
explicit ethical considerations.
6.3.1.1  Data Ownership
When an individual or a business uses a cloud computing-based platform, 
it may be asked “who owns the data”? Can this data be considered as pri-
vate property, or does the mere fact of using a cloud computing platform 
mean that this data automatically may belong to another party?
The majority of individual and corporate consumers outsource data 
storage to cloud services, whereby users can use the flexibility and scal-
ability of the cloud without purchasing standalone software or hardware. 
These are owned and maintained by various service providers whose over-
all remit is to store and share the data of a multitude of users. However, 
these service providers do not provide a uniform service. Further, cloud 
computing services typically traverse national borders, operating in a 
global context. This global and international cloud computing environ-
ment presents difficulties for regulating in such a context. In practice, 
national laws and regulations may not always align seamlessly into the 
international domain. As a result, it is becoming apparent that current 
legal provisions, which are largely pertinent to national jurisdictions, may 
not appropriately regulate for the cloud (Bartolini et al. 2018). As a con-
sequence, the relevance of ethics is increasingly debated in relation to a 
potentially essential role regarding the ‘outsourced’ and international 
exchange of data in the cloud.
Indeed, the ownership of data and the respect of the right of this par-
ticular kind of property is essentially linked with the respect of the funda-
mental dignity of the human person. The European Data Protection 
Supervisor (EDPS), an independent institution of the European Union, 
clearly affirms that human dignity is at the heart of digital ethics: ‘the dig-
nity of the human person is not only a fundamental right in itself but also 
is a foundation for subsequent freedoms and rights, including the rights to 
privacy and to the protection of personal data’ (European Data Protection 
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Supervisor 2015, p. 12). This authority specifically refers to cloud com-
puting as one of the technologies that needs to carefully address the pro-
tection of data stored in cloud based systems, especially in an age when 
people are requested to upload their data from many and different 
instances in order to access even services related to basic needs. The EDPS 
also states that human dignity and ethics can be protected only in so far as 
the following four pillars are established: current regulation should be 
future-oriented; accountability of those in charge of checking compliance 
with internal policies and general regulation should be enhanced by codes 
of conduct, corporate rules and audits; the computer engineering system 
should be respectful of human dignity, structurally taking into account 
issues related to privacy; final users need to be empowered (Sect. 6.3.3 will 
address this last point more in-depth).
It is intended that these pillars should be applied to cloud computing, 
especially because issues pertaining to data ownership in the cloud envi-
ronment may not be clearcut (Al-Khouri 2012; Grimes et  al. 2009). 
Indeed, ownership of data is dependent on the nature of the data owned 
and where and/or how it was created. Some data is created by the user 
before uploading to the cloud while other data may be created on the 
cloud platform (e.g. statistical data). The service provider’s terms of ser-
vices can vary and may grant ownership of such data to the provider or to 
the public domain i.e. the mere uploading of content to the cloud may 
erode the user’s ownership entitlements to the data (Al-Khouri 2012).
In addition, the arrangement and structuring of data on the cloud may 
be dominated by the service provider rather than the user and this manip-
ulation of the data, e.g. generating and running algorithms while optimis-
ing data or generating statistical analysis, can have implications in relation 
to ownership. Ultimately, it is difficult to determine who actually owns 
this optimized data as any data on a cloud platform is likely to have com-
plicated ownership (Cavoukian 2008).
6.3.1.2  Data Security and Privacy
Data security in the context of cloud computing refers to securing data 
from unauthorised access and is largely a technical issue which providers 
must implement and maintain (Zissis and Lekkas 2012). Firdhous et al. 
(2012) discuss the importance of the security issue in specific relation to 
cloud computing. The complex interconnection of multiple services by a 
series of different providers for ever increasing numbers of users generates 
a myriad of issues in relation to the security of users’ data. In reality, the 
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strength of the cloud correlates with the security strength, or otherwise, 
of its weakest actor and a breach or an unauthorised access may effectively 
impact all users (Ali et al. 2015).
Data security may be regarded as an ethical issue because of the respon-
sibility of those in charge of data collection, storage and usage towards the 
multi-stakeholder environment involved in the cloud environment. The 
concept of responsibility has a strong ethical connotation when it needs to 
go beyond what is prescribed by existing laws, leaving to the willingness of 
individuals and companies the duty to respect the rights of the owners of 
the data. Each of the abovementioned ethical theories would agree with 
the suggestion that data security concurs to the good of data security con-
curs to the good of society (when data is not related to illegal or unethical 
issues). This is evidenced more widely in the context of regulation, where 
various legislative provisions pertaining to data issues in the complex cloud 
environment have been readily introduced. This highlights that it is rela-
tively more straightforward in some instances to identify a shared legal 
minimum requirement with regard to data security.
Ethical issues related to data security, when data is not collected, stored 
and managed by the same entity, are particularly significant. Within the 
overall cloud context, data security is effectively outsourced to service pro-
viders. Security measures adopted are dependent on the delivery models 
e.g. for SaaS models (i.e. Software-as-a-Service), users depend entirely on 
service providers to prevent multiple users viewing each other’s data, while 
in PaaS models (i.e. Platform-as-a-Service), providers may assign some 
security elements to those charged with building applications on top of 
the platform (Subashini and Kavitha 2011). Reed et al. (2011) highlight 
six areas of focus in relation to the lifecycle data in the cloud, ‘Create’, 
‘Store’, ‘Use’, ‘Share’, ‘Archive’ and ‘Destroy’ and assert that data security 
measures must be implemented at all stages. The importance of security 
measures in relation to ‘data remanence’, the ‘residual physical representa-
tion of the data after it has been deleted’ is also detailed (Kumar et al. 
2018, p. 693).
In addition, consumers expect providers to facilitate key data proper-
ties: ‘integrity’, ‘confidentiality’, and ‘availability’ (Izang et  al. 2017; 
Kumar et  al. 2018; Sun et  al. 2014; Tanenbaum and van Steen 2016; 
Zissis and Lekkas 2012). Integrity of data assumes a confidence that the 
data has not been manipulated or deleted by unauthorised actors; confi-
dentiality assumes data has not been revealed to unauthorised parties and 
availability assumes the data is intact and that users can use or recover it as 
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needed. The maintenance of these three properties requires service pro-
viders to carefully monitor access and authorisation in respect of all cloud 
components and may also require linkages to or some supervisory element 
of third party mechanisms, along with some ongoing verification of the 
integrity of the data (Bowers et al. 2009; Schiffman et al. 2010). Effective 
management of all three properties can help to increase overall trust in the 
system (see below Sect. 6.3.2.1).
The integrity, confidentiality and availability of data is also an essential 
component of the perception of data security from the point of the users 
of cloud computing services; this perception is what is characterized as 
data privacy.
Early concerns regarding privacy issues linked to storing and sharing 
content online have been somewhat sidelined as the usability and conve-
nience of such systems have proved very attractive in the marketplace 
(Constantine 2012). However, notwithstanding the wider debate in rela-
tion to the moral justification of a right to privacy, the privacy debate in 
the context of technological innovations is topical (Constantine 2012; 
Nissenbaum 2009, 2011; Timmermans et al. 2010; van den Hoven 2008). 
Privacy is ‘the ability of an individual or group to seclude themselves or 
information about themselves and thereby reveal themselves selectively’ 
(Sun et al. 2014, p. 6). In many societies, legislation and regulation require 
compliance such that personally identifiable information is appropriately 
managed (e.g. European Commission 2018; US Government 1986). In 
turn, data privacy is concerned with the proper handling of data and issues 
such as consent, notice and compliance with legislation and regulations 
are dominant (The Centre for Information Policy Leadership 2018). 
Service providers are thereby challenged with operating services which 
afford privacy, comply with legal requirements and also balance usability 
(Stark and Tierney 2014).
In relation to the cloud specifically, Whitworth and de Moor (2003) 
highlighted conflicts between data privacy and usability at an earlier point. 
While many of these have subsequently been addressed (Pearson et  al. 
2009), Stark and Tierney (2014) contend that data in the cloud is ‘still too 
mobile, too “promiscuous” and too often subject to inappropriate use or 
abuse’ (Stark and Tierney 2014, p. 6). They acknowledge that in today’s 
technological society, user autonomy and empowerment must be maxi-
mized, but argue that the “safety” of data should not be compromised and 
highlight mechanisms such as encryption which are widely used to foster 
privacy within information flows. They also assert that providers must 
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work to ensure data is “live” only when the user is “live” on the network: 
they stress that the “liveness” of data online, linked to the ‘input of the live 
user, ties decisions about stored online data to an individual’ (2014, p. 6). 
Stark and Tierney (2014) also detail cases where service providers track 
user information and use this for their own benefit and that of third par-
ties, without the explicit permission or knowledge of users, highlighting 
that service providers may readily access user data and may also release 
such data to external agencies.
However, recent governmental policy decisions incorporate focus on 
such matters e.g. the UK Government’s Data Ethics Framework ‘sets out 
clear principles for how data should be used…It will help [organisations] 
maximise the value of data whilst also setting the highest standards for 
transparency and accountability when building or buying new data tech-
nology’ (The Centre for Information Policy Leadership 2018, p. 19). This 
framework for data ethics is in line with the fact that ‘the principle that 
personal data should be processed only in ways compatible with the spe-
cific purpose(s) for which they were collected is essential to respecting 
individuals’ legitimate expectations’ (European Data Protection Supervisor 
2015, p. 10), thus confirming the idea that regulation should be ethically 
aware and informed, so that a human-centric use of data would be the 
only viable possibility.
6.3.2  The Ethics of Providers of Cloud Computing Services
The exploration of ethical and regulatory issues pertinent to data in cloud 
computing highlights how different stakeholders may have different 
vested interests in cloud computing and consequently encounter different 
kinds of ethical issues. Both cloud computing providers and cloud com-
puting users are central to the discussion. Cloud computing providers may 
be regarded as those who offer cloud-based services and solutions to busi-
nesses and/or individuals. They provide virtual hardware, software, infra-
structure and other related services. In turn, a cloud user may be regarded 
as someone who is available to (or who, lacking personal computing 
resources, necessarily needs to) surrender some control of the data he or 
she inputs in a system, on the basis that the user can trust the system itself.
For the cloud provider-user relationship to operate effectively, it is criti-
cal that cloud providers maintain the trust of users: when a user does not 
trust the system, he or she is less inclined to expose his or her vulnerability 
to the system and thereby less inclined to engage with it. The theme of 
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trust is therefore central to cloud computing, and this section begins by 
examining how ethics can promote the generation of trust, especially 
through the establishment of codes of ethics—which would need to be 
respected and enforced beyond the borders of country-based regulation 
(Sect. 6.3.2.1). The section then considers the perspective of providers 
regarding sustainability, and the extension of the discussion on “green” 
computing to cloud computing (Sect. 6.3.2.2). It also explores issues per-
taining to the increasing concentration of power and the emergence of 
oligopolies in the cloud computing industry (Sect. 6.3.2.3).
6.3.2.1  Codes of Ethics for Cloud Computing: Promoting Trust
The accelerated velocity in cloud computing innovation makes it difficult 
for cloud computing regulators to keep pace with updating standards and 
guidance and for providers to ensure compliance while maintaining users’ 
trust. Indeed, while it may be debated that ‘certification, audits and a new 
generation of contractual clauses and binding corporate rules can help 
build a robust trust’ (EDPS 2015, p. 10), it may also be argued that ‘elim-
inating bureaucracy in data protection law, by minimising the require-
ments for unnecessary documentation to maximise room for more 
responsible initiative by businesses’ supported by additional broader guid-
ance would be a more useful future initiative within the sector (EDPS 
2015, p. 10).
In the wake of this call for a more responsible implementation of good 
practices—as opposed to a detailed menu of further regulations—it is 
interesting to consider the work of Whitehouse et al. (2016), who high-
light that further major shifts in the cloud computing landscape are likely 
in the coming years and advocate heightened emphasis on ethics is neces-
sary with respect to key stakeholders, namely providers and users. This, 
they suggest, is particularly important if certain behaviours on the part of 
these stakeholders are desirable into the future. They note that an ethics 
sufficiently robust to be able to withstand the intensity of the sector and 
capable of keeping pace with the inevitable developments in the sector is 
needed but has not yet been established. This, they assert, will help to 
generate increased trust on the part of users. The International Federation 
for Information Processing (IFIP) comprises more than 50 different 
Information and Communication Technology (ICT) global groups. One 
of their key foci is the societal and ethical challenges of cloud computing 
(Whitehouse et al. 2016). They assert that enhanced ethics offers many 
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further advantages for the cloud computing sector e.g. improved products 
and services, improved workplace behaviours, improved overall quality.
One of the potential key constituents for the promotion of a responsi-
ble way of building a culture of trust is the introduction of codes of ethics 
specific to cloud computing (Kouatli 2016). Whitehouse et  al. (2016) 
describe how actors and organisations can make visible their ethical 
responsibilities and pledge to meet them in a transparent manner within 
codes. Codes may comprise both codes of conduct, which provide guid-
ance in relation to personal conduct of individuals, and codes of ethics 
which go beyond the behaviour of individual actors, pertaining to organ-
isations and wider sectoral behaviour. Both involve emphasis on moral 
guiding principles e.g. ‘Contribute to society and well-being’; ‘Be honest 
and trustworthy’; ‘Respect the privacy of others’; ‘Give proper credit for 
intellectual property’ (Association for Computing Machinery 1978 Code, 
cited in Whitehouse et al. 2016). Codes thereby are heavily influenced by 
Deontological Ethics, which focuses on particular imperatives that are 
typically constant over time. Codes normally also provide more contextual 
examples to explain how these imperatives might be applied and these 
examples might be updated periodically to illustrate the application of 
imperatives as pertinent issues change over time e.g. technological 
advances. However, codes also focus on balancing different stakeholders’ 
concerns, and, in so doing, incorporate key Utilitarianism components.
Codes have the capacity to support and affirm common standards that 
go beyond cultural differences of users. This is particularly important to 
the cloud computing sector, given its global context and the acknowl-
edged difficulties in legislating and regulating in an international environ-
ment where different legal, cultural and operational norms may operate in 
the different jurisdictions and where trust considerations are dependent 
both on the sector and the country (Fujitsu Research Institute 2010).
Whitehouse et al. (2016) suggest that two-part codes of ethics might 
be considered, which distinguish between principles and guidance that are 
internationally acceptable and those that are locally feasible. It is likely that 
reporting of and monitoring of this guidance may be considered a local 
issue, given jurisdictional variations. Further, drafting of codes must be 
general enough to adapt to new and changing conditions without being 
so general that they cannot be of any practical use. They must also be spe-
cific enough to provide direction to relevant actors to the extent of being 
able to direct them and to also enable stakeholders to hold them to 
account.
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Whitehouse et  al. (2016) state that a further ‘conscientious, applied 
examination of key ethical and societal challenges ‘will continue to take 
place in the future both in practice and on practice’ (2016, p.  24) to 
ensure relevant codes can be maintained. However, it is also important to 
note that criticisms in relation to codes of ethics and their adoption (see 
e.g. Webley and Werner 2008) can be applied, mutatis mutandis, to cloud 
computing. It is also important to acknowledge that codes of ethics are 
often perceived as ineffective in changing organizational culture, being 
necessary but not sufficient measures to exert change in behaviours 
(Webley and Werner 2008).
6.3.2.2  Green and Sustainable Cloud Computing
Literature on cloud computing has developed notably with reference to 
“green” computing, which plays to a renewed societal interest in relation 
to protecting the environment. In some instances, the “green” issue is 
discussed to the extent that the relatively novel term, “greenwashing”, has 
been linked to this sector (Nanath in Moorthy et al. 2015). This refers to 
the marketing of cloud computing as more environmentally friendly than 
other tools, when in reality no substantial effort has been made to render 
it so. In a more extreme sense, “greenwashing” may even refer to an 
attempt to make something that is environmentally damaging appear to 
be environmentally friendly. This section reports different perspectives on 
cloud computing providers and their attention (or lack thereof) to envi-
ronmentally sensitive issues.
Scott and Watson (2012) assert that new technologies such as cloud 
computing ‘provide unprecedented opportunities to improve the effi-
ciency of business operations and represent a realistic opportunity to 
reduce energy costs and combat global warming’ (Scott and Watson 2012, 
p. 1). Di Salvo et al. (2017) go so far as to affirm that cloud computing is 
not only a green technology, but it is the “greenest.” They claim that the 
centralised aspects of cloud computing effectively facilitate the operation 
of a virtual machine system and storage of data in a manner that consumes 
less than half the energy and global resources required by traditional 
decentralised systems. Lin (2012) also examines “green” cloud computing 
and highlights that a well-considered scheduling strategy of the various 
information flows, combined with careful management of resource alloca-
tion, may further contribute to a more sustainable and green technology.
Buyya and Gill (2018) provide a more balanced discussion, arguing 
that while cloud computing reduces some discrete environmental 
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footprint, the wider data center industry may have a disproportionate neg-
ative environmental impact. In practice, hyperscale cloud data centers con-
sume a disproportionate amount of energy—currently almost on a par 
with sectors such as the aviation sector—and are reaching technical limits. 
This negative impact of high carbon usage on global warming has been 
referred to as the “dark side” to cloud computing.
Bachour and Chasteen (2010, p. 1) refer to the ‘triple bottom line’ 
concept and the monitoring of ‘economic viability’, ‘social responsibility’ 
and ‘environmental impact,’ which they acknowledge may be difficult to 
define and measure. Scott and Watson (2012) urge caution in relation to 
monitoring and measuring green issues connected to cloud computing 
and other technologies. They assert that potential models for identifying 
and measuring such “green” components must consider a wide range of 
impacts, including direct financial impacts as well as broader societal 
impacts. They propose a framework which captures key stakeholders—
societal, organizational, customer and supply-chain—and core value 
dimensions—economic, environmental, ethical and competitive position. 
Buyya and Gill (2018) advocate an alternative “green” model for holistic 
management of resources to ensure more energy-efficient and sustainable 
cloud operations in a bid to further decrease carbon footprints of cloud 
datacentres. Similarly, Di Salvo et  al. (2017) note that the extent of 
“green” labelling has to date been based solely on energy consumption 
reduction and assert a more appropriate assessment of sustainable prac-
tices should also consider wider aspects such as eco-energy efficiency 
performance.
The duality of the cloud and its impact on the environment is thereby 
acknowledged: cloud computing has much potential to impact positively 
on discrete environmental matters; however, less positive ‘green’ comput-
ing considerations also need to be addressed. While most climate change 
activists are currently focused on limiting emissions from other sectors, 
such as the auto, aviation and energy sectors, the cloud computing indus-
try may be on track to generate more carbon emissions than all of these 
sectors combined. It is therefore important that this “green” issue be even 
a more central component of the next generation of cloud (Garg et al. 
2015; Lin 2012; Mohamed and Pillutla 2014; Murugesan 2008).
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6.3.2.3  Concentration of Power and Oligopolies in the Cloud 
Computing Industry
As previously highlighted, the cloud overarches national and international 
borders and boundaries. Indeed, it may be observed that cloud computing 
has accelerated the pace of a truly global world (Mohamed and Pillutla 
2014). While the cloud is offered to users all over the world, cloud com-
puting as an industry is very much concentrated in the hands of a relatively 
small number of providers, akin to an oligopolistic market. These provid-
ers sustain the cost of the cloud infrastructure and decide on the cloud 
services provided. An issue commonly associated with oligopolies is the 
control that the small number of companies providing a specific good or 
service have on setting prices. This concern is also prevalent with regard to 
cloud computing: Feng et al. 2014 conduct an analysis of cloud providers’ 
pricing strategy, addressing the cloud computer economic arena as an oli-
gopoly market. Timmermans et al. (2010) assert that a significant amount 
of cloud computing innovation originates in the US. Synergy Research 
Group (Alley 2019) tracks such activity and reports that 38% of worldwide 
hyperdata centres are located in the US.  It also reports that Amazon, 
Microsoft, Google, Alibaba and Oracle are the most active companies in 
this arena. These are effectively stockpiling information about consumers, 
presumably seeking to gain some competitive advantage in the process.
In these aforementioned contributions, there is no explicit mention of 
ethical issues associated with the concentration of power in a key industry 
such as cloud computing. Usually, ethical issues related to concentration 
of power regard the (un)fair treatment of the weak party in the economic 
agreement (Crane and Matten 2016) i.e. powerful oligopolies can estab-
lish terms and conditions that violate the rights of final users, who are 
effectively forced to accept them if they want to benefit from the service. 
Whatever the selected approach to ethics might be, a concentration of 
power is usually not in favour of the satisfaction of the greatest number of 
people (Utilitarianism), nor of the respect of established rules 
(Deontological Ethics).
Moreover, concentration of power which generates oligopolies is also 
responsible for spreading particular cultural influences. Timmermans et al. 
(2010) reflect on such trends within cloud computing and ponder if 
Western values may thereby dominate pertinent future applications, frame-
works and regulations, and lead to ‘increasing cultural homogenization’ 
(2010, p. 5). This argument is discussed by Ess (2001) who posits that 
today’s multicultural domains ‘reflect an extensive diversity, if not 
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cacophony, of cultural identities, traditions, voices, views, and practices’ 
(2001, p. 196) and asserts that it is critically important that cloud systems 
deal with such diversity in an ethical manner. However, if current trends 
continue, it is likely that Western perspectives will dominate into the future.
6.3.3  The Ethics of Cloud Computing Users
The ethical issues pertaining to users of cloud computing services pre-
dominantly relate to the way they use the services. Cloud users are the 
main stakeholders of cloud provider entities, being at the same time the 
most vulnerable element of the complex chain of interactions that cloud 
computing services entail. With reference to the ultimate technical capa-
bilities and limitations imposed by the different cloud systems, users decide 
how to interact relative to the context in which they find themselves. One 
means of understanding the perspective of users of cloud computing ser-
vices is to engage with the term “prosumers.” The expression was coined 
in 1980 by Alvin Toffler (Toffler 1980), and refers to consumers who, 
simultaneously, are also producers. The European Data Protection 
Supervisor discusses this term in relation to the end users of new technolo-
gies, including cloud computing. The associated reference to prosumers 
relates to one of the pillars for a new digital ethics: the empowerment of 
individuals using technologies. Consumers are no longer passive receptors 
of the available good or service; rather, they co-create the product present 
in digital platforms. As a result, the empowerment of twenty-first century 
prosumers is meant to increase their technological and ethical awareness. 
This perspective of empowerment is a top-down approach, where regula-
tors are attempting to provide tools to strengthen the role and responsibil-
ity of individual users of digital platforms.
An alternative perspective on users’ awareness of their digital presence 
is to consider how individuals can empower themselves, without the sup-
port of a regulatory authority. Cloud users themselves can learn how to 
engage with the cloud environment by developing intellectual and practi-
cal habits that may be examined through the lens of the epistemic virtues. 
De Bruin and Floridi (2017) examine epistemic virtues, also referred to as 
informational or knowledge virtues, in light of the specific circumstances 
that cloud computing users encounter. They highlight that users must be 
able to make informed decisions in relation to their engagement with 
cloud services. To enable such informed decisions, there must be clarity of 
communication between the two parties i.e. between providers and users. 
De Bruin and Floridi (2017) note current barriers to communication 
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within the industry whereby terms of usage are written in lengthy and 
complex legal jargon which many people do not readily understand.
De Bruin and Floridi (2017), building on the work of Kawall (2002) 
and De Bruin (2015), ultimately characterize the virtue of “interlucency” 
as the other-regarding epistemic virtue that helps establish a common 
knowledge through providing the relevant information in a language that 
can be understood and shared by the interested users. More than the vir-
tue of a single cloud user, the epistemic virtue of interlucency, according 
to De Bruin and Floridi, must be applied to the cloud computing industry 
as a whole. To ground their contribution, the authors make explicit refer-
ence to the concept of “comprehensibility” as formulated by Habermas 
(quoting Habermas 1981).
De Bruin and Floridi (2017) further discuss users’ attitudes. They sug-
gest that users should be intellectually impartial, sober and courageous. 
Intellectual impartiality applies to users insofar as they are able to over-
come personal prejudices towards the cloud computing industry and the 
possible risks connected to the circulation of their data. They may attempt 
to do so by listening to authoritative voices in the field of technology and 
by seeking information from independent experts. Intellectual sobriety 
helps users to ‘resist the overly enthusiastic adoption of beliefs about either 
the pros and the cons of cloud computing’ (2017, p.  29). Intellectual 
courage concerns the continuous active attitude to overcome ignorance 
and lack of information even when faced with obstacles. The authors assert 
that users must continue to ask questions when something is not clear, for 
example the terms and conditions of a specific service.
It is interesting to note how De Bruin and Floridi (2017) articulate in 
favour of “proscriptive pressure” on the side of users more than on the 
side of the providers of cloud services: in so doing, they are actually inter-
preting one of the main ethical issues associated with the relationship 
between technology and the use of technology. Indeed, the authors place 
emphasis on the freedom of the agent and on his/her responsibility to 
make the best use of technology without limiting the possibility of tech-
nology developers to advance their discoveries, highlighting that the ethi-
cal boundaries of technological advances should be determined in relation 
to the way they are used, not by what they can potentially do. For exam-
ple, a terrorist organization can benefit from services available in the cloud, 
however the objective for which it uses this service is illegal and contrary 
to the good of society.
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6.4  conclusIons
The chapter offers an overview of ethics and prominent ethical theories, 
which can help to chart existing literature in relation to ethics and cloud 
computing. One of the key findings of this analysis is that the contribu-
tions aimed at addressing ethical issues in cloud computing do not explic-
itly refer to a specific conception of ethics, nor explicitly declare a reference 
point for their analysis from an ethical perspective. It was therefore not 
possible to structure the chapter in line with the different schools of ethics, 
and required analyses to focus on recurring topics within selected cloud 
computing literature. Given the complex multi-stakeholder cloud com-
puting environment, ethical issues particular to cloud computing were 
distinguished in relation to three categories: data, providers and users.
With reference to data, issues related to ownership, security and privacy 
were discussed. The cloud computing literature in this context is particu-
larly technical and oriented to address the legal framework of pertinent 
data issues. Further research in relation to data ethics in cloud computing 
may be inspired by the seminal work conducted in the parallel field of data 
ethics and algorithm ethics. In addition, the methodology of social ethics 
could be useful to conduct research on the way the society of the future 
will store and manage data via cloud computing technology. This research 
could explore the different kinds of society that could result depending on 
the quality and quantity of individual and collective data available and how 
human beings could live in these kinds of societies. Another interesting 
direction that the research about data ethics in cloud computing might 
take is suggested by Koehn (2019). In the context of the new technolo-
gies of the twenty-first century, she argues that it is worth reflecting on 
Plato’s Socratic notion of responsibility: this notion is essentially dialogic 
and goes beyond the concept of responsibility typical of the Anglo- 
American culture, which perceives responsibility as part of a role-based 
duty. This personalization of responsibility can help those who manage 
data on others’ behalf, so that they do not limit themselves to what is pre-
scribed by their role, but are able to see the relational component of their 
role towards the people on the cloud platform, considering them as people 
and not as a set of data.
With reference to the ethical issues related to cloud computing service 
providers, codes of ethics, green and sustainable cloud computing, and 
concentration of power were examined. Future research in sustainability 
and oligopolies in cloud computing may consider studies such as those 
conducted in mainstream literature regarding these topics, while ethics 
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and cloud computing literature might explore further possibilities for 
writing and implementing codes of ethics, and may seek to examine the 
experiences (and failures) of other sectors in this regard.
As regards ethical issues pertaining to cloud users, the perspectives of 
individual empowerment and epistemic virtues were explored. Very few 
authors have dedicated attention to these important areas. A possible 
pathway for future research may be an application of ancient Aristotelian 
ethics to the new technological environment: while the context may have 
profoundly changed, the fundamental attitudes and questions of human 
beings still remain and the ethics and cloud computing literature could 
benefit from the wisdom of one of the first ethical theories formulated.
It may be argued that the pace of academic publications, while slower 
than cloud computing innovation, is still relatively rapid. It must be 
acknowledged that the majority of contributions examined in this chapter 
report specific perspectives on focussed topics in the cloud computing 
domain, without delving further into the theoretical foundations of their 
ethical analysis. It is anticipated that the structure and articulation of this 
chapter will aid the reader to understand how a multi-stakeholder ethical 
analysis is needed in order to appropriately examine the multi-stakeholder 
context within the cloud computing domain. The aforementioned catego-
ries selected for this review are interrelated and overlapping, and highlight 
factual complexities. The cloud providers and users must be mindful that 
they shape the morality of the cloud computing context through their 
interactions with the other stakeholders and with the platform itself, and 
they must not abdicate their responsibilities to the possibilities offered by 
the technology. Providers must be accountable, not only to the final users 
of their platforms, but also to the environment, and to the cultural context 
within which the platforms operate. It must also be remembered that reg-
ulation, although continuously evolving, is unlikely to advance at the pace 
of cloud computing innovation and this review clearly illustrates that eth-
ics is an integral component to orient cloud computing towards the good 
of society into the future.
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7.1  IntroductIon
In 2002, Bill Gates, in an email to Microsoft employees, presaged a future 
where computing would be “an integral and indispensable part of almost 
everything we do” (Gates 2002). Subsequently, Microsoft published a 
white paper defining what would ultimately become a seminal white paper 
for trustworthy computing. Recognising that trust is a complex concept, 
Mundie et  al. (2002) explored trustworthy computing from three per-
spectives—the user’s perspective (goals), the mechanisms employed by 
industry to meet the goals (means), and the way in which an organisation 
conducts its operations to deliver the components (execution). The key 
definitions of goals, means and execution are summarised in Table  7.1 
below. While in 2002, cloud computing was not the dominant computing 
paradigm it is today, these perspectives reflect the dominant themes in 
computer science research on trust in cloud computing. Indeed they are 
reflective of the wider scholarly debate discussed throughout this book.
Improving the confidence and perception of trustworthiness is critical 
for the adoption of cloud computing, and has been a central tenet of the 
European Union cloud strategy for nearly a decade (European Commission 
2020). The remainder of this chapter provides a brief overview of com-
puter science research based on the goals of trustworthy computing iden-
tified above, namely security and privacy, reliability, and business integrity.
7.2  SecurIty and PrIvacy
According to the National Information Systems Security Glossary, infor-
mation security is the protection of information systems against unauthor-
ised access to and modification of information and data in various forms 
such as data at rest, and in transit (Hayden 2000). Information security 
applies to the safeguarding of data in its various states and storage loca-
tions, as well as offering protection against attacks such as denial-of-service 
(DoS), which might adversely impact the confidentiality, integrity, and 
availability of information to authorised users. As discussed in Chap. 1, 
integrity is a key element in trust, and in the context of cloud computing, 
the maintenance of confidentiality and continuity of service availability are 
key signals of competence. As such, from a computer science perspective, 
designing attack-resilient systems is critical to building and maintaining 
trust. Different frameworks and models have been proposed and designed 
for the establishment of trust within cloud computing that offer system 
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Table 7.1 Definition of goals, means, and execution in trustworthy computing
Goals The basis for a customer’s decision to trust a system
Security & privacy The expectation of attack-resilient systems and that the 
confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the system and its 
data are protected.
The customer can control data about themselves, and those 
using such data adhere to fair information principles
Reliability The customer can depend on the product to fulfil its 
functions when required to do so.
Business integrity The vendor of a product behaves in a responsive and 
responsible manner.
Means The business and engineering considerations that enable 
a system supplier to deliver on the Goals
Secure by design, secure 
by default, secure in 
deployment
A process is in place to protect the confidentiality, integrity, 
and availability of data and systems at every phase of the 
software development process.
Fair information principles The collection and sharing of end-user data requires the 
consent of the end user, and privacy is respected, and data is 
only used in line with Fair Information Practices.
Availability The system is available for use as required.
Manageability The system is easy to install and manage, relative to its size 
and complexity.
Accuracy The system performs its functions correctly. Data is 
protected from corruption and loss.
Usability The software is easy to use and suitable to the user’s needs.
Responsiveness The vendor accepts responsibility for problems, and takes 
action to correct them. Support is available to customers as 
needed throughout their engagement with vendor.
Transparency The vendor is open in its dealings with customers. Its 
motives are clear, it keeps its word, and customers know 
where they stand in a transaction or interaction with the 
vendor.
Execution The way an organisation conducts its operations to 
deliver the components required for trustworthy 
computing
Intents   • Company policies, directives, benchmarks, and 
guidelines
  • Contracts and undertakings with customers, including 
Service Level Agreements (SLAs)
  • Corporate, industry and regulatory standards 
Government legislation, policies, and regulations
(continued)
7 TRUSTWORTHY CLOUD COMPUTING 
132
security and data privacy for cloud service providers and their customers. 
Five common approaches for protecting cloud systems and data in extant 
literature include multi-cloud storage, homomorphic encryption schemes, 
secure sharing systems, deployment of intermediary components, as well 
as more traditional security and privacy methods.
Multi-cloud storage strategies seek to reduce security and availability 
risks by diversifying this risk through the use of multiple cloud storage 
service providers (Bucur et al. 2018). For example, Alqahtani and Kouadri- 
Mostefaou (2014) propose a framework that ensures the security of mobile 
cloud computing by deploying distributed multi-cloud storage, data 
encryption, and data compression techniques. The framework operates by 
dividing the data into different segments at the user end based on the 
preference selected by the user before the encryption and compression of 
the segments. The compressed segments are stored on distributed multi- 
cloud storage service providers. Similarly, Abdalla and Pathan (2014) pre-
sented a framework using a data protection manager (DPM) deployed for 
the transmission of data to the cloud service provider. The DPM both 
fragments and merges the data in the proposed framework. First, it breaks 
the data into fragments and transmits them to the multi-cloud for storage. 
When a user requests the data, the DPM merges the data. The service 
provider maps the information of fragmented and merged data to the indi-
vidual users and the multi-cloud technique applied protects data on other 
segments if one segment is compromised. While multi-cloud storage in 
theory has many advantageous attributes, in practice, it has significant 
Table 7.1 (continued)
Implementation   • Risk analysis
  • Development practices, including architecture, coding, 
documentation, and testing
  • Training and education
  • Terms of business
  • Marketing and sales practices
  • Operations practices, including deployment, 
maintenance, sales & support, and risk management
  • Enforcement of intents and dispute resolution
Evidence   • Self-assessment
  • Accreditation by third parties
  • External audit
Adapted from Mundie et al. (2002)
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limitations, not least the lack of standards-based interoperable clouds and 
APIs, the possible amplification of the attack surface to multiple clouds, 
and the management and measurement of multiple service level agree-
ments across multiple clouds (Bucur et al. 2018).
There is a long history of encryption as a means of securing systems. 
For example, many messaging systems use encryption to protect the con-
tent of messages through the use of shared public or private keys. These 
legacy systems have a number of limitations including data control and the 
management of keys (Acar et  al. 2018). Homomorphic encryption 
schemes overcome these limitations by allowing a cloud service provider 
to perform certain computable functions on the encrypted data while pre-
serving the features of the function and format of the encrypted data (Acar 
et al. 2018). Louk and Lim (2015) proposed a homomorphic data secu-
rity encryption scheme that converted data into ciphertext and manipu-
lated the ciphertext just like the original text without compromising the 
encryption. There are a variety of different homographic encryption types, 
for example multiplicative, additive and fully homomorphic, all of which 
have been applied to secure communication and storage in the cloud 
(Tebaa and Hajji 2014). There are significant performance limitations 
with fully homomorphic encryption schemes thus requiring optimisation 
at the architectural, algorithmic, and hardware resource levels (Moore 
et al. 2014).
The ubiquity of smartphones, and their dependence on cloud comput-
ing, present significant challenges for securing data at the edge, in the 
cloud, and in between. Smartphones, and indeed other Internet of Things 
end points, are typically resource constrained due to their form and band-
width. As such, security methods need to be relatively lightweight. Wang 
et al. (2014) propose a secure sharing scheme that envisages users upload-
ing multiple data pieces to different clouds, and using a watermarking 
algorithm for authentication of mobile users and cloud services. A key 
feature of this solution is the both the security and the reduced load on the 
network. Khan et al. (2014) propose a BSS (block-based sharing scheme) 
cryptographic method that divides data logically into multiple blocks, 
encrypting and decrypting the blocks, and reconstructing the data into 
their original form. Secure Data Sharing in Clouds (SeDaSC) is another 
approach to secure sharing comprising three entities—the user, a crypto-
graphic server (CS) and the cloud (Ali et al. 2015). The CS is responsible 
for encryption, decryption, key management, and access control. Yu et al. 
(2015) proposed a public auditing protocol that ensures the integrity of 
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data stored in the cloud and shared data among users by using the asym-
metric group key agreement scheme and proxy re-signature. The asym-
metric group key agreement scheme allows the group to share both public 
and private keys and create a tag attached to files. The proxy re-signature 
updates the tags when there are changes in the group members. User 
identity information is preserved by anonymising the auditor and group 
members. In this way, data control is improved, in instances such as when 
employees leave an organisation.
Similar to the auditing scheme proposed by Yu et al. (2015), a number 
of works have proposed auditing schemes where, in effect, an independent 
third party serves as the verifier of data integrity. For example, Sookhak 
et  al (2014) proposed a remote data auditing method for verifying the 
integrity of data stored in cloud; algebraic signatures are used to allow the 
auditor to check the possession of user data in cloud. Similarly, Yu et al. 
(2016) propose key-updating and authenticator-evolving mechanism with 
zero- knowledge privacy of the stored files for secure cloud data auditing, 
which incorporates zero-knowledge proof systems, proxy re-signatures 
and homomorphic linear authenticators. Yang et al. (2015) proposed an 
extended proxy-assisted approach that utilises an attribute-based encryp-
tion method to ensure scalable data sharing within the cloud. Tian et al. 
(2015) proposed a dynamic hash table (DHT) public auditing scheme. 
The DHT is a two-dimensional data structure used by the auditor to 
record data property information for rapid and dynamic auditing. Public 
key-based homomorphic authentication and random masking created by 
the auditor are used for the preservation of privacy.
While each of the approaches above represent novel means to securing 
data, the practical reality is that most cloud service providers rely on tradi-
tional security and privacy methodologies. A wide range of approaches 
have been proposed for securing cloud services including securing infra-
structure using extant multi-component methods. For example, Liu et al. 
(2015) propose a secure infrastructure based on Advanced Encryption 
Standard (AES), Searchable Symmetric Encryption (SSE), Ciphertext- 
Policy Attribute-Based Encryption (CPABE) and Digital Signature (DS). 
Mollah et al. (2017) propose a scheme that utilises a combination of secret 
key encryption, public key encryption, searchable secret key encryption 
and digital signatures for a data searching and sharing scheme. The 
STOVE model proposed by Tan et al. (2014) secures data in the cloud by 
restricting the operational ability of applications. The model restricts 
untrusted applications and isolates the application using formal 
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verification methods to verify the isolated code; application execution is 
performed in isolation and under strict observation. The novelty of these 
methods, and many others, is in the combination of multiple approaches. 
However, the challenge for industry and researchers alike is identifying the 
most feasible candidates for a given use case.
7.3  relIabIlIty
It is essential that services and data in the cloud are available to users at all 
times. As discussed in Chap. 2, availability is defined in the service level 
agreements between cloud service providers and their customers. The 
most commonly used definition of reliability in engineering applications 
according to Dummer et al. (1997, p. 79) is “the characteristic of an item 
expressed by the probability that it will perform a required function under 
stated conditions for a stated period of time.” In general terms, service 









While such a calculation may indicate service reliability, in hyperscale 
multi-tenant clouds the overall cloud may be reliable but specific services 
may be unreliable. Due to the scale of the clouds, one particular service 
failure or underperforming component may not impact an overall reliabil-
ity score, while at the same time result in catastrophic failure. Huang et al. 
(2017) suggest that major cloud failures often result from subtle underly-
ing faults in systems, so-called ‘gray failures’, that may be difficult to 
observe or even detect. They are characterised by this differential observ-
ability (Huang et al. 2017).
When ascertaining that a system will perform a specific function within 
a given cloud service environment, Adams et al. (2014) suggest the fol-
lowing key considerations:
• Service availability must be maximised to ensure users can access the 
service and perform their required task to completion without 
interference;
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• The impact of system failure should be minimised for individual 
users, the overall number of users affected, and the downtime associ-
ated for the failure;
• Service performance and capacity should be maximised to reduce the 
impact of reduced performance even if no failure is detected; and,
• Business continuity should be maximised by responding to failures 
when they occur, protecting the integrity of data, and recovering as 
soon as possible.
Reliability and high availability are closely related and regarded as sig-
nificant challenges in cloud computing. Obviously, cloud service providers 
and scholars invest a significant amount of effort in to the design of fault- 
tolerant, attack-resilient and reliable systems. A detailed discussion of this 
is beyond the scope of this chapter. These innovations are often opaque to 
the user. As such, we provide a high-level overview of approaches to reli-
ability including ensuring reliability by design through monitoring, redun-
dancy and disaster recovery, and the evaluation of performance and quality 
of service (QoS).
A major focus of computer science research is reliability by design so 
that no one point of failure can result in the failure of the entire system. 
There are a wide variety of causes of unplanned cloud outages including 
infrastructure or software failures, planning mistakes, human error, or 
external attacks (Endo et al. 2017). Three main strategies are employed to 
counter such failures namely, monitoring, redundancy, and disaster recov-
ery. In the terminology of trust, two could be classified as trust-building 
mechanisms (monitoring and redundancy) while the third, disaster recov-
ery, could be classified as a trust repair mechanism. A wide variety of gen-
eral purpose and vendor-specific monitoring tools are used in cloud 
computing. From the user perspective, these are primarily used for 
accounting and billing, security and privacy assurance, and SLA manage-
ment, while for the cloud service provider they may be used for other 
reliability functions, for example fault management (Fatema et al. 2014). 
As mentioned earlier, gray failures may not be detectable by extant moni-
toring systems that focus on singular failure detection. To mitigate the risk 
of such failures, Huang et al. (2017) suggest that cloud service providers 
must move to multi-dimensional cloud health monitoring. While accept-
ing monitoring all applications and workloads in hyperscale multi-tenant 
systems is not feasible, they propose a number of techniques to close the 
observation gap including approximating application views, aggregating 
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observations from multiple components to infer the likelihood of a gray 
failure in an isolated component, as well as temporal analysis (Huang et al. 
2017). As noted briefly in Chap. 1, monitoring data can be used more 
widely in the context of building knowledge-based trust. Emeakaroha 
et  al. (2016) have proposed a system and show through experimental 
studies with business decision-makers that such monitoring systems can be 
used to build trust through communication strategies such as trust labels 
(Emeakaroha et al. 2016; van der Werff et al. 2018).
Cloud failures can be caused by issues that occur at different levels in 
the cloud stack e.g. at the data, application, and/or system level (Huang 
et al. 2017). Given organisational and consumer concerns about data and 
availability of data in the event of a failure, it is unsurprising that in addi-
tion to general system redundancy, data redundancy is a primary concern 
of cloud service providers. Data replication and erasure coding are com-
monly used data redundancy techniques in cloud computing (Nachiappan 
et al. 2017). With simple data replication, data is replicated in at least two 
locations on distributed cloud storage systems so that in the event of stor-
age failure, it is just served from the replicated copy (Plank 2013). As such, 
data loss only occurs if data corrupted on all storage targets the replicated 
copies (Rajaasekharan 2014). As simple data replication carries a signifi-
cant resource overhead in terms of storage, network and associated energy 
consumption, hyperscale cloud service providers, such as Facebook and 
Microsoft, use more advanced erasure coding, such as K out of N codes, 
to detect and correct errors in cloud storage, and provide a less resource 
intensive means to reconstruct data from parity data (Nachiappan et al. 
2017; Rajaasekharan 2014).
Disasters differ in terms of scale and impact (although this is subjec-
tive), and are typically unpredicted events that occur relatively rarely over 
the lifetime of a given system. A full cloud service outage occurs more 
frequently than one might imagine but due to the disaster recovery sys-
tems in place, the recovery time is extremely fast. Disasters can result from 
natural, human, or technological causes, or a combination of two or more 
of these (Singh et al. 2016). To mitigate the impact of natural disasters or 
large-scale malicious physical attacks, cloud service providers, like many IT 
organisations, use distributed backups, online and offline, in geographic 
locations that are located sufficiently distant to avoid a homogenous natu-
ral event (Pokharel et  al. 2010). Maintaining two infrastructures is 
extremely costly. However, cloud outages can also result from relatively 
small-scale localised natural causes, for example lightning strikes are a 
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significant threat to both primary and uninterruptible power supply (Li 
et al. 2013). Human causes include human error or malicious attacks from 
insiders or external third parties. The latter is largely a security issue while 
the former is a training and behavioural one. Li et al. (2013) document a 
wide range of public cloud outages resulting from human error including 
vehicle accidents, power shutdowns, and inputting commands in error. As 
discussed earlier in this section, application and system level failures can be 
technological causes of full service outage. In these instances, for applica-
tion failures, the key requirement is business continuity through redun-
dancy and rollback. It should be noted that a number of middleware 
approaches have been applied to address application-level reliability via 
application-independent failure detection, checkpoint and rollback and 
recovery (e.g. Hormati, et al. 2014), optimal replica placement (e.g. An 
et al. 2014), stop and copy VM migration (Sampaio and Barbosa 2018), 
and entity reputation management (Abawajy 2011). For system level fail-
ures, the primary focus is minimising recovery time (Singh et al. 2016). It 
is important to note that while these causes are isolated, they may be cas-
cading, natural causes can result in unanticipated technological failures, 
which in turn may be exacerbated by human errors, and so forth.
As discussed in Chap. 2, the SLA details the level of service to be pro-
vided, often in the form of specific QoS metrics (Ghazizadeh and Cusack 
2018). Obviously, in the context of trust, there is a close relationship 
between SLA metrics and monitoring, and unsurprisingly this is a major 
focus of both cloud monitoring systems (see Fatema et  al. 2014) and 
trustworthy cloud computing research. This research primarily focuses on 
the decomposition of SLA parameters in to low-level system performance 
metrics, mapping these in to KPIs, and then ultimately aggregating these 
KPIs in to some form of aggregated quality indicator that can be used to 
mitigate transactional risk (Sun et al. 2012). A wide range of techniques 
are used to measure and predict cloud service performance (and indeed 
SLA violation). Typical metrics include availability, bandwidth, cost 
(including energy), CPU cycle, service duration, memory, request arrival 
rate, space/storage. Upgrade request frequency as well as other more spe-
cific performance metrics (throughput, response time, execution time 
etc.) are also present, although the importance of these will vary by cloud 
service (Faniyi and Bahsoon 2015). Cloud service providers may also 
include metrics that specifically acknowledge the risk of failure e.g. the 
maximum fraction of SLA violations allowed or penalty rates (Faniyi and 
Bahsoon 2015). Notably, security is an attribute metric that is extremely 
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difficult to measure and is typically based on a qualitative evaluation of 
cloud service provider policies and system features (Shaikh and Sasikumar 
2015). Once such metrics have been extracted from the system, they can 
be shared with consumers to build trust or select cloud service providers. 
An example of the former is the cloud trust label mentioned earlier 
(Emeakaroha et al. 2016; van der Werff et al. 2018). Regarding the latter, 
Garg, et  al. (2013) propose a Service Measurement Index Cloud 
(SMICloud) framework for assisting consumers to identify the most suit-
able cloud service provider to contract with. The SMICloud reviews 
Quality of Service (QoS) requirements and ranks services based on previ-
ous user experiences and performance of services based on KPIs such as 
those previously mentioned. As a final note on cloud performance metrics, 
the determination of the intervals for this data is an essential and some-
what open challenge. This includes the monitoring intervals between the 
collection of low-level metrics and the intervals between the aggregate 
KPIs or high-level quality indicators (Sun et al. 2012). A balance between 
intrusiveness and utility is required to avoid adverse impacts on system 
performance while ensuring the availability of sufficiently time-sensitive 
data to assure accurate SLA measurement (Sun et al. 2012).
7.4  buSIneSS IntegrIty
As discussed in Chap. 1, the trust literature views integrity generally as one 
party’s perception that another party will adhere to a set of acceptable 
principles, act honestly, and fulfil their promises (Mayer et  al. 1995; 
McKnight et al. 2011). This is consistent with the principles laid out by 
Microsoft in Mundie et al. (2002), namely that a vendor, in this case a 
cloud service provider, will behave in a responsive and responsible manner. 
While Mundie et al. (2002) exemplify this behaviour in terms of respon-
siveness to problems that may arise, others expand this, in a technological 
context, to mean that both the service and vendor behave predictably to 
the extent which it is possible to anticipate the system and the service pro-
vider’s behaviour accurately (van der Werff et al. 2018). In one sense, it is 
no surprise that computer scientists have found it difficult to distinguish 
reliability, as an attribute, from integrity.
In computer science literature, integrity is more commonly found as an 
attribute of data and underlying systems rather than the service as a whole 
or the vendor. This is not to say that computer science researchers have 
not explored technological innovations in this regard. In addition to 
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attempts to communicate performance metrics and service measurement 
mechanisms similar to those outlined in Sect. 7.3 above, some researchers 
have focussed on more holistic evaluations of cloud services and service 
providers. As referenced briefly in Chap. 1, feedback systems and reputa-
tion management systems are two approaches explored in research to 
build trust. For example, Baranwal and Vidyarthi (2014) propose a Service 
Measurement Index (SMI) comprising two sets of metrics—application- 
dependent metrics and user-dependent metrics. Notably, in the context of 
Mundie et al. (2002), they include customer support as an application- 
dependent metric. Unlike the SLA-focused measurements discussed ear-
lier, SMI includes reputation metrics based on feedback from users, user 
experience and certification of compliance with industry best practice and 
regulations. In a similar vein, Machhi and Jethava (2016) present a trust 
management framework that measures service provider trustworthiness 
based on feedback, aging factor, and other parameters, while eliminating 
or otherwise discounting unreliable feedback. Indeed a number of works 
have sought to combine SLA metrics with feedback systems as a means of 
communicating trust in the service and vendor (see, for example, Nguyen 
et al. 2010; Habib et al. 2011; Yau and Yin 2011; Garg et al. 2013; Noor, 
et al. 2015; Tang et al. 2017).
While these researchers have sought to explore integrity as a quantifi-
able attribute of a service, business integrity is typically either conflated as 
competence (see for example Chakraborty and Roy 2012), or as a func-
tion of information assurance practices and qualitative audits such as cer-
tification (Chakraborty et al. 2010).
7.5  concluSIon
This chapter presented a discussion on trustworthy computing from three 
perspectives—security and privacy, reliability, and business integrity. 
Computer science research has typically sought to focus on trust as an 
objective attribute of systems, and on occasion cloud service providers, 
that can be ultimately measured, compared and benchmarked. One might 
argue that it is a narrow view of trust that misses the more nuanced aspects 
of the psychological underpinnings of trust. This may go some way to 
explaining why trust remains a significant barrier to cloud computing 
adoption. As a starting point, researchers might consider using the tax-
onomy of trustworthy computing laid out by Microsoft in Mundie et al. 
(2002), i.e. goals, means and execution, to identify gaps in the literature 
and state of the art, and guide future avenues for research. As we move 
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towards the Internet of Things, and greater use of advanced autonomous 
technologies, such as self-learning, self-management, and artificial intelli-
gence, a more inter- and multi-disciplinary approach is needed to ensure 
that all stakeholders benefit fully and fairly from these transformative 
technologies.
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